

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION-PRIVACY ACTS SECTION

SUBJECT: VVAW

FILE NO: HQ 100-448092

SECTION: 44

PAGES REVIEWED: 295

PAGES RELEASED: 267

REFERRALS: 1

EXEMPTIONS: b2, b7C, b7D, b7F

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (100-18353) (C)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] b7C
[REDACTED]
(OO: San Diego)

DATE: 5/4/73

Re Los Angeles nitel to Bureau, 8/18/72, dual captioned, "VVAW, IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES, OO: New York" and "MIREP, OO: Miami".

Referenced teletype identified the subject as the registered owner of an undescribed vehicle bearing California vehicle license number 364 EQB and further indicated that a vehicle bearing this license number was observed by the Texas Department of Public Safety on August 16, 1972, as one of several vehicles forming a Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) caravan, apparently traveling to the Republican National Convention held in Miami, Florida, during August 21 through 24, 1972.

Records of the San Diego Police Department and San Diego County Sheriff's Office contained no information or arrest record for the subject.

b7C Files of the San Diego Merchant's Credit Bureau reviewed on May 2, 1973, reflect the subject has been on file with that agency since September, [REDACTED] uses Social Security Account Number [REDACTED] and is married. Subject's wife is listed as [REDACTED] and all credit ratings reflect the subject's record is satisfactory with no derogatory information.

Records of the California Department of Motor Vehicles, reflect the subject has no record of traffic violations or accidents and contained the following information for the subject:

1 - Bureau (RM)
2 - San Diego
RMC/lpo
(3)

REC-32

246093-EX-101

54 MAY 16 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/94 BY SP6 BJA/DA



SD 100-18353

NAME:
DATE OF BIRTH:
ADDRESS:

[REDACTED]
San Diego, California 92113
(effective March 7, 1972)

CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S
LICENSE NUMBER:

SEX:
HEIGHT:
WEIGHT:
EYES:
HAIR:

[REDACTED]
Male
[REDACTED] pounds
Brown
Black

b7c

San Diego Office indices contain only one reference to the subject which is identical to the above referenced nitel.

Contacts on February 27, 1973, March 20, 1973 and March 27, 1973, with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] confidential sources who are familiar with VVAW activities in the San Diego area, reflect that they have no knowledge of the subject.

b2

b7D

In view of the above, no further investigation is being conducted by San Diego.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TELETYPE

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holmes	_____
Mr. Kinley	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Mr. Bowers	_____
Mr. Herington	_____
Ms. Herwig	_____
Mr. Mintz	_____
Mrs. Neenan	_____

NR 045 LA CODE

1029 PM NITEL 4/27/73 LDM

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

ATTN: INID

CHICAGO

KANSAS CITY

MINNEAPOLIS

FROM LOS ANGELES (100-77703) (P) 3P

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, IS - RA, OO: CHICAGO.

INSTANT DATE A SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT AT VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW) NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, PLACITAS, NEW MEXICO, 4/19-22/73, ALL VVAW REGIONS STATED THEY WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THE INDIANS AT WOUNDED KNEE. JOHN MUSGRAVE, REGIONAL COORDINATOR OF KANSAS AREA STATED HE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS REGION HAD JUST RETURNED FROM TAKING SUPPLIES TO THE INDIANS.

END PAGE ONE

11 MAY 9 1973

2 cc. IS CRIM. INTER. ADM. data deleted
54 MAY 16 1973
F398

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/11/94 BY SP6 JVP

5/1/73

FBI

LA 100-77703

PAGE TWO

SOURCE REPORTED THAT [REDACTED] HAD JUST RETURNED FROM WOUNDED KNEE. SOURCE STATED THE INDIANS WERE IN DESPERATE NEED OF AMMUNITION, WEAPONS, MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND FOOD. AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED [REDACTED] FROM THE ORANGE COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE VVAW IN CALIFORNIA, INQUIRED AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING INTO THE COMPOUND AT WOUNDED KNEE WITH ANY OF THE ABOVE ITEMS. [REDACTED] STATED THAT ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO WANTED TO GET INTO WOUNDED KNEE SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH A MALE NAMED CHRIS (LNU), POSSIBLE TELEPHONE NUMBER 605 348-1025. THIS NUMBER IS THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT HEADQUARTERS, RAPID CITY, SOUTH DAKOTA. [REDACTED] FURTHER STATED THAT INDIVIDUALS COULD GET INTO WOUNDED KNEE ILLEGALLY THROUGH THE COMMUNITY OF ROSEBUD NEAR RAPID CITY. SOURCE ADVISED [REDACTED] SEEMED VERY SERIOUS ABOUT GOING TO WOUNDED KNEE AND MIGHT BRING WEAPONS WITH HIM. [REDACTED] ALSO EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO GO TO WOUNDED KNEE AND BOASTED OF ACCESS TO WEAPONS.

b7C
D

A NURSE NAMED, [REDACTED] STATED THERE WERE FIVE VVAW MEMBERS INSIDE THE COMPOUND AND ELEVEN WHITE MEN BESIDES THE 220 INDIANS. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE PRESENTLY MONITORING ALL FBI RADIO TRANSMISSIONS.

END PAGE TWO

LA 100-77703

PAGE THREE

b7C

[REDACTED] STATED THE INDIANS ARE ASKING FOR VVAW AND BLACK PANTHER PARTY HELP. AN AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD AT WOUNDED KNEE ON 5/1/73 AT WHICH TIME THOUSANDS OF INDIANS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS [REDACTED]

b2
b7D

EN

PLS HOLD ONE

JRM FBIHQ

FOR FOUR

CC: MR. GERHARDT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092) DATE: 5/4/73

FROM : SAC, CHARLOTTE (100-11256)(RM,C)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAW)
IS - REVACT

Re Charlotte airtel to the Bureau, 12/7/72.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM. This LHM is being disseminated locally to Secret Service, Charlotte, North Carolina. Copies of FD-376 are attached.

[REDACTED] mentioned in instant LHM is subject of Charlotte file 100-11672, captioned [REDACTED] SM - VVAW", OO: CE.

b7c [REDACTED] mentioned in instant LHM has been subject of Charlotte file 100-11624, captioned [REDACTED] SM - SUBVERSIVE", OO: CE.

Neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] is on ADEX.

In view of the absence of any activity on the part of the VVAW at Raleigh, N. C., or Jacksonville, N. C., UACB, Charlotte is placing these matters in a closed status.

If any information developed that organizational activities are again resumed, Bureau will be advised and appropriate investigation conducted.

REC-34

- ② - Bureau (Encs. 8)(RM)
- 2 - Chicago (100-11672)(RM)
- 3 - Charlotte (100-11256)
 - (1 - 100-11666)
 - (1 - 100-11729)

LRJ:sjw
(7)

16 MAY 14 1973

57 MAY 24 1973



CE 100-11256

INFORMANTS:

IDENTITY OF SOURCE

LOCATION

b2
b7D
CE [REDACTED] is a well placed source

CE 100-11666-2

CE [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]

CE [REDACTED]

CE [REDACTED] is a well placed source

CE 100-11729-1

CE [REDACTED] is a well placed source

CE 100-11729-3

CE [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]

CE 100-11729-5

CE 100-11256

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

IDENTITY

LOCATION

b2
b7C
CE [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Southern Bell Telephone Co.,
Raleigh, N. C. (deemed advisable)

100-11666-2

b7D
CE [REDACTED] is the NIS, Camp Lejeune,
N. C. (By request)

100-11729-1

CE [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Jacksonville, N. C.
(By request)

100-11729-3



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA
RE: JACKSONVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual or organization believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Threats or actions against persons protected by Secret Service.
2. ☐ Attempts or threats to redress grievances.
3. ☐ Threatening or abusive statement about U. S. or foreign official.
4. ☐ Participation in civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or hostile incidents against foreign diplomatic establishments.
5. ☐ Illegal bombing, bomb-making or other terrorist activity.
6. ☐ Defector from U. S. or indicates desire to defect.
7. ☒ Potentially dangerous because of background, emotional instability or activity in groups engaged in activities inimical to U. S.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available.

Very truly yours,

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

Mr. Talmadge W. Bailey
1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s))
U. S. Secret Service
226 Skeens Building, 4530 Park Road
Charlotte, North Carolina 28209

11-17-94 SP6 GJM



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Charlotte, North Carolina
May 4, 1973

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA
JACKSONVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA
INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

On August 1, 1972, the Raleigh, North Carolina, daily News and Observer newspaper carried an article entitled "VETERANS, VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, ORGANIZING FOR MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION TO MIAMI. FULL OR PART-TIME JOBS. SAVING AMERICA. 772-8972 FOR INFORMATION."

On August 1, 1972, CE [REDACTED] advised that telephone number 772-8972 was listed to the "VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR," 5409 Old Stage Road, Raleigh, North Carolina. b2
b7D

Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) is an anti-war organization organized in 1967 with headquarters in New York City. Its first published objective is "to demand an immediate cessation of fighting and the withdrawal of all American troops from Indo-China."

[REDACTED] - b2, b7D further advised that [REDACTED] had contacted the Southern Bell Telephone Company, Raleigh, North Carolina, and requested a phone in the name of the VVAW. b7C

In an article appearing in the August 4, 1972, issue of the Raleigh, North Carolina, News and Observer, [REDACTED] stated that only seven individuals had responded to the VVAW article on August 1, 1972. [REDACTED] stated the article of August 1, 1972, was to advertise for a volunteer effort to organize area veterans for a "massive demonstration" in Miami during the Republican Convention.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS
NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY
OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY; IT AND
ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE
YOUR AGENCY.

100-443092-2403

11-17-74
sp66g/11A

ENCLOSURE

RE: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA
JACKSONVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

62
b7D On [redacted] stated that a meeting sponsored by the VVAW to discuss demonstration plans for the Republican Convention would occur on August 15, 1972, at the North Carolina State University union building, Raleigh, North Carolina.

On [redacted] stated that [redacted] spoke of getting favorable news media coverage at the Republican Convention without violence. Member of Subject Organization

On October 2, 1972, [redacted] advised that [redacted] leader of the VVAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, was closing the VVAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, due to lack of members or funds.

On December 31, 1972, January 14, 1973, January 26, 1973 and February 8, 1973, [redacted] stated that the VVAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, was not active in the Raleigh, North Carolina, area.

On April 16, 1973, [redacted] stated that the VVAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, was inactive and no information had been received indicating any additional activity.

[redacted] another Government agency that conducts security type investigations, advised that the VVAW had started a chapter in Jacksonville, North Carolina, Post Office Box 301, Jacksonville, North Carolina.

Member of Subject Organization
On February 9, 1973, [redacted] advised that the VVAW, Jacksonville, North Carolina, is, in fact, an underground news sheet printed by [redacted] Jacksonville, North Carolina.

67C On April 5, 1973, [redacted] advised that the VVAW, Jacksonville, North Carolina, is only active through publications and that no other activity exists.

RE: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA
JACKSONVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

b2 [REDACTED] stated on April 18, 1973, that the only activity
b7D of the VVAW, Jacksonville, North Carolina, that is going on
at this time is occasionally a handbill concerning mistreatment
of some military man. [REDACTED] further advised that the VVAW,
Jacksonville, North Carolina, activities are very limited.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Charlotte, North Carolina

May 4, 1973

Title VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA
JACKSONVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY
ACTIVITIES
Reference Memorandum at Charlotte, North Carolina,
dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed
in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALBANY (100-22944) (C)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

DATE: 5/12/73

SM - REVAL

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM reflecting investigation conducted on [REDACTED] who was a member of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Chapter in Binghamton, New York, in 1972.

Investigation conducted reveals that this individual does not pose a direct current danger to the national security and does not meet the current criteria for inclusion in ADEX. In view of this, no further investigation is being conducted and this matter is being closed.

First source referred to in LHM is [REDACTED]
second source is located on Non-Symbol Source Page;
third source is [REDACTED] additional sources are located on Non-Symbol Source page.

2 - Bureau (Enc. 5) ENCLOSURE
1 - Albany
CFH:kms
(3)

NON SYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE
ATTACHED.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/28/95 BY SP6 BJA/UA

REC-53

EX-105

23 MAY 14 1973

FIVE

54 MAY 23 1973



AL 140-2854

NON SYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

Sources referred to in LHM are as follows:

[REDACTED] Officer,
Binghamton, New York Police Department,

[REDACTED]
State University of New York at Binghamton, New York;

[REDACTED]
State University of New York at Binghamton, New York.

b7C
b7D



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Albany, New York

May 12, 1973

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

all

b7c

[REDACTED]
On April 30, 1973, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Binghamton, New York Post Office, made available
the [REDACTED] who
is presently on the [REDACTED] list of the
Binghamton, New York Postal Service, and this folder
contained the following information:

[REDACTED] was born [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] at [REDACTED] has Social
Security Account Number [REDACTED] and presently is
residing at [REDACTED] Binghamton, New York.
He served in the United States Army from [REDACTED]
to [REDACTED] and had Army Serial Number [REDACTED]
He is presently receiving Veterans Administration
disability payments of [REDACTED] per month. His next
of kin is listed as his mother, Mrs. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] New York.

He graduated from [REDACTED] High
School, Brooklyn, New York in June, 1966, attended
State University of New York, [REDACTED] in
New York City from September, [REDACTED] to June, [REDACTED] and
has been a student at the State University of New
York, Binghamton, New York from September, [REDACTED] to
the present time. He listed for character references
on his application for employment at the [REDACTED]
the following three individuals:

This document contains neither recommendations
nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the
FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are
not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/28/95 BY SP6/391/UA

RE: [REDACTED]

New York; [REDACTED]

Binghamton, **all b7c**

New York; [REDACTED]

New York. [REDACTED]

Binghamton,

The application reflects the following description:

Height:

Weight:

Eyes:

Hair:

Previous Employments:

[REDACTED] tall

[REDACTED] pounds

Blue

[REDACTED]

In [REDACTED] New York
in the summer of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Park Avenue, New
York, in [REDACTED] to
[REDACTED] and again in [REDACTED]

The current Student Directory at the Registrar's Office, State University of New York at Binghamton, New York, reflects that [REDACTED] is presently in the [REDACTED] division at the University and has been a student there since [REDACTED]. His box number is shown as [REDACTED].

On June 9, 1972, a confidential source advised that included on a list of names of coordinators for the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in the United States was the name [REDACTED] Binghamton, New York, Box [REDACTED] Binghamton, New York, telephone number 607-[REDACTED].

RE: [REDACTED] b7C

The Vietnam Veterans Against the War is a national organization composed primarily of veterans of the war in Vietnam that has organized and participated in numerous demonstrations against the war in Vietnam during 1970-72, including the seizure of the Statue of Liberty, New York City, and the occupation of the Betsy Ross House, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in December, 1971. Six members of the VVAW were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, Tallahassee, Florida, July, 1972, on charges of conspiracy to violate the Federal Antiriot Law.

On May 27, 1972, the local daily newspaper published in Binghamton, New York, contained an article concerning the Memorial Day Parade scheduled for May 29, 1972, in the City and stated that a small group of veterans from the Vietnam War, who were opposed to the Vietnam War, had been denied permission to join the Memorial Day Parade. The article reflected that this small group of men referred to themselves as the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. The newspaper reported on May 30, 1972, that the parade was held as scheduled and six individuals appeared at the parade dressed in fatigue clothes and claimed they were opposed to American involvement in the Vietnam War. These individuals stood by the County Building in downtown Binghamton, New York during the parade holding a wooden box supposed to be a coffin and signifying their opposition to the Vietnam War. No incidents occurred during this parade.

b7C [REDACTED] A second confidential source advised that [REDACTED] a student at the State University of New York at Binghamton, was one of the six individuals participating in this incident, of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War group.

RE: [REDACTED] b7C

During the period of May 1, through 11, 1972, several demonstrations were held at the Federal Building in Binghamton, New York, primarily by students from the State University of New York at Binghamton, opposing the increased bombing by the United States in the Vietnam War. During this period of time, Binghamton, New York Police arrested 215 individuals, charging them with disorderly conduct, when these individuals attempted to block the entrances to the Federal Building on several different days. Subsequently, these individuals either pled guilty or were convicted of disorderly conduct in City Court and the vast majority of them were fined \$50.00. There was no violence involved during the course of these demonstrations.

The files of the Records Office, Binghamton, New York Police Department, as checked on May 2, 1973, reflected that [REDACTED], born [REDACTED], a student, with a permanent home address of [REDACTED] Brooklyn, New York, was arrested on [REDACTED] charge with disorderly conduct. On [REDACTED] he was found guilty after trial in City Court, and on [REDACTED] he paid a \$50.00 fine. No additional record was located concerning this individual in the files of the Binghamton Police Department.

b7C
The records of the Broome County Sheriff's Office, Binghamton, New York, were checked on May 2, 1973, and it was determined that the same information concerning the disorderly conduct arrest of [REDACTED] appeared in these files. It is to be noted that most of the 215 individuals arrested during this period were processed through the Broome County Sheriff's Office and the record of the disorderly conduct arrest appears there.

On May 2, 1973, it was determined that there is no record of [REDACTED] in the files of the Triple Cities Credit Bureau, Binghamton, New York.

RE: [REDACTED] b7c

During the period of April 30, 1973 to May 4, 1973, three confidential sources, who are in a position to furnish information concerning subversive type activities at the State University of New York at Binghamton, New York, were contacted and advised they never heard of [REDACTED] and there was no activity on his part on the campus of the State University of New York at Binghamton.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Albany, New York
May 12, 1973

Title

[REDACTED]

b7c

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY
ACTIVITY

Reference Albany memorandum dated and
captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed
in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

DATE: MAY 7 1973

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-50772)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION
IS - RA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/96 BY SP7C/96

Enclosed for the Bureau are four copies of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War National Steering Committee Meeting Report, Placitas, New Mexico, April 19 to 23, 1972, and one copy for all receiving offices.

Also enclosed for the Bureau are four copies of a Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization, "Position Paper on Amnesty".

Copies of above were furnished by [redacted] on May 7, 1973

- ENCLOSURE (em)
- 2 - Bureau (Encl. 5)
 - 2 - Albany (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Albuquerque (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Alexandria (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Anchorage (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Atlanta (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Baltimore (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Birmingham (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Boston (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Buffalo (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Butte (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Charlotte (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Cincinnati (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Cleveland (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Columbia (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Dallas (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Denver (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Detroit (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - El Paso (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Honolulu (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Houston (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Indianapolis (Encl. 1)
 - 2 - Jackson (Encl. 1)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/26/94 BY SP3 FCR/CA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/26/94 BY SP3 FCR/CA

REC-40

ST-112

2 MAY 11 1973

Copies continued on page 2

CLASS. & EXT. BY 10320 AUK/RWS
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 (2)
DATE OF REVIEW 5/7/93
#37,206 SPI gsk/make alm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

53 JUN 8 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly from Payroll Savings Plan 11-80 55704

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copies continued from page 1:

- 2 - Jacksonville (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Kansas City (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Knoxville (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Las Vegas (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Little Rock (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Los Angeles (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Louisville (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Memphis (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Miami (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Milwaukee (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Minneapolis (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Mobile (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Newark (Encl. 1)
- 2 - New Haven (Encl. 1)
- 2 - New Orleans (Encl. 1)
- 2 - New York City (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Norfolk (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Oklahoma City (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Omaha (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Philadelphia (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Phoenix (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Pittsburgh (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Portland (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Richmond (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Sacramento (Encl. 1)
- 2 - St. Louis (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Salt Lake City (Encl. 1)
- 2 - San Antonio (Encl. 1)
- 2 - San Diego (Encl. 1)
- 2 - San Francisco (Encl. 1)
- 2 - San Juan (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Savannah (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Seattle (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Springfield (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Tampa (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Washington Field (Encl. 1)
- 2 - Chicago

GGB/d11
(120)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

5-17, 197

- ① ☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☒ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention **b7C**
② ☒ Return to **9084L** **b7C**
Supervisor Room

Type of References Requested:

- ☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☒ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- ☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject **b7C**
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date **5/17** Searcher Initials **215**

Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

100-448691-118

91-25509-5

11/17/94 **5063/1114**

NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING
PLACITAS, NEW MEXICO
APRIL 14 - APRIL 23, 1973

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ENCLOSURE

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NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING
PLACITAS, NEW MEXICO
APRIL 19 - APRIL 22, 1971

REGIONS PRESENT: California/Nevada; New Mexico/Arizona; Colorado/Utah; Wyoming; Kansas/W. Missouri; S. Illinois/E. Missouri; N. Illinois/Iowa; Louisiana; Florida; Wisconsin/Minnesota; New York; Connecticut/Rhode Island; New England; Arkansas/Oklahoma; Oregon (proxy); Ohio/Indiana/Kentucky; Alabama/Mississippi (proxy).

ROUND ROBIN REPORTS

New Mexico: The region has not been very active because most of the effort has been spent in preparation for the National Steering Committee Meeting. They have, however, been mobilizing support for the struggle at Wounded Knee.

Colorado: The region now has two chapters. The Denver chapter has joined an anti-imperialist coalition and is doing political education work around imperialism. The regional office was moved because VVAW was evicted as a result of their support for Wounded Knee. The regional newspaper, Hoa High, has been published since the last NSCM, and will soon be published again.

Kansas/Western Missouri: Nebraska and South Dakota have been annexed to this region because of the lack of activity within those states. These states will now be coordinated through the Kansas City office. The region gathered supplies for Wounded Knee and conducted a supply convoy to Rapid City, S. Dak. VVAW has been working with AIM in Kansas and are also supporting the Pottawatomie Prairie Band Indian Tribe near St. Mary's, Kansas in their battle for land. On April 7th, the region made another supply convoy to Cairo, Illinois and will be going to Cairo again on June 16th for the 4th Annual National Solidarity Day. Cairo is in desperate need of supplies because of the recent flooding. Cairo is also starting a liberation school for the black community and they need people to work in the school this summer. Specifically, Cairo needs people who can teach First Aid, Reading and Math. They want volunteers to teach -- not guilt-ridden folks or missionaries. The regional newspaper, Veteran's Voice, has been published twice since the last NSCM, but the region is out of money right now and don't know when the paper will be out again.

Southern Illinois/Eastern Missouri: St. Louis sent supplies and people to Rapid City for Wounded Knee. The Military Law Project is still going strong in St. Louis and people should utilize this project. The main priority in St. Louis is the establishment of a coffee house which is to offer cultural and political alternatives for the community. Out of this house, VVAW hopes to begin a food co-op. The region is also working on the charging of discharged. St. Louis has been working closely with the United Front and Cairo. Cairo is trying to start chicken farm, and they want to use St. Louis VVAW as a distribution point for eggs.

Northern Illinois/Iowa: The regional office has been moved from Chicago to DeKalb and they are now working in a collective for the regional liberation struggle.

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Chicago chapter is working on the DeMau Mau defense committee and is also busy selling Winter Soldier newspapers on the streets. They sold over 400 copies of the first edition. The Elgin chapter has advertised that it will show on the weekend, they need people to order these shows. The chapter does not have enough money to get the slides out of the laboratory, so people should send payment for the show when they order. If chapters have already ordered the show, please send them the money now. This will facilitate Elgin in getting the slides.

Texas: Northern Texas is lacking in activity, but VVAW is gaining strength at the military bases. Houston is conducting a petitioning campaign for arms. This chapter is also in the process of suing the federal government in trying to get office space in the federal building because other veterans' organizations have office space there.

Louisiana: The membership in Louisiana is falling off but the people who are staying are becoming more political. They are trying to set up a communal farm and a food co-op which will also serve as a self-help program for veterans. They will work in the food co-op which will help with their food bills and give them a small income. They hope that this will help in retaining membership as many members have become inactive because they have to get jobs in order to survive.

Florida: There are seven chapters now active in Florida. Those in the southern part of the state have been working with the United Farm Workers and all of the chapters have been gathering supplies for Wounded Knee. The Tampa chapter is working on the boycott of A&P with UFWOC. The Tallahassee chapter has been talking to the State Legislature for the purpose of increasing veterans benefits, and Florida has also been lobbying for the Equal Rights Amendment. The state is beginning to organize around the raising of money for Bach Mai Hospital. The regional office has moved from Gainesville to Ft. Lauderdale and is working with a regional steering committee for leadership rather than with one coordinator. Florida has a booklet first aid course which deals specifically with trauma injuries (i.e. knife wounds, gun-shot wounds). This can be received upon request by the regions.

Wisconsin/Minnesota: The Milwaukee food co-op is working excellently. It has grown from 5 family units to 22 units and all but 5 of these units are families within the community. This is aiding the chapter to broaden their base. A mechanics co-op is also being established in Milwaukee. The position of the regional coordinator was abolished and leadership is now being provided by a collective. The region has been gathering supplies and support for Wounded Knee but have had some problems working with AIM. Milwaukee has been making contact with the local National Guard unit and is now in the process of planning a week-end camp-out with some of the Guardsmen. The library collected at the PVS Clearing House is growing rapidly. The library is presently out of circulation because all of the articles are being transferred to stenocards so that they can be re-produced more cheaply. The cost of the library is \$6.00 and can be ordered any time and will be sent out as soon as possible. A bibliography will be included with the library and the bibliography should be re-printed and added to the library.

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that people can keep their libraries up-to-date. An historical event was the establishment of a PVS rap group within the Waupun State Prison.

New York: The regional office has been moved from New York to Buffalo. The region has been busy collecting supplies and support for Wounded Knee and they have also been involved in raising funds for Gainesville. Buffalo has been printing a newspaper, Column Left, and hope that this will be coming out regularly, but as always, the publication is contingent upon funds. New York VVAW has been working hard to kill a state bill proposing that ROTC be offered in high schools. This bill was recently tabled in the Legislature. The region was involved in protesting the Home With Honor Parade for the returning P.O.W.'s. VVAW made their presence affectively noticeable in combatting this PR garbage.

Connecticut/Rhode Island: There are now 9 chapters within this region and most of them are fairly active because of the revival which occurred around January 20th. Some of the chapters are getting into union work. The region was active in supporting the Jake Jacobsen trial. Jake was falsely accused of carrying dangerous weapons, but the trial recently ended in a victory and acquittal for Jake. The region has had problems with informers and some of the chapter and regional files have been ripped off.

New England: The regional collective hasn't been working well because of personality problems so they have recently begun to function with two regional coordinators. People within this region have been organizing in Vermont and Maine and will soon begin to work in New Hampshire. All three of these states were previously inactive. The region is planning to conduct a regional amnesty conference sometime in May.

Arkansas/Oklahoma: Nothing is going on in this region. Any information on this region with regard to names of people who might be interested in organizing is much needed.

California: There are 10 active chapters in California and interest has been picking up, thanks to the return of the P.O.W.'s. Los Angeles has been busy serving as a Clearing House for Operation County Fair, and some of the members have also been involved in an Anti-Police Brutality Coalition in Watts. Other projects within the region are PVS rap groups, working on discharge upgrading, an active women's group in San Francisco, debating on amnesty, Indochina medical programs of all kinds, and education programs around the peace treaty. The region has been working with other veteran's organizations on referral programs rather than counseling for vets. The L.A. office has the video tapes on the Last Patrol, and these will be available to regions at cost. The region also is selling bracelets bearing the name of a political prisoner held by the Thieu regime. These bracelets sell for \$1.25 each, or 75¢ each for orders of 100. The region sent supplies to Wounded Knee but they were mysteriously confiscated on the Nevada border and never reached their destination. The Gary Lawton restaurant has been moved to Riverside and is to begin on May 14th. The defense committee is in desperate need of funds. Money should be sent to: P.O. Box 5134, San Bernardino 92412.

GAINESVILLE REPORT

The next (and hopefully last) pre-trial hearing will be on April 23-25 in Gainesville. Judge Arnow will be ruling on three motions presented by the defense. Two of these motions are precedent-setting and deal with the make-up of the grand jury and with electronic surveillance on defendants and lawyers. It is expected that the gag rule will be enforced upon the defendants at this pre-trial hearing (it was enforced on the attorneys at the last hearing). It looks fairly certain that the trial will be held in Gainesville and we hope to have the date of the trial set at the April hearing. The defense committee is getting together bumper-stickers, leaflets, and buttons which will soon be available to the chapters. Regions will be receiving samples and prices shortly. Judging from past defense costs, it has been estimated that the defense committee will need \$175,000 for trial costs. Chapters and regions should continue in their fund raising efforts and set up speaking engagements for the defendants, benefit concerts, etc. Besides money, the defense needs affidavits from anyone who has been contacted by the FBI for purposes of showing the extent of the harassment from the federal government. These affidavits should be sent to Gainesville immediately.

Addition to the Minutes: The trial date has been set for July 17th, in Gainesville.

NATIONAL OFFICE REPORT

Internal Report: The national office has 15 films which are available for the chapters to use. These will be available upon request. A list of resource materials is being put together and will be sent to the chapters soon. The office needs in-input from the chapters and regions for the newsletter. As it now stands, the regional reports are the shortest section of the newsletter. National knows that there is activity going on which should be gotten out in the newsletters, but this information must first be submitted to the office. Also, the office needs information from all chapters who have programs. There is a lack of unity in the programs which are going on around the country, and if information on these programs was submitted to the national office, the programs could be better coordinated and become more cohesive.

Incorporation: National is now working on getting the organization incorporated. If regions wish to incorporate within their respective states, it is vitally important that offices must keep good books on all money. If your region covers more area than one state, you may incorporate in your "base" state and get a statement of authority to operate under the corporate name in other states. Once again, all financial reports are vitally important because the incorporated state will be held responsible for all of the state/chapter books. When incorporating, your corporate name should be the name of your state followed by Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization, i.e. New York VVAW/WSO.

External Reports: We now have communication with over 200 foreign organizations. We are looked up to as a credible organization by these international groups and people. We should always remember that we are tied into an international struggle and people should identify with this idea.

Structure: The national office is doing very well and is functioning extremely well. The office is still young, there is a great deal of growth, but the office has succeeded in creating a great deal of unity.

of the collective are involved in the decision-making, but individuals are selected to handle specific projects or areas of interest (i.e. Wounded Knee, Aminogty). By working in this collective manner, commitments have been fulfilled with more success. It is important that all members of the collective must be able to work together, as well as live together. Because of this, the national office is suggesting that when there is turn-over in the office (both of coordinators and staff) the collective should have something to say about who is to join the collective. This will facilitate the ability of the collective to work well and effectively together.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Organization: The major weaknesses of VVAW as seen by the national office include the lack of communication within the organization. Also, VVAW is vulnerable to political attack and oppression. This weakness should be obvious after the attack which was made upon us in Gainesville, as well as all of the other numerous hurts which have come down on VVAW members throughout the country. Another weakness is that there is a lack of political education present throughout the country. It is vitally important that our membership be educated as to the nature of our struggle, because only in this way will we be able to educate the public. Another problem is that there is a lack of consistency in programs on a national level. Our programs must be coordinated in order to achieve the maximum of effectiveness. Also, by better coordination, we can more readily learn from our mistakes and our successes. We have not spent the time that we should building programs that will build the organization. Specifically, we have not paid attention to building VVAW within our communities. It is necessary that we establish programs and project which will be relevant to people's daily lives. Only by doing this will be able to broaden our base and increase our relations with the people. A final weakness of VVAW is that we have often ignored the importance of fund-raising. It should be obvious that we need money in order to build strong and on-going programs. Consistent fund-raising programs would provide the optimum of effectiveness.

One of the major strengths of VVAW is that we are the only mass organization with a base on the national level, and with a base that is being maintained. Our appeal to specific elements of this society has remained constant. The class base of our organization lies primarily in the fact that we are strong with the working class and the poor. This is the area in which our struggle lies, and this base must be maintained in order to ensure our survival and growth. Another strength of VVAW is that the membership has an understanding of the necessity of on-going struggle. We understand that the problems with this country are not going to be solved in the immediate future, but that we have years of very difficult work ahead of us. We must continue with this understanding of protracted struggle because in it lies our ability to build. Another strength of VVAW is our non-sectarian nature. As an organization, we maintain unity under a common political program which is not exclusive, and this enables to broaden our base. A final strength is that VVAW has validity as an organization. Unlike anti-war groups, VVAW is still viable and very much alive, and this credibility of ours is recognized by other organizations inside and outside of the United States. This fact should always be remembered by our membership. Finally, it should be noted by all that our survival is dependent upon our ability to build and grow, to broaden our base, and to continue in our relations with the oppressed peoples of this country and of others.

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RESIGNATION OF STEVE HAWKINS

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

At this time I would like to officially submit my resignation from national office. I regret that I cannot come and present it in person but it seems most logical for all the national collective to be present at this meeting that will continue to be in the national office. It is necessary for some one to watch the office, phone and house during the meeting anyway.

My reasons for leaving are several. Most of all, I need a rest. Also I have made several prior commitments which are demanding my presence sooner than I had anticipated. I've come to the conclusion that having the national office in one's home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, isn't the best situation for my personal and political development as this has meant a total annihilation of personal life and privacy.

In all honesty I must say that the past 9 months have been the most productive in my life. I will never consider myself outside of VVAW or the movement, and will always be proud to be a member of VVAW.

I don't know how to summarize in a brief way the progress that I have seen in this office. All I can say is look at the quality and quantity of the internal and public (newspaper) communications now being regularly produced from the national collective, and judge for yourself. I have total confidence in the present collective and ask everyone to continue to give them your full support.

In conclusion, let me encourage you all to keep struggling, because after we have won our liberation and self-determination like the Indochinese have, we will then fully understand the importance of our present work. The better we do our organizing ground work now, the easier and sooner the people's victory will be.

All my love and solidarity,

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION ~~Steve~~ Hawkins

OPERATION COUNTY FAIR

The logistics of the establishment of the clinic are more difficult than was anticipated, but progress is being made. For example, blue-prints are there and ready to go -- all we need is money and building materials. Communications have been poor, so people should re-read the proposal on Operation County Fair which came out of the Chicago NSCM and stay within the guidelines of that proposal. The Los Angeles office is a Clearing House for the clinic and it is imperative that they know what the regions are doing with regard to what items have been collected. The L. A. office will then compile this information and get it back out to the regions so that everyone can know what we need for the clinic. Regions should consider the possibilities of putting together grant proposals for money and supplies for the clinic. It is vital to build a financial base for the building and operation of the project and grants are a feasible means of getting funds. The people in L.A. and Alabama are now considering putting together a brochure with information on the clinic which can be distributed to interested persons. The Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Clinic has already been incorporated and is tax-exempt. They are trying to get tax-deductable status.

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Representatives from the People's Farm were present at the NSCM and expressed their need for an administrator qualified to run the clinic. Also, anyone willing to work on the Farm and who is qualified will be welcome. Regions should screen people wanting to go to Alabama before sending them, and you should make sure that the people sent will be able to stay for an extended period of time, and are willing to work diligently.

1st CASUALTY PRESS

If regions have not received copies of Free Fire Zone, they should check with 1st Casualty Press because several books were returned after mailing. The 3rd book of the series is over half completed. It is entitled Post Mortum and is a retrospective examination of the war. It will contain poems, stories and essays. Material for this book will be accepted up until June 1. All debts have been wiped off the 1st Casualty books and chapters ordering from this point on should send payment along with their order.

* * * * *

OLD BUSINESS

OBJECTIVE CHANGES

Objective #2: We voted on the two proposed objective changes which read as follows:

To demand the immediate termination of all other operations by the United States government, its agencies, and American business interests that are designed to suppress the rightful struggles for liberation and self-determination of the peoples of the earth. This includes the maintenance of dictatorial governments, economic domination, and the theft of the natural resources of other countries. The United States should make reparations in a project acceptable to the Indochinese for all of the damage done by the United States.

The second proposed objective change reads as follows:

To demand the immediate termination of all other operations by the United States government, its agencies, and American business interests that are designed to suppress the rightful struggle for liberation and self-determination of peoples inside and outside of the United States. . . . (the remainder of the objective would remain the same as before).

Neither of these proposed objective changes received a 2/3 majority vote: 29 in favor of "peoples of the earth", 25 for no change in the objective, 20 in favor of "people inside and outside of the U.S." and there were 10 abstention votes. Because of this, the objective will remain as it has been in the past:

To demand the immediate termination of all other operations by the United States government, its agencies, and American business interests that are designed to suppress the rightful struggles for liberation and self-determination of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This includes the

maintenance of dictatorial governments, economic domination, and the theft of the natural resources of other countries. The United States should make reparations in a program acceptable to the Indonesians for all of the damage done by the United States.

Objective #3: The proposed objective change reads as follows:

To join in the struggle of all active-duty servicemen, National Guardsmen, and Reservists for those rights guaranteed under the U. S. Constitution and Bill of Rights presently denied under the UCMJ. G.I.'s are exploited and their rights violated both in the U. S. and overseas to ensure the U. S. 's position in the economic world, to suppress wars of liberation, to break strikes and to carry out those policies that the ruling class deems necessary for its interests. G.I.'s control the means of destruction in the military; just as working people control the means of production in a civilian society. G.I.'s have a long and rich history of struggle against oppression; the accomplishments of that struggle cannot be ignored.

This proposed objective change was defeated: 10-yes; 52-1/2-no; 17-1/2 abst. Because of this failure to ratify the objective change, the objective will remain as it has been in the past:

To demand that all active-duty servicemen and women, Reservists and National Guardsmen be afforded the same rights that are guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights that are presently denied by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. We are appalled that our active-duty G.I.'s are treated as less than first class citizens. We endorse the efforts of our active-duty sisters and brothers in their struggle to democratize the military.

Objective #7 and the Third World Workshop: After receiving in-put from Third World communities with regard to the issue of bussing, the NSC voted not to support two-way bussing as a part of organizational policy. We voted on a portion of the Third World Workshop held in Chicago which reads:

Whereas VVAW has adopted as one of its primary national objectives an end to racism in all forms, and whereas VVAW recognizes the existence of institutionalized racism in the American school system, VVAW supports the use of two-way bussing, including across district lines, as one tool, admittedly imperfect, for achieving racial and educational equality.

This proposed objective change was defeated with a vote: 8-1/2-yes; 54-1/2-no; 17-abst.

PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH TROOPS

The following groups have not been identified as certain political organizations (specifically the Red Army, the Black Panther Party, the National Black Action Coalition (NT-BA), the National Black Alliance (NBA), the National Black

Committee (SMC), and the Women's National ~~Political~~ Action Coalition (WNAC), the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), and their affiliates Student's for a Democratic Society (SDS), and Workers Action Movement (WAM); Workers World and their affiliates Youth Against War and Fascism (YAWF), and American Servicemen's Union (ASU) engage in attempts to split or co-opt other organizations in order to achieve their goals.

- That in the past these attacks have been made upon VVAW as SWP attacks upon the regions of Illinois, New York, California, Ohio, Texas, New England, Missouri, and Colorado, etc.

- That in the past PLP has attacked California, Texas, New England, Florida, and New York.

- That in the past Workers World through their affiliates YAWF and ASU have directed attacks against Illinois, New York, etc.

- That none of these organizations support the Vietnamese people in their struggle for liberation and self-determination, the 7-point proposal of the PRG, or the 9-point agreement reached by the U. S., the DRV, and the PRG:

We resolve the following:

- That VVAW chapters, be they local, regional, or national, shall not form any alliances with any of the above mentioned organizations and parties specifically, and any other parties and organizations which by nature use means of co-optation or splitting tactics on other organizations to obtain their objectives;

- That VVAW cadre, be they local, regional, or national, shall not place the objectives of other political organizations to which they may belong before the objectives of VVAW;

- That all members of VVAW, after sufficient time for education, must support the Vietnamese people, the 7-point proposal of the PRG, and the 9-point accords of Oct., 1972; and that failure to do so is grounds for expulsion from VVAW.

This proposal was passed with a vote of 40-yes; 15-no; 75-~~absent~~. The guidelines set forth in this proposal are now organizational policy and must be strictly adhered to.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

FARRY ROMO'S RE-ELECTION:

Farry's one year term in the national office expired at this NSCM. He was unanimously elected to another year term as a national coordinator.

NOMINATIONS FOR NATIONAL COORDINATOR

In lieu of Steve Hawkins' resignation from the national office, nominations were taken for a coordinator to fill the vacant position. Those nominated were: John Musgrave (Kansas/M. Missouri); Joe Hirsch (New York); and Rich Bengert (E. Missouri/S. Illinois). According to the policy established in Palo Alto, these nominees have until one month prior to the next NSCM to decide whether or not they wish to be considered for election. They will send out their decision prior to the next NSCM, and those remaining in nomination will be voted on at the August NSCM.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

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WINTER SOLDIER INVESTIGATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The WSI on Nukes was brought up because there has been so little in-put on this investigation which was proposed and passed at the Chicago NSCM meeting. People should look at this investigation as a long-range project of research and exposure. The National Office wants to talk to people who have any sort of knowledge on nuclear weapons of any kind and anywhere. Specifically, they need to talk to people who have had experience with Nukes. Steve Hawkins and Ed Franzen have been doing most of the research on nuclear weapons, and since both of these members of the national collective will be leaving, another member of the collective will be taking over this research (name will later be published in the newsletter).

FUTURE OF VVAW

We discussed the workshop report on the Future of VVAW which came out of the Chicago meeting. The sections of this workshop report were voted on one-by-one. Because few of the parts of the proposal received a 2/3 majority vote, the entire workshop report was tabled for discussion and revision within another workshop. The conclusions and votes of this workshop will be included with the rest of the workshop reports.

* * * * *

WORKSHOP REPORTS

FUTURE OF VVAW WORKSHOP

The following is the finalized and accepted form of the restructuring of the organization. The votes will be included under specific sections, but it should be noted at the outset that the following has all been proposed and passed and is now policy for the organization.

- I. The Survival of VVAW -- concerning immediate action by each chapter.
 1. Education on the organization: a. structure; b. functions; c. history
 2. Find out the members' interests: a. What should VVAW be concentrating on? b. What will they (members) themselves work on? c. What resources and skills do they possess?
 3. On-going education around the ten objectives.
 4. Education of the war and imperialism.
 5. Combination of friendship and a sense of common goals and purpose. (A balance between these should lead to the optimum of effective working!)
- II. Internal Restructuring -- original stages
 1. a. The National Steering Committee is empowered to determine whether or not a region is non-functional.
 - b. The National Steering Committee is empowered to annex weak or non-functional regions to other regions, and this is to be done on a case-by-case basis.
(This section was passed with a vote of 51-1/2-yes; 11-1/2-no; 5 abst.)
 2. Each region should examine their own area and determine the strategy which will be the most successful in order to more effectively dominate that region under their individual circumstances. This strategy should

be submitted to the national office.

(This section was passed with a vote of: 57-1/2-yes; 12-1/2-no; 5 abst.)

3. This committee suggests that collectivization would be the optimum of effective organization within VVAW on all levels.

III. Transitional Period -- suggestion for restructuring VVAW internally

1. The main function of the regional coordinator is to make sure that chapters are actually strong, functioning chapters. This will prevent the problem of cooptation and the need to incorporate regions. A list of the functioning chapters should be sent to the national office with a synopsis of strengths and weaknesses of that chapter.

2. The National Office will have direct contact with the chapters. All information now sent to the regional coordinator will, in the future, be sent to the chapters.

(The vote on this section is: 41-yes; 12-no; 15 abst.)

3. The national office staff will be increased and expanded so that more time can be devoted to specific areas.

4. A. The National Steering Committee is empowered to develop and implement organization training programs.
 1. These training programs may be implemented on a national level with various regions participating.
 2. These training programs may also be implemented on a regional level.
- B. National Organizers and national representatives are authorized to travel throughout the organization for purposes of internal liaison. Internal liaison is defined as (1) coordination of national VVAW activities and programs, (2) support of regular VVAW activities and programs as requested, and (3) evaluation and assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of VVAW.
- C. National organizers are authorized to travel and organize in non-functioning regions (as determined by the National Steering Committee).
- D. Regional coordinators/members of the Regional Steering Committee have the obligation and responsibility of traveling as regularly as is practical, throughout their regions to organize and co-ordinate all VVAW activities.

(All of the above section #4 was unanimously accepted. This entire section was discussed and voted on during New Business, but is included here for purposes of clarification).

5. Member: A member is one who works for and supports the objectives of the organization.

Chapter: A chapter is a group of people who continue to work on a day-to-day basis for the objectives, and in accordance with national policy and structure. The size of a chapter should be determined so that the chapter is capable of working in a viable way to be effective within the population of a given area.

A chapter must be accredited by the region.

Each chapter must have a P.O. Box where possible and suitable so that problems with transient addresses can be alleviated. If a chapter has a permanent office, it need not have a P.O. box.

(All of the above was unanimously accepted).

- IV. Winter Soldier proposal: That we do in fact accept "Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization" name with no limit on either name being dropped and with the idea that we will in the future examine our political situation domestically and abroad to determine that this name is appropriate.
- (This proposal was passed with a vote of: 43-yes; 12-no; 15 abst.)

All of the above workshop report is now in effect as organizational policy and is to be immediately and strictly followed.

GAINESVILLE NATIONAL ACTION WORKSHOP

It was decided at the Chicago Steering Committee Meeting that a national action would be held by VVAW during the trial of the Gainesville 8. This workshop drew up a proposed scenario for the action that was accepted by the NSC at the meeting held in Placitas. Given the numerous uncertainties of the trial -- how long the trial will last, how long it will take to select a jury, etc. -- it was decided by the workshop that what would be proposed would be a general planning concept that would be implemented by the Gainesville collective actually planning and implementing the action in light of the realities of the situation, i.e. what is possible and most logical. This means that the following general scenario must remain flexible. It is a concept of the Gainesville action which the Gainesville collective will implement as closely as possible given the conditions that they have to deal with.

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Parade permits for the action have been obtained.
2. Campsites have been obtained for the action in Gainesville. These sites are on private property and can accommodate a very large number of people.
3. As these campsites are on private property, and in view of the necessity for security precautions, no one will get on the campsite without the approval of VVAW security.
4. Medical and Legal support personnel have already been arranged for.
5. Sensitivity sessions have and will be held with the Gainesville Police. Indications are that things will proceed smoothly in this respect. The Gainesville Police Department has agreed to allow VVAW to handle its own security problems and not to interfere unless requested by us to do so.
6. Additional equipment which is needed: CB radios, camping gear, food, medical supplies.
7. People will be able to go to the Eugene Chitto People's Farm to work before or after the action if they so desire.
8. Above all, it is important that everybody understand that this will be a completely LEGAL demonstration.

PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS

- Since security precautions obviously must be maintained throughout the trial, the following guidelines on security were set up:

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1. Each region is responsible for organizing its own contingent.
2. Each member of a regional contingent must come with identification.
3. Each region is responsible for the security of its own contingent.
4. Each contingent will abide by VVAW/WSO organizational discipline for this action.
5. Regions can take whomever they decide on to the demonstration, but all participants must understand that this is a VVAW demonstration and that they will need to abide by the collective decisions made by VVAW/WSO with regard to the demonstration.
6. No one will participate in the demonstration as a result of a unilateral decision.
7. Lists of names of those participating in the demonstration will be prepared by each region and taken with the contingent to Gainesville.
8. PE will be done around the need for security and how it will be implemented. This will be done within the regions for each contingent.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE GAINESVILLE ACTION

The following are some of the ideas which resulted from the workshop. Nothing has been definitely decided upon, but these are some of the suggestions made.

The basic thrust of the demonstration will be that of combatting political repression within the U. S. Since the U. S. is not, in fact, a democracy, it must necessarily increase its repression of political dissent within the nation as people begin fighting for their rights. In attempts to do this, we see the perversion of the system of "Justice" through the witch hunts of the Grand Jury System as witnessed in the Gainesville 8 Trial, in the Harrisburg Trial, etc. The point of all this being to communicate to people that they must resist this repression or they will be enslaved by it. Resistance must be carried out through unified action. In this way we will be able to defeat our repression. The basic themes and slogans that would be used for the action would center around the following: trying people for "crimes" of peace rather than crimes of war; parallels of Gainesville with the whole issue of amnesty; parallels with the struggle in Wounded Knee; antecedents of our heritage of the American Revolution and repeated examples of political repression throughout American history: Don't Tread On Me; Struggle - Don't Be Afraid; Unity, Struggle, Victory!

Overall, we will try to de-emphasize the defendants as much as possible and concentrate on the issues involved.

GENERAL IDEAS FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ACTION SCENARIO

holding a grand jury play
holding a court house vigil or honor guard
articles in Winter Soldier, regional newspapers and newsletters
local and regional support actions around the country
hanging in effigy of the grand jury system
organized singing
candlelight marches
postering
guerrilla theater
people's assemblies/ teach-ins on Gainesville and political repression

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holding of a Vietnamese meal
WSI's on Grand Juries
marches
picketing
showing movies on vehicles around the country -- hopefully, a slide show will be developed for this purpose
leafletting
speaking engagements
communal, non-denominational services

GENERAL SCENARIO

- A. Building demonstrations are to be held in regions prior to the Gainesville action. This will build support for the Gainesville 8, build contingents to go to Florida for the national action, and do PE on understanding the requirements for participation in the action (such as security, discipline, etc.)
- B. While the Gainesville action itself is going on, those people in VVAW/WSO who are unable to go to Florida will hold simultaneous actions in their respective regions. Regions should try and coordinate these actions as closely as possible with the Gainesville planning collective.
- C. Gainesville Action

I. Action for the beginning of the Trial

Length: 5-7 days, depending on the planning requirements and situation with the trial

Time: Starting as closely as possible with the 1st day of the trial

Primary Focus: The focus will be on the actions of the 1st day. Everyone should try and concentrate energy on this action.

Day #1:

- 1. non-denominational communal services held on the evening before, or the morning of the trial
- 2. assembly at the University of Florida
- 3. March to the courthouse
- 4. actions at the courthouse
- 5. March back to the University
- 6. Rally at the University. A major speaker will attend this rally.
(Estimate: 4-5 hours for the entire action)
- 7. a vigil will be held all day at the courthouse during the trial -- this will consist of approximately 100 people

Days #2-7

- 1. The actions on these days are to be planned for a smaller number of people because many will not be able to stay for the entire week.
- 2. The scenario for these actions is to be developed by the Gainesville collective. Their decisions will largely be taken from the suggestions listed above with the "General Ideas"
- 3. These actions will include daily marches to the courthouse, vigils around the courthouse, guerrilla theater, etc.

Last Day of the Action

1. A large rally will be held with a major speaker giving the address.
2. The scenario for this day is to be planned by the Gainesville collective.

II. Action for the Conclusion of the Trial

This action is to be planned for the day that the case goes to the jury. Because of this, the date obviously cannot be fixed. The action will concentrate on doing a resume of the trial, how absurd and perverse the entire procedure was, a possible indictment of the grand jury system. A major speaker will be giving the address at this demonstration. Support demonstrations are to be held around the country.

The above workshop report was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

PVS WORKSHOP

The following is the political definition of Post Vietnam Syndrome which resulted from the discussion within the workshop.

Post Vietnam Syndrome is the realization and rejection, either on a political or gut level, of U.S. imperialism. Seeing first hand the racist and genocidal nature of U.S. imperialism in Indochina, we have rejected the Great American Myth of Bringing Peace and Freedom, etc. to the world.

Many veterans saw the Vietnam War as a means to gain recognition in society. We remember from past wars the status and recognition that "heroes" received when they returned to this country.

The failure of our society to recognize the sacrifice of the veterans, the realization on the part of the individual that the government lied to him to motivate him in "Nam" and the feelings of frustration over the loss of a brother in a war that society wants to pretend did not occur combined in general, leads the individual to withdraw into himself, reject concepts such as love and humanity as being hypocritical and in affect becomes a human time bomb programmed for his own destruction and the destruction of those who attempt to break down his defenses and reach out to the individual.

The traumatic experiences of the Vietnam War coupled with unemployment, poor schooling opportunities, inadequate medical care, drug addiction and sometimes the total rejection by society has produced heightened emotional and psychological problems for Vietnam era veterans.

Post Vietnam Syndrome on an emotional level manifests itself in Guilt, Rage, Combat Frustration, Alienation, Psychic Numbing, Lack of Trust, and a feeling of an inability to love others or themselves.

The VA gave the disenfranchised veteran of the Vietnam era a label -- "Post Vietnam Syndrome" -- but few Vietnam era veterans are successfully treated in VA programs and fewer will approach an agency of a government they feel manipulated by. Existing VA programs for the most part seem to be based either on a highly manipulated environment or clinical control -- ideas which seem defeating given the experience of the Vietnam era veterans.

Post Vietnam Syndrome has not been recognized by the VA for two reasons. 1. Political, in that the government would have to acknowledge what we did in Vietnam, and they cannot do that. 2. They would have to recognize it as a service connected disability.

We of Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization recognize PVS and are attempting to realistically deal with it, as the VA does not -- either by the means of rap groups, one-to-one sessions, and political education. In conclusion, the manifestations of PVS will disappear when Imperialism is smashed.

This definition was accepted unanimously by the Steering Committee and will from this time forward be the political definition of PVS for all VVAW/WSO PVS programs.

AMNESTY WORKSHOP

The purpose of the workshop was to discuss our national policy and program on amnesty. The policy statement which resulted from this workshop is not included in this workshop report, but will accompany the minutes. This position was accepted unanimously by the Steering Committee. Also, several proposals came out of this workshop, all of which were accepted by the Steering Committee. The first of these proposals deals with the terminology of our campaign for amnesty. There was a lot of discussion on whether or not we wanted to use the term of "total unconditional amnesty" or "honorable repatriation." The feeling of the workshop was that the term "amnesty" can be used to cover a broader spectrum because it includes people with bad discharges, political prisoners, and resisters underground within this country. Also, the public has got this word in their minds, so it can be more easily related to.

PROPOSAL: To accept the term of "amnesty" to apply to this issue.
A definition of this term is to mean a total restoration of all civil liberties.

This proposal was accepted with a vote of: 60-yes: 11-no: 4 abst.

The workshop also discussed the conference which is to be held in Toronto and is tentatively scheduled for May 26-28. The guidelines for the participation of VVAW/WSO are those which are set down in the adopted position paper of the organization. There is a planning meeting for this conference on April 30th in New York so we discussed the number of delegates that we want to send to this conference.

PROPOSALS: That 10 people be chosen to attend the Toronto Conference. Regions are to submit names of people working on amnesty projects to the national office where people will be selected according to concrete programs. Background information should be sent along with the person's name in order to facilitate selection. If regions don't have a member who they feel is qualified, then they are not to submit a name.

The above proposals for delegate number and method of selecting were unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

The workshop next discussed the establishment of a national clearing house for purposes of gathering and disseminating information concerning amnesty.

PROPOSALS: That a National Amnesty Clearing House Resource Center on amnesty be set up within the next six months. That it provide all pertinent information on amnesty including the implementation of a national VVAW/WSO Amnesty pamphlet which is to be produced and disseminated to all regions within the next six months.

This Clearing House on Amnesty is to be set up within the National Office.

The above proposals were unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

The workshop also made a strong recommendation that each region go back and educate themselves on the politics of amnesty as set forth by the guidelines of our position paper and that we collect information and send it to the Clearing House for the establishment of concrete national programs.

The workshop also discussed ways in which the amnesty issue might be effectively raised. The following are the suggestions made to the Steering Committee:

1. general community educational programs
2. participation with other groups who are working for amnesty
3. speaking engagements -- including debates
4. petitioning campaigns
5. contact with families of war resisters, people with bad discharges, etc. and asking them to write letters to newspaper editors, Congressmen, etc.
6. bracelets -- California is now producing bracelets similar to those made by VIVA which will bear the name of a war resister
7. bumper-stickers
8. in-put from other veterans organizations to find out where they are coming from and the possible establishment of a coalition
9. a week for showing visual support -- i.e. wearing an arm-band for a week
10. direct actions at the V. A.
11. taking a national poll of veterans on amnesty. This is to be done on a chapter level and the results sent to the Clearing House.
12. songs which raise the issue
13. if financially feasible, we hope to make a movie of the Toronto Conference similar to a Winter Soldier Investigation

WOUNDED KNEE WORKSHOP

The Wounded Knee workshop began with a discussion around the American Indian movement and its history. It was decided that in general, whites are ignorant in terms of the culture, history, strengths, weaknesses, and reality of the situation of the American Indian. A proposal was made to attempt to alleviate this weakness within ourselves.

PROPOSAL: To do the best we can to educate ourselves about the Indian culture and in working with Indians in our own communities.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

The national policy of VVAW/WSO with regard to the issue of the Indian struggle was also discussed.

PROPOSAL: In accordance with the objectives of VVAW/WSO, we support the struggle for freedom, self-determination, and justice of all American Indian people throughout the land and we also support whatever action they find necessary to secure their rights under the treaties with the U. S. or any measures they feel necessary to secure freedom, self-determination and justice.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

As a result of some of the problems which have arisen out of the Wounded Knee situation, it was decided that our reliance on the telephone leaves us in deep water in emergency situations. Through the following proposal, we hope to begin dealing with this problem.

PROPOSAL: All chapters and regions of the organization are to research the feasibility of communication facilities in order to circumvent the use of the telephone.

This proposal was unanimously accepted and should be followed as soon as possible.

WOMEN'S WORKSHOP

The women's workshop began with a discussion of the mailing which was recently sent out from Milwaukee to some of the women within the organization. We decided that this newsletter should be given more structure and should be sent out twice between the NSCM's. It was suggested that the next newsletters come out at the end of May and the middle of July. Women should send in letters telling of what they are doing. The newsletter will discuss projects which are now in existence within VVAW/WSO, problems which women have and how these problems have been or can be effectively dealt with. The newsletter will also deal with consciousness raising and political education. Book reviews should be submitted to Milwaukee for publication in the upcoming newsletters. Hopefully, by utilizing this tool, we can open up the lines of communication, get to know and more fully learn to trust each other. For purposes of increasing the audience of this newsletter, copies will be sent to each regional office, and it is the responsibility of the offices to make certain that the women within the respective regions read the newsletter.

The workshop also decided that it would be beneficial for the women of VVAW/WSO to get together. Because of this, there will be a women's national meeting tentatively set up for June 10-11. To help alleviate transportation and distance problems, two meetings will be held simultaneously in different places in the country. One of the meetings has been suggested to be held in Denver, and the other will be either in Cape Cod or Boston. Information on these meetings will be coming out in the newsletter from Milwaukee.

The above workshop report was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

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WAR WORKSHOP

The war workshop discussed the possibility of organizing nationally coordinated regional actions around the war in Indochina. They also suggested that the 9 Point Accords should be disseminated throughout the country and that it is one of our responsibilities to educate the public as to the manners in which the U. S. is violating the "peace" treaty. The workshop also discussed the importance of regionally mobilizing people around the continued bombings in Laos and Cambodia. Local actions should be organized around this issue.

Concrete plans resulting from the war workshop are as following:

PROPOSAL: That there be regional, autonomous, anti-war actions coordinated through the National Office on Armed Forces Day, May 19, 1973, and that there be full support of the 4 Points of the Stockholm Conference and that the regions be allowed to expand these 4 points. The 4 points are:

1. Demand that Nixon and Thieu abide by the Peace Treaty.
2. Free all Vietnamese patriots in prisons in the South.
3. Demand official diplomatic recognition of the PRG as an official representative of the people of South Vietnam.
4. Rebuild Vietnam and Rebuild America not with the People's budget but with the Military budget.

The above proposal was unanimously accepted. In essence this is a plan for an anti-war demonstration and it is vital that all regional actions be a success.

PROPOSAL: We feel it vital that in the event of a major re-escalation of the war in Indochina, that a plan be drawn up to immediately implement militant responses to any escalation. We propose that the following 7 Point Contingency Plan/Guideline be implemented:

1. That each chapter develop ideas for imaginative responses and that plans for these ideas be kept in a safe place where they can be called upon when needed.
2. That after the initial crisis unfolds, certain members of the chapter would call for an emergency meeting of the membership for that night or the next.
3. That at that meeting the plans would be discussed and put into effect.
4. That there be one person in charge of publicizing the action and that others would, if necessary, enlist the support of other groups who could work with VVAW/WSO on the action.
5. That this action be followed up with appropriate actions until such time that the crisis is over.
6. That whatever the action, a phone call should go to the National Office and regional offices so that a complete list of the actions could be compiled for press releases.
7. That after the crisis period, the chapter again draw up contingencies for response to the next possible crisis.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

NEW BUSINESS

FUTURE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETINGS:

PROPOSAL: Instead of holding National Steering Committee Meetings four times a year, in the future, they should be held three times a year. We will be having NSCM's every four months rather than every three months.

This proposal was unanimously accepted.

SITE AND DATE OF NEXT NSCM:

There were five locations suggested for the holding of the next NSCM. These sites were: Gainesville, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Eugene Chitto and Los Angeles. Through a run-off vote, the sites were narrowed down to St. Louis and Gainesville. The final vote was:

Gainesville -- 40

St. Louis -- 30

Thus, the next NSCM will be held in Gainesville, Florida. The dates selected for this meeting are August 16-21.

NATIONAL GENERAL MEMBERSHIP FESTIVAL OF LEARNING:

The Wisconsin region suggested that it is important for us to inter-act with the general membership more than we have done in the past. Because of this, they proposed that VVAW/WSO hold a National General Membership Festival of Learning for the purposes of doing Political Education work and getting to rap with members in order to better find out what is going on in our respective regions and around the country. The Steering Committee felt that this was next to impossible within the immediate future because of the up-coming Gainesville, actions, the August NSCM, and the Women's National meeting. Because this Festival of Learning will require a good deal of planning, it was suggested that a workshop on this idea be conducted at the next NSCM with the possibility of holding this sort of action next spring. This idea should be discussed within the regions so that the planning of such an event can be done easily.

FUTURE OBJECTIVE CHANGES:

PROPOSAL: Each region should pick the objective which they are working around most and simplify that objective to a more concise form. Position papers on the objective should be brought to the next NSCM and dealt with in a workshop.

This proposal was made in light of the fact that some of our objectives are wordy and difficult to understand on first reading. The purpose of simplifying the objectives is not to take away the meaning, but to make them more concise. It was suggested that chapters and regions check around and find out how people would best understand our objectives. We must realize how important these objectives are and discover the manner in which our ideas can best be communicated. (An example would be to have a word for word explanation of the idea of the objective followed by a short paragraph explaining it. It would be a good idea to not feel-

back from those people reading the Winter Soldier to discover their opinion of our objective form.

It was also suggested that proposed objective changes be sent to the national office so that proposed changes can be included in the newsletter. This would enable us to vote on the changes at the next NSCM, rather than having to wait for eight months while the regions discuss the changes.

WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH CONFERENCE:

The World Federation of Democratic Youth will be holding their 10th annual Youth and Student Festival in East Berlin from July 28 - August 4. This will be a meeting of revolutionary youth from around the world. Some VVAW/WSO members have been accepted to attend this conference. Because of past problems surrounding spokespeople from VVAW who were not qualified to speak for the organization, it was decided that any spokesperson from VVAW/WSO is to be a representative from the national organization and not from specific regions. To avoid problems at this up-coming conference, the Steering Committee unanimously accepted the following proposal.

PROPOSAL: Rich Eangert (St. Louis) is to be the official spokesman and national representative for the VVAW/WSO delegation at the Youth and Student Festival. Other regional representatives are to be considered as members of the delegation. If more members are accepted by WFDY, their names and a short biography is to be sent to the National Office for coordination and for publication in the newsletter so that the regions can be made aware of the members of the delegation. Each region has the responsibility to vote on the people suggested from their region, and then a decision on the make-up of the delegation will be made by that specific region and the National Office.

DELEGATE SELECTION FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS:

PROPOSAL: Any time that there is an international or national meeting and there is not time to coordinate the delegate selection with the National Steering Committee, then regions are to elect representatives and send the names and biographies to the National Office for coordination. The biographies are to state who the member is, what he/she is doing and why they are going. The National Office is to give each representative a letter prior to the meeting stating that he/she is an official VVAW/WSO representative. All of the above information is to be published in the newsletter so that the regions will be aware of who is attending conferences as official VVAW/WSO representatives.

The above proposal was unanimously accepted.

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN REGIONS:

PROPOSAL: Whenever possible, regions should submit names of individuals working on specific projects. This information is to be sent out in the

national news center so that projects and programs can be better coordinated throughout the country. This will facilitate the establishment of good lines of communications around projects and programs between chapters, regions, and national. All chapters should send a list of their specific programs and projects (i.e. PVS, Amnesty) to the National Office so that a comprehensive list of all projects can be compiled and made available to other chapters.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

INTERNAL SECURITY:

The National Steering Committee strongly recommends that when people come into a region saying that they are from another region, the visited region should call the region from whence they came for purposes of checking out the visitor's story.

PROPOSAL: The National Steering Committee hereby levels the responsibility upon the National Office for the development of a comprehensive security packet for immediate dissemination to all chapters.

This proposal was unanimously accepted, but the development of such a packet is contingent upon the input received in National from the regions. It is the responsibility of the regions to inform the National Office of specific problems with security and how these problems are dealt with.

REGION INCORPORATIONS:

PROPOSAL: Alabama/Mississippi wishes to annex the state of Tennessee to their region.

This proposal received unanimous acceptance.

PROPOSAL: Kansas/Western Missouri wishes to annex Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota to their region for purposes of coordination. Because of the size of this area, Kansas/Western Missouri retains the option to drop these additional states if the activity in this area grows stronger.

This proposal was unanimously accepted.

PROPOSAL: Eastern Missouri/Southern Illinois wishes to temporarily annex the states of Arkansas and Oklahoma to their region for purposes of trying to build up this area through a stronger regional office.

The vote on this proposal was: 14-yes; 0-no.

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national newsletter so that projects and programs can be better co-ordinated throughout the country. This will facilitate the establishment of good lines of communications around projects and programs between chapters, regions, and national. All chapters should send a list of their specific programs and projects to the PVG. Annually to the National Office so that a comprehensive list of all projects can be compiled and made available to other chapters.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

INTERNAL SECURITY:

The National Steering Committee strongly recommends that when people enter into a region serving for their own region, they should report their call the region from whence they came for purposes of checking out the internal security.

PROPOSAL: The National Steering Committee hereby levels the responsibility upon the National Office of the development of a comprehensive security packet for immediate dissemination to all chapters.

This proposal was unanimously accepted, but the development of such a packet is contingent upon the input received in National from the regions. It is the responsibility of the regions to inform the National Office of specific problems with security and how these problems are dealt with.

REGION INCORPORATIONS:

PROPOSAL: All regional incorporations should be reported to the National Office for their review.

This proposal was unanimously accepted.

PROPOSAL: National Steering Committee hereby recommends that all chapters in North Dakota and South Dakota report to the National Office for their review all incorporations of new chapters. This is to be done by the end of the year. The National Office will then act upon the incorporations.

This proposal was unanimously accepted.

PROPOSAL: National Steering Committee hereby recommends that all chapters in North Dakota and South Dakota report to the National Office for their review all incorporations of new chapters. This is to be done by the end of the year. The National Office will then act upon the incorporations.

The vote on this proposal was 100% in favor.

PROXY VOTES:

Once again the subject of proxy votes was brought on. The following proposals were accepted and are now procedural policy.

PROPOSAL: Each region can only have one written proxy and this proxy is to apply to all votes on specific issues unless otherwise specified. These proxies are to be turned into the chair at the beginning of the meeting.

This proposal was accepted with a vote of: 57-1/2-yes; 7-1/2-no.

PROPOSAL: That the National Office be considered one region with regard to the holding of proxy votes.

This proposal was passed with a vote of: 42-yes; 23-no; 5 abst.

MEDICAL AID FOR INDOCHINA:

Because of some problems with the terminology of the proposal for Medical Aid for Indochina which was presented at the Chicago Steering Committee Meeting, an alternate proposal was presented and the original proposal was withdrawn. The following proposal was unanimously accepted.

1. That VVAW participate in local coalitions to promote and develop local and regional consciousness of the need for continuing aid and support to the people of Indochina from the people of the United States.
2. That VVAW/WSC participate in and organize fund-raising and educational medical programs for Indochina.
3. That VVAW/WSC remove the Nguyen Van Thu Hospital as a national priority. That individual chapters support any medical program to Indochina that they wish.

Our commitment to the Indochinese is one which is based on our continuing relationship and solidarity. Our programs should reflect that same commitment.

* * * * *

UNITY	In the name of the blood flowing in my heart, In the name of the ardour burning in your chest, Let's respond to the call of the future, Rise up and shoulder to shoulder March forward.	UNITY
STRUGGLE	Grasp firm my hand - And let's tighten our lethal stranglehold Around those who take guns and bullets for power, Prisons for weapons, Violence for glory. Without respect we will only lie down in slavery, Selling our conscience for gold. And with eternal remembrance, The soil of our Homeland Will be forever immortal	STRUGGLE
VICTORY!		VICTORY!

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-- by Vu Cue

APPENDIX A

These items are needed to stock the MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. MEMORIAL CLINIC. PLEASE forward donations and/or items from the list to:

PEOPLES' FARM
Rte. 1, Box 125A
Brownsville, Alabama 36724

(Please include an inventory of all items at

1. Examination Tables
2. Eye Charts
3. Clinical Scales
4. Stethoscopes
5. Blood Pressure apparatus
6. Thermometers (oral and rectal)
7. Microscopes
8. Ambly Boxes
9. E type oxygen tanks, gauge, disposable masks
10. Pregnancy tests
11. Simple Gold Tests
12. Portable X-ray machines (2)
13. Clinical Van (vehicle)
14. Specific Gravimometer
15. All types of bandages and gauze
16. All types of antibiotics, oral and injection
17. All types of antiseptics
18. Oral Airways
19. Cots
20. Sheets/Blankets
21. Towels (hand, bath, for surgical)
22. Acids, Penicillin, etc. (as needed)
23. Syringes and needles (disposable)
24. Other Surgical Kits
25. Vitamins (children's and adult's) One liver oil capsules
26. Mineral forms
27. Clinical supplies
28. Office supplies
29. Dental Filling Cabinets
30. Obstetrical Materials (e.g., delivery blocks, etc.)
31. Plastic Containers (e.g., for blood, urine, etc.)
32. The most valuable of all - the love and support of the community

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VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION

POSITION PAPER ON AMNESTY

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AMNESTY STATEMENT OF DELEGATES OF EXILES, ACTIVE-DUTY GIs, AND VETERANS

NEW YORK, NEW YORK, PARIS, FEBRUARY 19-21, 1973

At a time when we are told the war is coming to an end, American troops, material and advisors still remain in Indochina and U.S. intervention in the affairs of the Indochinese peoples continues. We, war resisters in exile, active-duty GIs, and veterans demand that the U.S. government withdraw all its troops from Indochina and strictly adhere to the January 27 agreement to end the war.

The American government's illegal intervention in Southeast Asia has been opposed by a majority of the American people. Hundreds of thousands of men and women in the U.S. have suffered a loss of civil rights, liberty, and jobs because they have been in opposition to the war or subjected to the racism and oppression of the American military and draft systems. Contrary to Nixon's deliberate distortion about the "few hundred" anti-war exiles, there are in fact 60,000 to 100,000 of them. But the majority of war resisters are inside the U.S. where an estimated 200,000 live underground. Thousands are behind bars; many have court records; and over 500,000 veterans have less than honorable discharges.

We demand universal, unconditional amnesty (with no alternative service or other punitive measures, or case-by-case judgment) for:

1. All military resisters (so called "deserters") and draft resisters in exile or underground in the U.S.;
2. All people who are or have been in civilian and military prisons, or of those who are sought for prosecution because of their opposition to the war -- this includes a clearing of their records;
3. The more than half million veterans with less than honorable discharges.

War resisters are not criminals: the real criminals are the American Government leaders who have violated the U.S. Constitution and International Law in waging this war. It is these people who are responsible for the death and destruction in Indochina and for the hundreds of thousands of Americans killed or wounded in combat.

The perpetration of this illegal war by the United States has violated the honor that should surround one's service to one's country. Only an amnesty which is universal and unconditional will truly mark an end to the U.S. government's disastrous policy in Indochina and at the same time serve to prevent all such future wars.

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(The following is a more detailed explanation of the national position of VVAW/ISO on amnesty. This paper was written by representatives of RIT, ACT, the National Lawyer's Guild, Pacific Counseling Service, Campaign for Amnesty and Vietnam, Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization. It was adopted as the official position of VVAW/ISO at the National Steering Committee Meeting held in Placitas, New Mexico from April 19-23.)

BACKGROUND

There are several basic starting points which are relevant to any discussion of the amnesty issue; first, that US intervention in Indochina has been by Executive decree only, without the declaration of war by Congress, and therefore has always been an illegal war. In addition to illegal entry, the US has violated the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, the International Rules of War and the Nuremberg principles that it stated in the Nazi trials after World War II. The latter held that an individual is personally responsible for his or her own acts, no matter what orders may have been given by a higher civilian or military authority. Resistance to fighting in that war, therefore, came from several conclusions about both the letter and letter of domestic and international law. There was additionally the widespread feeling that the US as a superpower was interfering in the internal affairs of other countries for reasons that had nothing to do with national security or defense.

TYPES OF RESISTANCE-- Hundreds of thousands of American men legally resisted the draft; they found ways to prevent their personal involvement in the Vietnam War. These ways include: CO status, staying in school, getting jobs which carried draft exemptions, finding medical excuses often provided by anti-war and sympathetic doctors, etc. The common basis for all these types of actions was the financial ability and availability of information to essentially a middle-class group. These people are usually not counted among figures of resisters, because their forms of resistance carried no penalty, but they in fact form an enormous base of people who acted as they did because of anti-war sentiment, and they ought to realize that their actions were responsible for both the increased anti-war sentiment in the population at large, and also for the necessity of other young men taking their place in the draft. This last fact had particularly high consequences for the working class, poor and third world segment of society. We should look to this group of successful resisters for help in organizing local amnesty campaign.

REFUSED REGISTRATION OR INDUCTION-- The majority of those men who refused to register or who refused induction are still vulnerable to prosecution. It was these acts of resistance which focused public attention on anti-war resistance to the draft, and which resulted in a tremendous court backlog of cases. The courts are now moving to prosecute these cases after a slowdown of several years. It is clearly the hope of the Nixon administration that the cease-fire agreement has taken public attention away from these cases.

LIVING WITHIN THE US-- The government is currently paying particular attention to those resisters who are politically conscious and active, and while we certainly agree that many resisters will be dealt with leniently, we also think that those who are active will be dealt with extremely harshly--the members of groups like the Weathermen, Black Revolutionary Workers Organization, Rainy Day Angry, etc. We think that the present these people will result in that division of visibility between the people from others, and we should not allow that division to take place. We should assume that the men involved, for their own part, in the opposition to the war, are in their own defense.

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LIVING AS EXILES--There are presently about 200,000 in America who are other fugitives from the draft or military, awaiting trial or in prison. The number is upwards of 60,000, in addition to the resistance and drafters. There are also several thousand in other countries. Some of these people are not completely changed their lives to live in the U.S. for the first time, but to compromise their political and moral beliefs. An enormous political group would show that the draft resistance was not a political movement, but a moral one. In their exile in America were better able to understand the Canadian requirements, and have made new lives in the U.S. applied for United States Citizenship. Some of these people are sisters and brothers who do not have either the skills or the financial backing to attain citizenship. This group that Canada has recently begun to move against and deport, are the most vulnerable of the exiles.

MILITARY RESISTERS--Men who left the military after induction and that group for whom alternatives were very few. They are largely coming from poor backgrounds, many did not have information about legal resistance available at the time, they did not have information about the nature of the war itself and what happened after they were in the military. Many of them believed that the war was necessary in order to protect their country, many were provided that it was their patriotic duty to defend it against communism.

This group has always been the "human fodder" of the war-torn world. They have been the military as a result of their own situation, and they have been used to help their families. Not only did this group have many difficulties in the U.S., but over a period of time, they have been forced to be put in contact with their own survival, and entering the military, whether by draft or by choice. It was always seen as the worst way of survival and a dismal one. For this group, many of the world's men in particular believed in the U.S. about opportunities, and the kind of our assessments, was in fact, they thought that group still would take a million to be killed or wounded in the war.

Figures about the size of this group are difficult to ascertain; the military automatically classifies all exiles as deserters after 90 days. The number of the potential size of the group, however, in 1965 there were about 100,000 exiles and deserters from the Army alone. In 1967 there were over 100,000 exiles and deserters from the Army. Up until the 1960s, the majority of exiles in Canada were draft resisters; during the last few years, 90% of the exiles who went to Canada were military resisters. The majority of the exiles by far have always been military resisters.

MILITARY RESISTERS AFTER VIETNAM--There is a situation in the U.S. of exiles and drafters who left the military after their period of duty in Vietnam. This group reacted in a particularly strong way to their experiences in Vietnam. They came to hate and distrust the U.S. military and the U.S. government. Their perceptions of what the Vietnam war was all about, with very little preparation, and understanding that they were being forced to take the war to Asia, it is now deserted wherever they came to be in western Europe, Canada, or in the U.S. itself.

MILITARY RESISTERS AFTER VIETNAM--Since 1967, 100,000 exiles have received discharge from the U.S. military, and many of them are currently in the U.S. as a result of the military's policy of "discharge" from the military and the U.S. government. The military's policy of "discharge" from the military and the U.S. government is a result of the military's policy of "discharge" from the military and the U.S. government.

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LIVING AS EXILES-- There are presently about 25,000 exiles in Canada, either fugitives from the draft or military deserters. According to the Canadian exiles number upwards of 20,000, including both the resisters and their families. There are also several thousand in other countries. These men have been forced to completely change their lives, to leave friends, family, and country, in order not to compromise their political and moral beliefs. As a group, they are not in complete agreement that the most legal forms of resistance were not feasible. The resisters who were able to plan their exile in advance were better able to take advantage of Canadian immigration requirements. Many have made new lives and have applied for families in migrant status. Some of the draft resisters and also some deserters do not have either the skills or the financial backing to attain such status, and thus this group that Canada has recently begun to move against are, well, socially deprecate. They are the most vulnerable of the exiles.

MILITARY RESISTERS-- Men who left the military after induction are that group for whom alternatives were very few. They are largely coming from poor economic backgrounds, many did not have information about legal resistance available in any form, they did not have information about the nature of the war itself and only learned after they were in the military. Many of them believed that the war was necessary in order to protect their country, many were persuaded that it was their patriotic duty to defend us against communism.

This group has always been the 'bannon fodder' of any war--they have traditionally regarded the military as a way out of their economic situation, and as a way to help their families. Not only did this group always have difficulty in obtaining good jobs, but over a period of time, they have been forced to be primarily concerned with their own survival, and entering the military, whether by draft or by enlistment, was always seen as one more way of survival among a dismal set of choices. Of this group, many think world young men in particular believed military propaganda about opportunism, but by virtue of duty assignments, was in fact relegating them to that group which would take the most likely to be killed or wounded in a war.

Figures about the size of this group are difficult to ascertain; the military automatically classifies all A.O.L.s as deserters after 30 days. We can get some idea of the potential size of this group, however. In 1960, there were about 10,000 A.O.L.s and deserters from the Army alone. In 1970, there were over 25,000 A.O.L.s and deserters from the Army. Up until the last few years, the majority of exiles in Canada were draft resisters. During the last two years, 90% of the resisters who went to Canada were military resisters. The majority of the exiles in Europe have always been military resisters.

MILITARY RESISTERS AFTER VIETNAM DUTY-- There is a sizeable number of deserters and A.O.L.s who left the military after their period of duty in Vietnam. This group reacted in a particularly strong way to their experiences in Vietnam. They came to hate and distrust the US military machine, based on their only too acute perceptions of what the Vietnam War was all about. With virtually no advance preparation, and understanding that they were being forced to take tremendous risks, this group deserted wherever they happened to be, in western Europe, some times in Canada or in the US itself.

RESISTANCE DISCHARGES-- Since 1960, 200,000 U.S. have received discharges under less than honorable conditions, and thousands more are currently in stockades and jails as a result of their resistance to the war inside the military machine. Many of these acts took the form of direct actions against the racist and oppressive US military.

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The general breakdown of military morale, discipline, and creditability was the result of a growing awareness on the part of GIs about the responsibility of the military for the war and the manner in which it was waged. It was also a reflection of resistance to the oppression of the military, of a growing sense of unity with other young people whose values, life-styles and politics were in direct contradiction to those of the people in authority. The reaction of those soldiers who had fought in Vietnam was extremely bitter, and although most of them did not leave the military, they did engage in acts of protest, of outrage, and of frustration. For third world GIs, the racism exhibited by the officers and an integral part of the military machine was even less tolerable after service in Vietnam than before. There was also a growing sense of unity with other resistance movements: the Black movement at home for example. A black draft avoider in Canada voiced these sentiments, "I'm not a draft evader, I'm a runaway slave. I left because I was not going to fight white America's war." In 1972, black soldiers received 20.3% of all Bad Conduct Discharges and 32.5% of all Dishonorable Discharges. This is an example of disproportional numbers of less than honorable discharges given to Third World people.

The attempts of the military to stem this wave of protest and rebellion caused even more problems. Discipline became harsher and the general climate of repression became stronger. These conditions produced even more individual acts of protest against the military, and we should be prepared to understand and analyze these unconscious acts of resistance as attacks on a system that was both the source of anti-war sentiment and the oppressive machinery that had helped to create the problem.

This group of men came out of the military with less than honorable discharges and often with criminal records. They do not receive veteran's benefits, have enormous difficulty in getting a job or education, and have largely been forgotten because they are easy to ignore. Any campaign for amnesty must therefore, include a demand to upgrade these discharges and the clearing of these records, along with amnesty for civilian and military resisters.

CIVILIAN PROTESTERS--By the government's creation of an illegal war, a draft which was then also illegal, and by virtue of a monopoly of channels of information about the war and protest to it, the state also created the need for 'illegal' acts of protest which could break through that monopoly. Just as members of the US military were forced to break military law in order to protest the war, and just as civilian young men who did not have legal means of resistance open to them were forced to break civilian laws in order to not participate in that war -- so there is a group of civilians who engaged in anti-war protests of differing kinds in order to gain public attention and focus it on the nature of US involvement in Vietnam. While their military counterparts serve time in briggs and stockades, the civilian men and women are serving time in prisons and jails. Amnesty should include organizing around all those who were forced to break the government's laws in order to resist and protest US actions in Indochina. Just as we are calling for the clearing of criminal records for those who resisted within the military, so we include the sealing of criminal records and dropping of charges for civilians as well.

AMNESTY SENTIMENT

A Gallup poll taken in February, 1973, on the subject of attitudes toward draft avoiders (no figures are available about attitudes toward amnesty for military resisters) shows that 39% of the population already favors unconditional amnesty. 19% feel that non-military service should be required, and another 13% feel that a choice of either military or non-military service is necessary.

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Eighteen percent more feel that military service must be required. Thus, 75% of those surveyed are sympathetic to some form of amnesty, conditional or unconditional, for draft avoiders. We feel that these people are educable to a position of complete and unconditional amnesty for all war resisters and protesters. Particularly when all forms of resistance are taken together, we feel that people can come to support the upgrading of discharges as well.

Our analysis of feelings about amnesty on the part of the general population include the Gallup Poll note that four times as many men as women think that draft avoiders should be given jail sentences (13%). Mrs. Patricia Simon, the mother of a son killed in Vietnam, and a supporter of unconditional amnesty for all military and civilian resisters noted: "I think that men like Nixon are more threatened than women by the idea of amnesty. For them, masculinity is still identified with force and violence. It's an ancient definition, but it still applies." We think that Mrs. Simon's statement explains the Gallup Poll figures and conclude that women of all classes are apt to be more sympathetic than men to the position of amnesty. This should not be seen as a strategy for organizing which would stress class appeals to a maternal sensitivity. We agree that there is a dominant male type in America which works against a position of support for amnesty. But realizing that all women are less affected by a MALE thinking which is destructive for all, neither substitutes for, nor contradicts, the strategy of organizing among those people who are most directly affected by the issue because of their economic and social position in society.

GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-AMNESTY POSITION.-- It is possible to reach several conclusions about current administration feeling on amnesty. Historically, there is no precedent in America for such a demand. It is true that Confederate soldiers did receive amnesty, but it was a political solution to the problem of reuniting the country after the Civil War, and it is important to note that Union soldiers were being prosecuted for desertion up to ten years after the war ended. In addition to the lack of precedent, it is more important to realize that the Nixon administration faces and is highly conscious of a growing lack of credibility on the part of the people toward the government. It is not difficult to understand the administration's fear that an amnesty would only increase that lack of credibility. Such thinking stems directly from their analysis of what support for the government means: if amnesty is granted, then the government might be seen as admitting that the war was wrong and the resistance was legitimate. The government has expended Indochinese and American lives and resources in order to prove that the war was right. There are no signs of a change in that position.

A second way of analyzing government sentiment on amnesty is to look at the moral crusade that Nixon is waging: a basic return to reactionary values; authoritarianism, individualism, male stereotypes, unquestioned racism, and support for America's imperialist spirit. There is no place in such a crusade for a program of amnesty, and we should understand that a victory in the amnesty campaign would be a major defeat for the Nixon administration in terms of fostering an even more widespread distrust and questioning of these basic values.

ECONOMICS.-- The US is faced with a crisis of unemployment, not just a question of the lack of jobs in certain areas, for which training programs might be a cure, but a lack of jobs across all levels, and the inability of the economic system to create them. Therefore, the prospect of tens of thousands of young, employed, largely semi- and unskilled young men is not a desirable one. Additionally, these particular young men have already challenged the government once, and a total appraisal of them is that they are likely to do so again. The government can be expected to advocate jail sentences or military service as a way of breaking...

spirit of militancy in order that they return to the economic system as passive participants. The fact that many of them who have taken the greatest risks and have to face the greatest penalties are third world does not make them desirable in a racist economy.

Less than honorable discharges which prevent men from being considered for most jobs and places an additional financial burden on the women in their families, puts the blame on the individual, and allows the government to maintain the cruel myth that if one doesn't oppose the system a good job is the reward. This is another reason why the government would be opposed to upgrading these discharges. Once the method by which these men are labelled and dismissed as being undesirable is removed, a huge segment of the under- or unemployed work force would be able to find themselves have and would encourage others to have a very different response to government propaganda about employment opportunities. An 'individual' problem would clearly become the collective problem it is, and public confidence in the economy would be undermined, and could be focussed upon the real causes of unemployment.

OUR STRATEGY

DEFINITIONS--There has been some discussion of the appropriate terminology we should use. Basically, we feel that we are not asking for forgiveness. We are committed to the position that all forms of resistance to the war were morally, politically and legally correct, and we support the brothers and sisters in all their actions -- direct or indirect. If no crime was committed, then the state has no authority to forgive.

The term 'amnesty' legally fits our requirements; it means 'abolition of the crime', in other words, there is no penalty because there was no crime. The term 'pardon' is legally used to mean the abolition of the sentence, while recognizing that a crime did occur. It is true that popular usage of the term amnesty carries the connotation of forgiveness which maintains that a crime did occur. We must weigh this public definition of the term against two factors; first, that amnesty is legally distinguishable from pardon, and that secondly, the term amnesty is the one which most American people are using, and the concept of unconditional amnesty does indeed signify what we want, provided that all the differing kinds of resistance are included. Our analysis means that we will educate people to the fact that no crime was committed, indeed it will form the basis of our campaign. Since the term will be widely used in any event, we feel that we should attempt to make it our term, with our definition.

CASE-BY-CASE REVIEWS--We must be particularly careful to avoid the term of pardon, not only because it indicates that a crime was committed, but also because it carries with it the notion of a case-by-case review of each individual. We support unconditional amnesty for any group that is involved, and are opposed to individual reviews for several reasons. First, individual reviews of draft avoiders would allow the government to pick and choose among those who have desirable skills as opposed to those who do not. It would grant the state the opportunity to select its citizens from those in exile, and would mean that race and class values would always prevail. Secondly, those men who left the military did so for the same reasons that civilian men refused to enter the military. Both kinds of actions are specific forms of anti-war resistance for which we want amnesty, and case-by-case reviews allows the government to obscure that fact by employing civilian authority to make the decisions regarding civilians, and

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keeping military decision-making virtually invisible. Thirdly, our more general political goals involve the stressing of collective actions and collective responsibility. Part of the educational work to be done in an amnesty campaign involves attacking the notion of individual separation. Case-by-case review would reinforce that tendency.

DISCHARGE UPGRADING--We feel that all military personnel should receive one type of discharge. Previously issued discharges under less than honorable conditions should be upgraded to this type. Our concept of universal, unconditional amnesty means that there will be no case-by-case review of these discharges. All of them reflect the racism and oppression of the military machine, and actions taken by G.I.'s are a statement of protest and outrage, and are directly or indirectly a result of the Indochina war and the institutions that created it.

Some of these acts resulted in the criminal prosecution of the G.I.'s. Most should have been prosecuted in the civilian courts, and we hope that one of the results of the campaign for amnesty will be that the military ceases to prosecute its personnel for acts that are considered to be crimes by civilian laws. Obviously, G.I.'s who were prosecuted by the military and who have been issued less than honorable discharges as well, bear the burden of paying twice for the same crime. We advocate one type of discharge for the future, the upgrading of all previous discharges, and civilian jurisdiction over judicial matters. For those whose charges are still pending, we feel that amnesty should include having them dropped for both military and civilian resisters.

UNITY IN DEMAND FOR AMNESTY

Our analysis of amnesty, therefore, brings us to the inescapable conclusion that all forms of resistance must be united. This is the best manner in which to make our political values clear, and it is also the most realistic way of uniting that large body of American citizens who are personally involved in one or another aspect of the issue. The government would undoubtedly prefer to individually bring back the desirable draft avoiders from abroad, to quietly try draft resisters at home, and to select penalties for them which reflect their own racist and class bias. The government would prefer to keep the workings of military "justice" as far from public view as possible; the military would like to be able to deal with its own dissenters according to its own standards of discipline as a way of maintaining absolute obedience. The broadest possible amnesty campaign is the best way to offset the government's preferences in these matters. A campaign which brings draft avoiders into the foreground at the expense of military resisters is politically self-defeating; it reinforces the anti-working class bias of American society, and it reinforces the racist nature of oppression. Including the question of upgrading discharges means that the military would be additionally faced with confronting its own racist machinery.

Our political analysis leads us to the position that the racist and class bias of American society not only structures the forces of the ruling class, but also attempts to structure the forces of dissent. Those who resisted have been, for the most part, those who were able to do so; those who resisted ill will

were forced to do so. The most vulnerable people have once again taken the greatest risks and are being asked to pay the greatest penalties.

A campaign conducted from this perspective increases its educational value; it prevents it from being only moralistic, and it unites the broad spectrum of the anti-war movement. Historically, the draft resistance orientation of the early anti-war people was based on a moral objection to participation in the Vietnam war or in war in general. This created an unfortunate separation between them and those who were forced -- directly or indirectly -- into the military. With fewer options available, the people who went into the military resented the war and/or racism and oppression by all means open to them. Far from being the "enemy," as early civilian anti-war people saw them, they were in fact immediate or potential allies. This division, which was antagonistic at times, played directly into the hands of the government. More clearly than the civilian anti-war movement, the government recognized the class nature of the difference between those who fought and those who did not, and sought to exploit that difference by calling attention to the backgrounds of most draft "dodgers." And they tried to get support for the war by appealing to working class resentment against those who were able to resist the draft. Of course the government would now seek to maintain that gulf by appearing to reluctantly and quietly grant amnesty to a few draft resisters while ignoring, if not directly attacking military resisters. Our amnesty campaign should prevent this from happening because our unity is based on complete support for all forms of resistance.

AMNESTY AS PART OF THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT--A white deserter from the Military Police now in Canada said: "I want amnesty because amnesty is the best way for America to confront what the Vietnam war was -- if we don't confront it, it will happen again." He deserted in 1970, after the protests at Jackson and Kent State over the invasion of Cambodia. The issue of amnesty therefore, speaks to the heart of the anti-war movement. It is the recognition of the price that the American people have paid in order to oppose the war. Amnesty does not ignore the fact that thousands of American young men were killed or wounded in Vietnam. It puts that fact into the perspective of the price that the Vietnamese people have paid, and into the realization that Americans should never have been sent to fight the Vietnamese people in the first place.

Secondly, the issue of amnesty is of direct personal importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans whose sons, friends, and neighbors are exiles, fugitives, in jail, or unemployed because of the consequences of opposition to the war. It is perhaps the only anti-war issue that the government is powerless to quiet down with its propaganda about the war being over, because the amnesty issue is just beginning and is crucial to millions of people.

Thirdly, talking about the question of amnesty is a realistic way for anti-war groups and individuals to continue to educate the public around the issues of US involvement in Indochina. The creation of the problem of amnesty belongs to the same government that created unwanted intervention in the affairs of the Vietnamese people. Those Americans who blame the anti-war movement for creating the current situation could be re-educated to fix blame where it belongs.

Fourthly, it makes the connection between the G.I. movement and the civilian movement clear, by recognizing the magnitude of the G.I. struggle. The attention and consciousness of the civilian movement to that struggle will help to point out possibilities for future united political work, and will be a clear step forward in the breakdown of class and race bias.

AMNESTY AS PART OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT--Recognition of U.S. reasons for involvement in Vietnam meant, for many Americans, the beginnings of an understanding about U.S. imperialism. The job of public education has only begun in that area, and we feel that the campaign around amnesty should be regarded as essentially basic to an understanding of the ways in which imperialism functions. We are inescapably led to the conclusion that imperialism abroad hinges on public acquiescence if not support, at home; and specifically in terms of an imperial army, it is crucial that the questions we have discussed about who fights in such armies be raised among the general population. An amnesty campaign supports the basic premise that no army has the right to force people to fight imperialist wars, through either indirect economic pressure or by direct means of a draft or criminal prosecution or military resisters. Resistance to the Vietnam war, both within and outside of the military, provides us with an important guide for future opposition to imperialist wars. If the essentially middle-class draft avoiders are focussed on, it will mean that those politically conscious members of the working class are not recognized as such, and that the working class as a whole is perceived as an opponent, instead of as the class most directly affected, hence the strongest political ally. In addition to narrowing rather than broadening our base of support, it will also reinforce the racist and class bias of American society by distinguishing "political" and "moral" acts from the "criminal" acts. The breakdown of the U.S. military was directly caused by the political consciousness of basically working-class young men and women. This is a crucial fact of our analysis in terms of opposition to future wars of U.S. aggression.

AMNESTY AND THE VOLUNTEER ARMY--The end to the draft was seen by the middle class as a victory for the anti-war movement. However, we must closely examine the implications of a professional (volunteer) army.

A fundamental reason for the transformation into a volunteer army was a rapid technological development of weaponry, and the resulting need for highly trained soldier whose careers would be long-term. Related to this fact is the different strategic role which will be assigned to the army in the future; ground forces for wars fought abroad will be provided by the governments who seek U.S. intervention. This is the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine -- the "Vietnamization" of all third world countries. Another way of looking at the same strategy would state that, in the future, the people of the third world will be forced by their ruling classes to fight for U.S. interests. This does not mean that the U.S. will play a less imperialist or less vicious role in future wars, but on the contrary, means that the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Special Forces, as well as the entire technological apparatus will intervene more quickly and forcefully in "support" of "indigenous" armies. "Vietnamization" was in some respects more brutal a policy than direct U.S. intervention because it was even more mechanistic.

the people of Vietnam, and because it allowed government propaganda at home to increasingly ignore the fact of intervention. A professional military has the virtue, therefore, of maintaining domestic ignorance of U.S. imperialist policies on the one hand, and permitting a more rapid and more skillful kind of military intervention on the others.

DOMESTIC COUNTER-INSURGENCY--At home, a professional army is supposed to play a more vital role as a "law and order" force. It will be used in the streets of the U.S. as a counter-insurgency force in dealing with ghetto rebellions, strikes, demonstrations, etc. Essentially, the ruling class has transformed the ground forces of the U.S. military into a civil war army, in which poor people, recruited by severe direct and indirect economic pressure, will be expected to give a life-time of service.

These expectations will have several effects on the lives of future soldiers. The U.S. military is acutely conscious of the need for a tightening up of discipline and morale for an army which will be called on to fight its own people. Acts of desertion and refusal to obey orders are much more crucial in such a situation. Life in the army will have to be even more isolated, sealed off from civilian life and from movements for social change on the part of civilians. The army will have to be a "state within a state" in order to perform well as a counter-insurgency force, and the influence of a civilian movement within the armed forces will be more difficult than it has been during the last few years. Organizing of soldiers by civilians will be extremely difficult. It is for these same reasons that the army is also making military life much more attractive and personally comfortable.

A broad-based amnesty campaign which stresses the correctness of individual responsibility for resisting criminal orders would help to break down the new ideals of the military machine. It should be seen as a way of opening the minds of new recruits for the volunteer army to the possibility and necessity for refusing orders that they find objectionable on political and moral grounds.

AMNESTY AND DOMESTIC ORGANIZING--In terms of the organizing efforts of many different kinds of groups, a campaign for amnesty given unconditionally for all forms of anti-war resistance should be regarded as highly useful. We regard such a campaign as lasting between 4 and 6 years, and think that during that period of time, many issues will be raised which community groups would be able to include and use in their work. Most importantly, it points out the ways in which working class people have paid a high price to oppose the war, and the penalties that they face as a consequence. The amnesty campaign represents the real interests of both working and middle class families whose sons rebelled, and those families are beginning to be organized into active participation in such a campaign. It will be perhaps the first time that the working class can have a direct and visible means of participation in the anti-war movement, and amnesty is therefore a good way in which to unite large numbers of people around an issue that is important to the largest segment of the population.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

An amnesty campaign which presents the class analysis we have spoken of should fit in very well with the attempts of people to point out ways in which class structuring operates in America. It should help those who engage in educational and agitational work in combatting U. S. imperialism. It will be possible to use amnesty campaign material in work that may have to be done around the court-martials of anti-war P. O. W. 's, indeed in the way people talk about the P. O. W. issue in general. Educational work around the people of Indochina can take into account the fact that millions of American people over the last 10 years came to regard them as our friends, not as our enemy. That beginning sense of friendship is certainly part of the reason for refusal to participate in the Vietnam war, and as such is another part of a campaign for amnesty.

The issue of amnesty, then, belongs to those who resisted, opposed, and organized against the war; whether they refused to fight initially, refused to support a military machine, or as veterans of the Vietnam war brought the meaning of it home to America in ways that others were never able to do. Perhaps the feelings of the exiles and the veterans are the most important for the American people to understand. They are both victims of U. S. intervention in Indochina, and it is significant that those who refused to fight and those who did fight agree. It is the U. S. government who ought to be asking for pardon, not amnesty, from those who it caused to be killed or wounded, to kill or wound others, to resist those alternatives by destroying their own lives, or to live in a society which imposes life-long penalties on them. The history of the anti-war movement is the history of decisions and actions that are among the most fundamentally decent and righteous actions that women and men have ever taken.

For those of us who came to understand, because of all these military and civilian resisters, that the war was white America's war, the war of the ruling class and the defense industry, the war of the rich, the racist, and the imperialist -- for us there would be no more progressive a step in our work than to demand universal and unconditional amnesty. Our work goes on -- to demand that there is never again a U. S. government which violates the basic spirit of its own people or of the people of the world.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/9/73

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (100-31763) (C)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] b7C
SM - VVAW
OO: SEATTLE

This case was opened by the Seattle Division on November 2, 1971, and placed in a 100-0 file until May 24, 1972, when a 100-NEW was opened to attempt to identify subject and determine extent of his activities. The 100-0 file was opened, when subject's name appeared on a pamphlet distributed in the Seattle area by the Seattle VVAW Chapter.

Investigation conducted at Seattle failed to identify subject. Seattle sources familiar with revolutionary activities, including VVAW activities in the Seattle area, were contacted and advised they were not familiar with subject or any activities he had participated in. In the VVAW pamphlet the subject's name appeared in connection with Highline Community College, Seattle, Washington, at telephone No. EM 2-0250.

Through a suitable no-name pretext call by SA [REDACTED] to the Registrar's Office, Highline Community College, Seattle, Washington, it was determined that there has never been a [REDACTED] enrolled at that school, and that they had never had telephone No. EM 2-0250 at that school.

b7C
The records of Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company, Seattle, Washington, does not show telephone No. EM 2-0250 as ever being listed to [REDACTED] or being affiliated with Highline Community College.

Logical Seattle area [REDACTED] were checked with negative results regarding [REDACTED]

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Seattle
WGG:kn
(3)

REC-40

22 MAY 15 1973

59 MAY 21 1973



SE 100-31763

Seattle Division does not feel further investigation to identify subject is warranted, as Seattle sources have not reported subject as being involved in any revolutionary activities in this area. This case is being closed at Seattle to be reopened at such time information is received to further identify subject and indicate if activity involved in revolutionary activities which may in some way be a threat to national security.

F B I

Date: 5/4/73

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

FROM: SAC, BUFFALO (100-21623) (P)

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION
IS - RA

(OO: Chicago)

Re Chicago tel to the Bureau dated 4/26/73.

Referenced Chicago teletype indicates that a source of the Chicago Office revealed that ED DAMATO, VVAW National Coordinator, advised that there would be a future undetermined action by VVAW in support of deserters and draft dodgers to be held at the Peace Bridge, Buffalo, New York, and an undecided western Canada location. No dates for this action were furnished.

On 3/1/73, [REDACTED] advised that plans for the Peace Bridge demonstration were discussed at a meeting of the VVAW, Buffalo Chapter, on 2/28/73. According to source, this demonstration was to be held on 5/19/73 in conjunction with possible demonstrations at Seattle and Detroit. This

REQ 43

100-448092 - 2887

- ② - Bureau (AM)(RM)
2 - Chicago (100-59772) (AM)(RM)
2 - Detroit (AM)(RM)
2 - Seattle (AM)(RM)
4 - Buffalo

(1 - 100-22441)

(1 [REDACTED])

GGL:lpf
(12)

MAY 9 1973

EX-105

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE BY

Approved: _____

54 MAY 21 1973

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

BU 100-21623

demonstration is to show support of deserters and draft dodgers in Canada and will demand amnesty for these individuals. Draft dodgers and deserters from Canada are scheduled to be in attendance at these demonstrations.

b2
b7C
b7D
On 5/4/73, [redacted] advised that he had conversation with [redacted] of VVAW, on [redacted] According to source, [redacted] advised that the demonstrations which were to be held on the Peace Bridge have been cancelled because of lack of communication with the deserters and draft dodgers in Canada. [redacted] advised that on 5/19/73, picketing will occur at the site of the Marine Corps Reserve Armed Forces Day display and possibly at the Armed Forces Induction Center in Buffalo. [redacted] could not determine the facts of the demonstrations which were possibly to be held at Seattle and Detroit.

LEADS

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Will contact VVAW sources regarding possible demonstrations in conjunction with exiles in Canada on 5/19/73.

SEATTLE

AT SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

Same as above.

BUFFALO

AT BUFFALO, NEW YORK

b2
b7D
Maintain contact with [redacted] regarding VVAW activities on 5/19/73.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (100-448092)

~~SECRET~~

March 15, 1973

FROM : Legal Attache, TOKYO

(100-1005)

Attn: FBI Laboratory

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR
(VVAW)
IS - REVACT

Request the enclosed Japanese language material, which is described below, be translated ☐ verbatim ☒ in summary and the translation distributed as indicated.

Disposition of Material:

- ☒ Return to this Office
- ☐ Retain at Bureau
- ☐ Other:

Disposition of translations:

- 2 copies to New York
- 2 copies to Tokyo
- _____ copies to _____
- _____ copies to _____

Communication for dissemination to be prepared by New York office.

Remarks:

EX-109

CLASSIFIED AND

EXTENDED

REASON

FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

DATE

BY

REASON

FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

DATE

BY

REASON

FOR

RNB:1mg

(6)

Status: P

Bureau - Enc. ()

~~SECRET~~

22 MAR 20 1973

CRYPT. SECT.

FREE

Legat, Tokyo (100-1005)

EX-103

May 8, 1973

Acting Director, FBI (100-448992)

REC-21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7c

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR
(VVAW)
IS - REVACT

Attached is the final portion of the translation
which you requested by letter dated 3/15/73. (u)

The contents thereof, where pertinent, must be
reported under appropriate captions and afforded whatever
investigative attention is necessary.

The foreign language material is returned herewith. (u)

Enc. (3)

- 2 - New York - Enc. (2) (2 translations) (u)
- 1 - Mr. [REDACTED] (Attn: CI-2), sent direct with enclosure
- 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit, sent direct without enclosure

WKK:kmm
(7)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) BY GLS/gll
DATE 2/6/81

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S)
DATE 2/6/81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-7-80 BY SP-5 RJB/142

MAY 9 - 1973
FBI

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY SP-5 RJB/142
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 5-8-93

CLASSIFIED BY SP-5 RJB/142
DECLASSIFY ON DATE

- Mr. Felt
- Mr. Baker
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Cleveland
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. Gelhardt
- Mr. Jenkins
- Mr. Marshall
- Mr. Miller, E.S.
- Mr. Soyars
- Mr. Thompson
- Mr. Walters
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Kinley
- Mr. Armstrong
- Mr. Bowers
- Mr. Harrington
- Ms. Herwig
- Mr. Mintz
- Mrs. Neenan

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 10370
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 5-8-2002

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXXFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET6

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- ☒ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552Section 552a☒ (b)(1)☐ (b)(7)(A)☐ (d)(5)☐ (b)(2)☐ (b)(7)(B)☐ (j)(2)☐ (b)(3)☐ (b)(7)(C)☐ (k)(1)☐ (b)(7)(D)☐ (k)(2)☐ (b)(7)(E)☐ (k)(3)☐ (b)(7)(F)☐ (k)(4)☐ (b)(4)☐ (b)(8)☐ (k)(5)☐ (b)(5)☐ (b)(9)☐ (k)(6)☐ (b)(6)☐ (k)(7)

- ☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.
- ☐ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of _____

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): _____

- ☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

100-448092-2888

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 004 VS CODED

TELETYPE

8:43 PM 5-10-73 NITEL LEB

TO ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTENTION: INTD

FROM KANSAS CITY (100-NEW 1P

Vietnam Veterans of America
WAW/WINTER SOLDIER RETREAT, JOHN REDMOND DAM AND PARK
BURLINGTON, KANSAS, 6/8-10/73. *IS-RA*

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Baker	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller	_____
Mr. Thompson	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Baynes	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

A CONFIDENTIAL SDURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE
INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE VVAW/WINTER SOLDIER
HAS SCHEDULED A RETREAT FOR 6/8-10/73 TO BE HELD AT THE SITE
OF THE JOHN REDMOND DAM AND PARK, BURLINGTON, KANSAS. THE AGENDA
WILL INCLUDE CHAPTER ROUND ROBINS, DISCUSSION OF THE APRIL NATIONAL
STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF WORKSHOPS
DEALING WITH POST VIETNAM SYNDROME, AMNESTY, WOUNDED KNEE AND CAIRO,
GOVERNMENT DEPRESSION AND WATERGATE, AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR.

ADMINISTRATIVE. CONFIDENTIAL SDURCE IS [REDACTED] BUFILE: [REDACTED]

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU, SDURCE HAS EXPRESSED

WILLINGNESS TO ATTEND RETREAT. AS SUCH, BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO

AUTHORIZE ADVANCED PAYMENT FOR EXPENSES IN THE AMOUNT OF \$75 ABOVE

THE AMOUNT AUTHORIZED BY THE BUREAU TO PAY THE SOURCE PER MONTH.

END.

2 cc. ISS
Adm. data deleted

VAF FBIHQ CLR

cc: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-17-94 BY SP6 BJS/ANP

b7C

NITEL b7c

TO SAC KANSAS CITY REC-49

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR FBI (100-448092) — 2 Pgs

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)/WINTER SOLDIER RETREAT,
JOHN REDMOND DAM AND PARK, BURLINGTON, KANSAS, 6/8-10/73; IS -
REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

REURTEL 5/10/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-17-94 BY 8046 JLV

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO ADVANCE [REDACTED] UP TO \$70 FOR EXPENSES IN CONNECTION WITH ATTENDANCE AT CAPTIONED RETREAT. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING OF EXPENSES INCURRED BY SOURCE.

KANSAS CITY INSURE INFORMANT IS THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED UPON HIS RETURN FROM THE RETREAT AND THEREAFTER, FORM FD-306 SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC LETTER 72-3 (C) REGARDING REPORTING OF RESULTS OF COVERAGE OF SUBVERSIVE CONFERENCES. IF, OF COURSE, DURING RETREAT INFORMANT DEVELOPS ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION OF VALUE, IT SHOULD BE SENT TO HEADQUARTERS AND INTERESTED OFFICES BY TELETYPE.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

1- [REDACTED] b2
2- [REDACTED] (6221 IB) b7C
WHP:erk b7D
(5) *gt*

45p *[Signature]*

NOTE:

Captioned informant is to attend VVAW retreat 6/8-10/73 at Burlington, Kansas. The agenda for this retreat will include chapter round robin, discussion of April National Steering Committee meeting and the organization of workshops dealing with post Vietnam syndrome, amnesty, Wounded Knee and Cairo, Illinois, Government oppression and Watergate, and the Indo-China war. In view of the extreme VVAW activity by the Kansas City Chapter and potential of important information being developed during this retreat, approval for informant to attend it is being granted and advance payment for expenses in amount of \$70 also being approved. This informant has been operated by [redacted] since [redacted] and is paid up to [redacted] per month for services and [redacted] per month for expenses.

~~ROUTE~~ IN ENVELOPE

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herrington _____
Mr. Conny _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eganley _____
Miss Gandy _____

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TELETYPE

NR028 TP CODE

11:04 PM NITEL 5-4-73 JFD

TO ACTING DIRECTOR
ATTN: INTD
SAC, JACKSONVILLE
SAC, WFO

FROM SAC, TAMPA (123-NEW)

VETERANS DEMONSTRATION AND MARCH ON THE WHITE HOUSE
WDC, 5/19/73, IS - VVAV.

ON 5/3/73, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT SCOTT CAMIL, SOUTHEAST REGIONAL
COORDINATOR OF THE VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAV)
IN GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA, HAD ADVISED THAT A DEMONSTRATION
AND A MARCH ON THE WHITE HOUSE BY VETERANS WILL BE HELD ON
SATURDAY, 5/19/73. CAMIL ADVISED THAT THE DEMONSTRATION
AND MARCH WAS A NATIONAL ACTION BY VARIOUS VETERANS GROUPS
IN WHICH THE VVAV WILL PARTICIPATE. THE PURPOSE OF THE
MARCH IS TO DEMONSTRATE FOR VETERANS RIGHTS. CAMIL FURTHER
ADVISED THAT THE FLORIDA VVAV DELEGATION WILL LEAVE GAINESVILLE
FLORIDA, ON THE EVENING OF THURSDAY, 5/17/73, AND VVAV MEMBERS
IN FLORIDA WILL BE A NOTIFIED AT A LATER DATE CONCERNING

END PAGE ONE

57 MAY 22 1973

Adm. data deleted

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

ESM/EE

Mr. Army _____

Mr. Eardley _____

Mrs. Hogan _____

REC-36

100-448892

2890

MAY 16 1973

54

PAGE TWO

FURTHER PARTICULARS.

THE VVAW IS A NATIONAL ORGANIZATION COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF VETERANS OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM, THAT HAS ORGANIZED AND PARTICIPATED IN NUMEROUS DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM DURING 1970-72, INCLUDING THE SEIZURE OF THE STATUS OF LIBERTY, NEW YORK CITY, AND THE OCCUPATION OF THE BETSY ROSS HOUSE, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, IN DECEMBER, 1971. SIX MEMBERS OF THE VVAW WERE INDICTED BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA, JULY, 1972, ON CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THE FEDERAL ANTI-RIOT LAW.

SECRET SERVICE, TAMPA, BEING ADVISED, AND A COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION BEING FURNISHED TO SECRET SERVICE, TAMPA.

ADMINISTRATIVE: THE SOURCE IS [REDACTED]

b2
b7D

WFO AND JACKSONVILLE REQUESTED TO CONTACT APPROPRIATE SOURCES FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIONED MATTER SCHEDULED FOR 5/19/73.

TAMPA WILL FOLLOW CLOSELY WITH SOURCES FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DEMONSTRATION AND MARCH ON THE WHITE HOUSE.

ENO

WGM FBIHQ CLR FOR UR ONE TEL

[REDACTED] b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Mr. Tamm
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Tele. Room
Mr. Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR005 SE PLAIN

TELETYPE

750 PM NITEL 5/15/73 FEE

TO ACTING DIRECTOR --ATTN: INTD--

FROM SEATTLE (100-NEW) 1P

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, DEMONSTRATION AT
FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON, 5/19/73, IS - VVAW. OO: SEATTLE.

ON 5/15/73, SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN
THE PAST REPORTED FORT LEWIS CHAPTER OF VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE
WAR (VVAW) MADE UP OF ACTIVE DUTY ARMY PERSONNEL WILL CONDUCT RALLY
AND DEMONSTRATION AT ONE OF FORT LEWIS' MAIN GATES AT YET
UNSPECIFIED TIME, 5/19/73. NO KNOWN VIOLENCE PROPOSED.

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR IS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION,
COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF VIETNAM WAR VETERANS, WHICH HAS ORGANIZED AND
PARTICIPATED IN NUMEROUS DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST VIETNAM WAR SINCE
1971, INCLUDING SEIZURE OF STATUE OF LIBERTY, NEW YORK CITY, AND
OCCUPATION OF BETSY ROSS HOUSE, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA IN
DECEMBER, 1971. SIX MEMBERS OF VVAW WERE INDICTED BY A FEDERAL GRAND
JURY, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA IN JULY, 1972, ON A CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY
TO VIOLATE ANTI-RIOT LAW.

ABOVE FURNISHED TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND U. S.
ATTORNEY COVERING FORT LEWIS.

ADMINISTRATIVE: SOURCE IS [REDACTED] NO LHM. TELETYPE FOLLOWS EVENT.

END

2 cc. ISS
Adm. data deleted

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/11/00 BY 1045

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/14/73

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (100-32209) (C)

SUBJECT:

(CO: CLEVELAND)

Enclosed for the Bureau are 5 copies of an

LHM re

is [redacted] Cleveland file
serials SA 10, 17, 32, 35, 44.

s [redacted] Cleveland file
SA 3.

Special Agents of the FBI observing parade
and rally September 4, 1972, and also attempting to interview
May 1, 1973, were [redacted] and [redacted]

In view of the fact that logical investiga-
tion has been completed in this matter without any
information that [redacted] meets current ADEX criteria,
and the fact that [redacted] did not wish to furnish any
information to the FBI, this case is being closed in
the Cleveland Division unless advised to the contrary
by Bureau.

2-Bureau (RM)
1-Cleveland

KDB:pjh
(3)

REC-76

21 MAY 17 1973



58 JUN 4 1973

58 MAY 24 1974

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Cleveland, Ohio

May 14, 1973

[REDACTED]

This investigation was predicated on a report received October 29, 1971, from Detective [REDACTED] Officer, Kent State University (KSU), indicating that the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) met on the KSU campus October 21, 1971. b7c

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR

The Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) is a national veterans organization with a national clearinghouse located at 25 West 26th Street, New York City, New York. Its first published objective is "to demand an immediate cessation of fighting and a withdrawal of all American troops from Indochina."

This meeting was for the purpose of electing officers of this group. [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

BIRTH

On July 26, 1972, [REDACTED] to Associate Registrar, KSU, advised that KSU records indicate that [REDACTED] was born [REDACTED] Chic. a11 b7c

EDUCATION

On July 26, 1972, [REDACTED] supra, advised that [REDACTED] has attended KSU from Winter quarter, [REDACTED] through Spring quarter. [REDACTED] 100-442079-2872

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

RE: [REDACTED] b7c

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

[REDACTED] On April 30, 1973, Detective [REDACTED] Security Officer, KSU, advised that [REDACTED] is still in attendance at KSU. [REDACTED] has Social Security Number [REDACTED]. He was born [REDACTED]. He is single, and is a white male. His home address is [REDACTED] Ohio, with his father [REDACTED]. He attended [REDACTED] High School, Akron, Ohio. all b7c

RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT

On April 30, 1973, Detective [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] is currently attending KSU as a student. He resides on campus at [REDACTED] East Main Street, Kent, Ohio.

MILITARY SERVICE

On July 26, 1972, [REDACTED] Supra, advised that [REDACTED] came to KSU in winter quarter, [REDACTED] from the United States Army, where he received his High School diploma via a General Education Development certificate.

CREDIT AND ARREST

On February 8, 1972, [REDACTED] Clerk, Kent, Ohio, Police Department advised that she could locate no record identifiable with subject.

On February 8, 1972, Detective [REDACTED] Kent, Ohio, Police Department advised that he could locate no record in the intelligence files of his department identifiable with subject.

On March 20, 1972, [REDACTED] Akron Credit Bureau, Incorporated, Akron, Ohio, advised his records indicate no information of a derogatory nature concerning [REDACTED]

RE: [REDACTED] b7C

On March 28, 1972, [REDACTED] Portage County Sheriff's Office, Ravenna, Ohio, advised that she could locate no record in the files of her department identifiable with subject.

On June 1, 1972, [REDACTED] Identification Division, Summit County Sheriff's Office, Akron, Ohio, advised that he could locate no record identifiable with subject.

On June 2, 1972, [REDACTED] Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, Police Department indicated that the only record she could locate identifiable with subject was that he received three traffic citations.

ACTIVITIES

On February 10, 1972, [REDACTED] who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that [REDACTED] was present at a meeting that date of the KSU chapter of the VVAW at 4:30 p.m., room 205, Student Union, KSU.

On February 14, 1972, Detective [REDACTED] Supra, advised that a source of his office, who has furnished reliable information in the past, but whose identity he did not further reveal, advised that [REDACTED] was quite active in the VVAW. He was treasurer of the organization and attends most of the meetings. However, he seems to have no part of other New Left activities.

On March 20, 1972, Detective [REDACTED] advised that the above information is still valid.

On March 31, 1972, [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was present at a meeting of the KSU chapter of VVAW on the KSU campus on March 30, 1972.

RE: [REDACTED] b7C

On [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was present at a meeting that date of KSU chapter of VVAW at 967 West Main Street, Kent, Ohio.

On May 4, 1972, [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was present at a meeting [REDACTED] at 9:00 p.m. on the KSU campus.

On May 23, 1972, [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] is still a member of the VVAW, and is Treasurer of the organization. However, he is no longer active, having missed several meetings. He has not collected dues of the organization for the past year.

On September 4, 1972, [REDACTED] was observed by Special Agents of the FBI participating in an anti-war parade and rally at Akron, Ohio. Both the rally and parade were completely peaceful, and there were no incidents or arrests.

On October 19, 1972, Detective [REDACTED] KSU, advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as such, [REDACTED] he advised that [REDACTED] of the group. [REDACTED]

His interest lay in ending the war in Vietnam. He was opposed, however, to the trend the group took to the left politically recently and was also very opposed to violence, which he spoke against in meetings of the organization regularly.

INTERVIEW

On May 1, 1973, Special Agents of the FBI contacted [REDACTED] at his residence at [REDACTED] East Main Street, Kent, Ohio. [REDACTED] indicated that he did not wish to make any statement whatever to the FBI.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Cleveland, Ohio

May 14, 1973

Title

[REDACTED] b7C

Character

Reference Memorandum, dated and captioned
as above at Cleveland, Ohio.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed
in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Mr. Felt —
Mr. Baker —
Mr. Callahan —
Mr. Cleveland —
Mr. Conrad —
Mr. Gebhardt —
Mr. Jenkins —
Mr. Marshall —
Mr. Miller, E.S. —
Mr. Savers —
Mr. Thompson —
Mr. Walters —
Tele. Room —
Mr. Kinley —
Mr. Armstrong —
Mr. Bowers —
Mr. Holloman —
Ms. Herwig —
Mr. Mintz —
Mrs. Neenan —

NR020 PH CODE

1247 AM PM 3-27-73 NITEL R J C

TO ACTING DIRECTOR (100-448092)

NEW YORK (100-160644)

WFO

FROM PHILADELPHIA (100-51647)

DECLASSIFIED BY 5066 JWA
ON 11/17/94

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW); IS - REV ACT.

RE NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM, 12-6-72, WITH DUAL
CAPTION "COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH ON THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY (CARIC); IS - SUBVERSIVE;
AKA [REDACTED] SM - PCPJ."

ON 3-27-73, A SOURCE PROVIDED A 16 PAGE XERDX
COPY OF A BULLETIN TITLED "COUNTER SPY", DATED MARCH 1973,
VOL. 1, NO. 1, PUT OUT BY CARIC.

END PAGE ONE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
100-472769

REC-95

100-448092-289

23 MAY 8 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Records place in
100-472769 re
CARIC

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF
DATE 5/10/78

MAY 16 1973
MAY 16 1973

MAY 29 1973
79 MAY 30 1973

Classified by 32
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite 5/2/78

PAGE TWO

THIS BULLETIN INDICATES THAT THE CURRENT CARIC MEMBERS ARE WINSLOW PECK, K. BARTON DSBORN, GARY THOMAS, AND TOM BUTZ. THE BULLETIN, "COUNTER SPY" IS TO BE PUBLISHED MONTHLY. A MAILING ADDRESS FOR CARIC IS LISTED AS CARIC, BOX 647, BEN FRANKLIN STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20044.

ARTICLES WITHIN THIS BULLETIN INCLUDE ONE ENTITLED "THE FBI AND THE PARAMILITARY RIGHT; PARTNERS IN TERROR". THIS ARTICLE REPORTS THAT THE FBI IN SAN DIEGO, CALIF., USED A RIGHTIST GROUP CALLED THE SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION TO ATTACK THE LEFT IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CALIF.

A SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE APPEARING ON PAGE 2 INDICATED THAT THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THE FBI ANNUAL REPORT WOULD BE REPRINTED IN THIS ISSUE. NO SUCH DATA APPEARED IN THE PAGES FURNISHED BY SOURCE.

END PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE THREE

PAGE 13 OF THIS BULLETIN ADVISES THAT CARIC AND THE VVAW ARE SPONSORING A WINTER SOLOIER INVESTIGATION (WSI) WHICH WILL PRESENT PUBLIC TESTIMONY BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE EMPLOYEES FROM BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AGENCIES. "THE TESTIMONY WILL HILIGHT WORLO WIOE ACTIVITIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT EXPOSING THE MUNOANE AND TERRIBLE SIOES OF INTELLI- GENCE." A QUESTIONAIRE IS INCLUOEO WHICH SOLICITS INFORMATION FROM FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE FOLLOWING INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCIES:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND G-2 FUNCTION), SPECIAL FORCES, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND (NIC FORMERLY ONI), AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY OR ONE OF THE SERVICE CYRPTOLOGIC AGENCIES (NSA, ASA, USA, AFSS, AND NSG), MILITARY INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES INCLUOING OSI, NIS, CIO, OIS, ETC., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OR ORGANIZATIONS.

ENO PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE FOUR

PERSONS RESPONDING ARE TO INCLUDE ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
BASIC INFORMATION REGARDING THEIR TRAINING AND FORMER
INTELLIGENCE POSITION BUT THEY ARE NOT TO INCLUDE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE. THOSE RESPONDING WOULD
LATER BE CONTACTED BY THE WSI COORDINATING COMMITTEE.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] IS NOW
EMPLOYED BY UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI) AT THE
NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. HE WILL NOW
PERMANENTLY RESIDE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. b7c/D

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SOURCE I [REDACTED] LHM FOLLOWS. b2 b7D

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PHILADELPHIA INFORMANTS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THEREFORE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

E N O b7c/D

~~CORRECTION WORD THREE LAST LINE THIS PG SHD BE "ON"~~

PLS ACK FOR TWO

ACK FOR 2 FOR 2 JPS FBIHQ CLR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
c [REDACTED] b7c

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXXFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

4

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- ☒ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552Section 552a☐ (b)(1)☐ (b)(7)(A)☐ (d)(5)☐ (b)(2)☐ (b)(7)(B)☐ (j)(2)☐ (b)(3)☒ (b)(7)(C)☐ (k)(1)☐ (b)(7)(D)☐ (k)(2)☐ (b)(7)(E)☐ (k)(3)☐ (b)(7)(F)☐ (k)(4)☐ (b)(4)☐ (b)(8)☐ (k)(5)☐ (b)(5)☐ (b)(9)☐ (k)(6)☐ (b)(6)☐ (k)(7)

- ☒ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

- ☐ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of _____

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): _____

- ☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

100-448092-2894

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Koe
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/94 BY SP5/ANW

NR 009 PD CODE
7:24 PM NITEL 5/16/73 AJW
TO: ACTING DIRECTOR
ATTN: INTD
SEATTLE
FROM: PORTLAND (100-12313) (P) 3P

b7c

DEMONSTRATION SPONSORED BY VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR
(VVAW), FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON, 5/19/73. MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION
CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY).

ON 5/16/73, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE
INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED AS FOLLOWS:

Bu
27

THE FORT LEWIS VVAW ALONG WITH ACTIVE DUTY SERVICEMEN FROM FORT
LEWIS AND MC CHORD AIR FORCE BASE ARE PLANNING A DEMONSTRATION AT THE
MADIGAN GATE EXIT OF INTERSTATE-5 FREEWAY AT FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON,
12:00 NOON TO 2:00 P.M., 5/19/73 (ARMED FORCES DAY) *BEC SO*

100-46186-28

VVAW IS AN ANTI-WAR ORGANIZATION ORGANIZED IN 1967 WITH HEAD-
QUARTERS IN NEW YORK CITY. ITS FIRST PUBLISHED OBJECTIVE IS "TO
DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE SECESSION OF FIGHTING AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
AMERICAN TROOPS FROM INDO-CHINA."

-28

END OF PAGE ONE
100-12313-21973

cc **[REDACTED]**

b7c

Handwritten notes:
1. ...
2. ...
3. ...
4. ...
5. ...
6. ...
7. ...
8. ...
9. ...
10. ...

56

FD 100-12313

PAGE TWO

THIS DEMONSTRATION IS PLANNED TO COUNTER ANY MILITARY DISPLAY AT FORT LEWIS IN HONOR OF ARMED FORCES DAY. THE DEMONSTRATORS INTEND TO PROTEST RACISM IN THE MILITARY AND THE FACT THAT UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ARE MISDIRECTED.

AFTER RALLY AT MADIGAN GATE EXIT, THE DEMONSTRATORS INTEND TO MARCH THROUGH THE TOWN OF TILlicum, WASHINGTON, TO HENRY TODD PARK IN ORDER TO HEAR ADDITIONAL SPEAKERS AND OBSERVE GUERRILLA THEATER.

INCLUDED AMONG THE SPEAKERS WILL BE AN UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL RECENTLY RETURNED FROM WOUNDED KNEE, SOUTH DAKOTA. THIS INDIVIDUAL INTENDS TO SPEAK ON HOW THE MILITARY HAS BEEN USED TO CRUSH THE INDEPENDENT OGLALLA SIOUX NATION.

SOURCE ADVISED DEMONSTRATION IS INTENDED AS A PEACEFUL PROTEST AND NO VIOLENCE IS PLANNED.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE UTILIZED IS [REDACTED] b2, b7D

SOURCE STATED FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS DEMONSTRATION COULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE SHELTER HALF COFFEE HOUSE, 1902 TACOMA AVENUE, TACOMA, WASHINGTON, TELEPHONE 272-5227. THIS ESTABLISHMENT
END OF PAGE TWO

PD 100-12313

PAGE THREE

IS WELL KNOWN TO SEATTLE DIVISION.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

SEATTLE REQUESTED TO DISSEMINATE ABOVE INFORMATION TO PROPER
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

PORTLAND WILL REMAIN ALERT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING
CAPTIONED MATTER AND WILL KEEP BUREAU AND SEATTLE ADVISED.

END

XGM FBIHQ CLR FOR UR ONE ELXXX TEL

3

RR161 FM 0000

0:43 PM / TEL 5-15-73 DNE

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR (103-443322)

FROM : BUFFALO (100-21513) CP

0 VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE
WAR (VVAW)/UNITED SOLDIER ORGANIZATION
IS - PA

ON 5/14/73, A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFOR-
MATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT BUFFALO CHAPTER VVAW INTENDS
TO MARCH ARMED SOLDIERS DAY DEMONSTRATION BY U. S. MARINE CORPS
POSTERS, LASALLE PARK, BUFFALO, NEW YORK ON 5/19/73. SOURCE
STATED TENTATIVE PLANS CALL FOR PICKETING AND POSSIBLE SHERIFF
THEATRE AT PARK ENTRANCE AND IF POSSIBLE IN MIDDLE OF MARINE
CORPS RESERVE FIRE POINT DEMONSTRATION. SOURCE STATED PLANS
CALL FOR NON-VIOLENT ACTIVITY AND ACTIVITY THAT WOULD RESULT IN
ARRESTS WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED.

ON 5/15/73, SOURCE ADVISED NO NEW INFORMATION HAS BEEN
OBTAINED REGARDING POSSIBLE DISRUPTION OF U. S. MARINE CORPS
ACTIVITIES.

END PAGE ONE

5-16-73
2cc to Crim Dir.
b7C
1 XEROX
MAY 21 1973
55 MAY 24 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/94 BY SP4B/AVS/579

21 MAY 18 1973

BU 100-21693

PAGE 2

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE BUFFALO AIRTEL TO THE BUREAU, DATED 5/8/73.

SOURCE UTILIZED IS [REDACTED] BUFFALO POLICE DEPARTMENT
AND U. S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE, BUFFALO, NEW YORK, ADVISED
REGARDING ABOVE. BUFFALO WILL FOLLOW ACTIVITIES OF MURKIN ON
5/19/73.

P

END

b2
b7D

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
Service Unit - Room 6524
Forward
Attention
Return to

Type of References Requested:
☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
Main References Only

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup
☐ Variations

Subject
Birthdate & Place
Address

Localities

R#

Prod.

Date 5/11

Searcher
Initials

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/01 BY 1042 pka

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-443092)

DATE: 5/18/73

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-15319) (RUC)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION
SM - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

OO: CHICAGO

Re Minneapolis letter to Bureau, dated December 7, 1972.

On May 17, 1973, [REDACTED] advised, as he has regularly advised over the past six months, that the former Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) organization in Minnesota is completely defunct. At various times individuals from Milwaukee have attempted to interest source and other Minneapolis people in establishing a VVAW chapter in the Twin Cities area with no success.

During the past six months sources who have been contacted on a regular basis relative to revolutionary activities throughout the Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota area have failed to indicate there exists any VVAW group or have been any VVAW activities within this area.

It is noted that in the minutes of the VVAW/USO National Steering Committee Meeting, Placitas, New Mexico, April 19-23, 1973, as contained in Chicago letter to the Bureau captioned as above dated May 7, 1973, it is set forth that South Dakota has been annexed to the Kansas/Western Missouri Region of VVAW/USO because of lack of activity within this state.

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Chicago (100-50772) (RM)
1-Milwaukee (100-15674) (RM) (Info)
2-Minneapolis
(1-72-6232) (HOUNDED KNEE)
FBC:kh
(7)

REC-67

MAY 18 1973



5010-108-01

54 MAY 23 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

17 (100-15819)

It is further noted that WMA participation in the disorder at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, is being investigated in the Wounded Knee Special, and if there are any indications WMA becomes permanently organized in South Dakota as a result of this participation, this case will be re-opened and appropriate investigation conducted.

In view of the above, this matter is being considered RUC.

Memorandum to Mr. [REDACTED]
RE: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAV)

b7c

[REDACTED]

OBSERVATIONS:

[REDACTED]

ACTION:

For information.

Bq 3-5 WWP/RES

EM

FBI

Date: 4/30/73

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL / _____
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

FROM: SAC, [REDACTED] (P)

CHANGED: **b7D**
 VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/WINTER
 SOLDIER ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)
 IS - RA

Title marked CHANGED to reflect organizational
 name change approved by VVAW at Placitas, N.M.

b7D [REDACTED] 3/7/73: [REDACTED] 4/23/73
 [REDACTED] 4/24/73, titled as previous
 reference.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 5 copies of an LHM
 dated and captioned as above.

Enclosed for other receiving offices are 2 copies
 of same LHM.

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
- 2 - Albany (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Albuquerque (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Buffalo (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Chicago (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Denver (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Jacksonville (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Miami (Enc. 2)
- 2 - Minneapolis (Enc. 2)
- 3 - [REDACTED]

TVH: [REDACTED]
 (21)

SS, CIA, STATE, IS (2), OTT (2) WBS
 5/8/73
 R/S
 R/LW2

ALL INFORMATION
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11/17/94 BY SP-6 BJS/ML

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Jacksonville, Florida
April 30, 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/ WINTER
SOLDIER ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)

The Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), is a national organization composed primarily of veterans of the War in Vietnam, that has organized and participated in numerous demonstrations against the war in Vietnam during 1970-1972, including the seizure of the Statue of Liberty, New York City, and the occupation of the Betsy Ross House, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in December, 1971. Six members of the VVAW were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, Tallahassee, Florida, July, 1972, on charge of conspiracy to violate the Federal Antiriot Law.

On April 25, 1973, source advised that during a meeting of VVAW National Steering Committee at Placitas, New Mexico, on April 21, 1973, it was voted to change the name of VVAW to VVAW/WSO.

On April 25, 1973, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised the following.

On Wednesday, April 18, 1973, [redacted] delegation to the VVAW National Steering Committee (NSC), meeting, arrives in Placitas, New Mexico, to attend the meeting. [redacted]

[redacted] in locating the camp site for the meeting. The meeting was to be held from April 19 to April 23, 1973, at George Stapleton's Ranch. After arrival at the camp site, the evening of April 18, 1973, was spent setting up tents for the stay at the camp.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by John Edward Hegarty
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification: Indefinite

DECLASSIFIED
ON 11/19/94
E6654148

b7D

- 2899

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER
ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On [REDACTED]
conversations were held with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] last name [REDACTED]
Vietnam veteran; and [REDACTED]

b7C
b7D

[REDACTED] the American Indian Movement (AIM),
is stockpiling weapons in an undisclosed place in New Mexico,
and future plans are for AIM to take over an unnamed town in
New Mexico. He said no attempt is to be made until the stock-
pile of arms and ammunition is adequate. [REDACTED]
arms and ammunition for sale [REDACTED] be located and specific
ammunition needed as 7.62 Soviet, .30-.30, 9 mm, and .30-06.
He said among weapons already available were Soviet AR's and
AK's.

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b7D

[REDACTED] AIM is planning a march to emanate from
a town near Wounded Knee, possibly Rapid City, South Dakota,
beginning approximately April 29, 1973, to arrive in Wounded
Knee on May Day, May 1, 1973. She said AIM hopes for approxi-
mately 3,000 participants in this march. Plans are for the
march to be made on the main highway through Government
roadblocks. She said participants are instructed not to
carry weapons, but the march will force a confrontation with
marshals at the roadblocks and marchers will stop only if
arrested or shot.

[REDACTED] advised another group of AIM members are
making plans to take over a mountain range on the border
between New York and Canada. Canadian Indians are to take and
hold the same mountain on the Canadian side. No date has
been set for this takeover, but it is hoped this will be the
start of a revolution in the United States. She said AIM is
planning on a total of 17 Indian takeovers of territory in the
United States. Also during a talk at the VVAW National
Steering Committee meeting, Ann advised that Indians in Wounded
Knee told her that they would stay in Wounded Knee until death.
She said Indian women are carrying arms and inhabitants of
Wounded Knee have homemade grenades, dynamite, firebombs, and
sticks of dynamite attached to arrows as rocket grenades, as
well as conventional weapons.

[REDACTED] known as [REDACTED] VVAW
[REDACTED] stated she was recruiting Vietnam vets

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VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER
ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to go to Wounded Knee to replace Vietnam vets already there, and she is the go-between for vets and Indians. She said many of the Indians who have been indicted for Wounded Knee participation have left Wounded Knee and she has knowledge as to where they are hiding.

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b7D
[redacted] all advised they have been in Wounded Knee in the past [redacted] left Wounded Knee on Saturday, April 21, 1973, after spending ten days there [redacted] advised also he had been in Wounded Knee on three different occasions. [redacted] there are currently seven or eight VVAW members in Wounded Knee, including [redacted] who is acting as a guide to take people in and out of Wounded Knee.

[redacted] furnished Rapid City, South Dakota, contact points for persons who wished to enter Wounded Knee as follows:

"Com Centre"
208 11th St.
605 348-1094
605 348-1095

Legal 605
348-3326; this number to be called to go in Wounded Knee

[redacted]
605 348-1090
Ext. 109

The National Steering Committee meeting was scheduled to begin on April 19, 1973. Due to a severe snow storm, delegates, including the national leadership group, did not arrive until the night of Thursday, April 19, 1973, and no meetings were held on that day.

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b7D
It was believed by [redacted] that the national leadership group delays their arrival at the site [redacted]

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER
ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Plans were known to the national office

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b7D

The NSC meeting began on Friday, April 20, 1973, with approximately 75 voting delegates present. Because of the snow storm, the Friday session was not held at the camp site, but at a community center in Bernalillo, New Mexico. Present were delegates from California, Florida, Kansas, Arkansas, Texas, New York, Alabama, New Mexico, Louisiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Ohio, Washington, and Pennsylvania; as well as the national officers. The meeting began with roll call, followed by regional reports, including a report on the conspiracy trial upcoming in Gainesville, Florida. A security check was made and four persons lacking proper credentials were asked to leave. These included three from California, and one from New York. A committee was formed to draw up an agenda for old and new business to be presented at the meeting.

The National Financial Report was presented to the meeting and it was announced that the national VVAW had collected \$26,000 since the last meeting, had spent \$10,000 and had outstanding debts of \$15,000.

Barry Romo was voted by the group as a national officer for one more year.

The group then discussed workshop items to be discussed during workshops on Saturday, April 21, 1973, and

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**VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER
ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

voted to discuss the name change for VVAW in workahopa under New Business. An attempt to organize a national traveling organizer was voted down by the delegates in order to keep the powers of organizing within each regional chapter.

The Friday night session ended at approximately 1 a.m., and the delegates spent the night in the community center. The VVAW had permission to use the community center to hold meetings, but was not authorized to stay in the center during the night and, therefore, was told they could no longer use the center since they violated the rules. On Saturday morning, all the delegates left the community center and returned to the camp site at Stapleton's Ranch to conduct the remainder of the meetings.

On Saturday, April 21, 1973, the meeting was reconvened at approximately 9 a.m., with delegates breaking up into individual workahopa to discuss business and proposals to be presented at the full meeting later in the day.

Following the workshops, the delegates met as a group and proposals were presented and voted on by the group.

The first proposal presented was a motion that the National Steering Committee meet once every four months for a total of three times a year. Five areas were recommended as meeting sites for the next NSC meeting. These sites were Gainesville, Florida, St. Louis, Missouri, Cincinnati, Ohio, Boque Chitto, Ala., and Los Angeles, California. It was believed that the national officers wanted the next meeting to be held in a northern site such as Cincinnati or St. Louis, but through prior efforts in obtaining a voting bloc, Scott Camil was able to swing a vote to have the next meeting at Gainesville, Florida. The final vote was 40 to 30 in favor of Gainesville, in a runoff over St. Louis, Missouri. It was decided that the next NSC meeting would be held on August 16-21, 1973, Thursday to Monday, with the meeting to start at 12 noon on August 16, 1973.

The Gainesville Conspiracy Trial was discussed and it was decided that national support would be available in the form of nationwide demonstrations. Since no trial date had been set for the trial, final plans will be made contingent on the date. It was determined that the actions would last approximately a week and would consist of pickets, vigils,

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**VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER
ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

teach-ins, marches and guerrilla theaters.

A proposal was submitted regarding the internal restructuring of non-functioning regional offices. The proposal stated that the NSC should be empowered to determine whether or not a region is non-functioning, that is, failing to carry out its duties as a VVAW chapter. The NSC would then be empowered to annex these regions to other nearby regions which are active. These actions would be determined on a case-by-case basis by the national office. This proposal was approved by a 53½ to 11½ vote. It was proposed that the national office be empowered to mail literature concerning VVAW directly to each local chapter within a region rather than to the regional office, in order to speed up delivery of information and to prevent duplication of mailing. This proposal was carried with 41 votes for, 19 against and 15 abstentions. A proposal was presented that each regional office would determine its own policies concerning its regional area, separate and apart from policies presented by the national office, and would submit regular reports to the national office. This proposal was carried with 57½ for, 12½ votes against, and 5 abstentions.

In an effort to further define rules governing membership and chapters within the VVAW, it was proposed that a member of the VVAW be recognized as a person who supports and works for VVAW objectives. A chapter is a group that supports VVAW objectives determined by the national office, and local objectives determined by the regional office. This proposal was carried unanimously.

A proposal was made to change the name of the VVAW to the VVAW-Winter Soldier Organization. This proposal was carried with 48 for, 12 against, and 15 abstentions. This proposal was approved with no date set for finalizing the move since it was felt the name change should be voted on at a regional level across the country.

The Saturday session ended at approximately 11 p.m.

On Sunday, April 22, 1973, the session was again called to order and broke up into workshops to study a position paper on amnesty. Each workshop group was given a nine-page position paper outlining the VVAW campaign for amnesty and this was discussed and any changes felt necessary were noted during the workshops. At approximately 12 noon, the full conference

**VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER
ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)**

CONFIDENTIAL

reassembled to discuss and vote on the position of amnesty to be taken by the VVAW. The group voted to meet with amnesty groups throughout the country in order to build a united front for amnesty nationwide. It was also decided to obtain backing through educational processes for the United States House Bill 236, which is on amnesty.

The delegates voted to meet on May 23-26, 1973, in Canada during the international conference on amnesty to be held in Canada. VVAW national office will appoint ten persons to attend this meeting. The position paper discussed in the workshops was now discussed in conference and certain changes were made in the paper and the position paper was accepted unanimously with the changes.

Following the amnesty discussion, the NSC meeting ended at approximately 5 p.m., Sunday, April 22, 1973, with the delegates dispersing to returning to their respective areas.

The following is the position paper "Campaign for Amnesty".

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

POSITION PAPER

This paper is an attempt to theoretically discuss the issues involved in a campaign around amnesty: amnesty for who, under what circumstances, with some suggestions for overall strategy. It is meant as an organizing tool for those who have thought about the subject, and who are interested (or currently) working on such a campaign. Additionally, it will hopefully put into perspective the different points of view that presently exist on the subject. It is the work of several individuals who are not affiliated with any organization, but who have given serious thought to the opinions of groups that are especially concerned with the subject: exiles and resisters themselves, veterans, G.I.'s, community organizers, and the families of those directly affected. As this paper is circulated, we hope to reach agreement with these groups, so that all the various organizations concerned see themselves as operating within a strategy for a national amnesty campaign.

BACKGROUND

There are several basic starting points which are relevant to any discussion of the amnesty issue: first, that US intervention in Indochina has been by Presidential decree only, without the declaration of war by Congress, and therefore has always been an illegal war. In addition to illegal entry, the US has violated the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, the International Rules of War, and the Nuremberg principles that it stated in the Nazi trials after World War II. ~~THE NUREMBERG~~ ~~TRIALS~~ held that an individual is personally responsible for his or her own acts, no matter what orders may have been given by a higher civilian or military authority. Resistance to fighting in that war, therefore, came from several conclusions about both the spirit and letter of domestic and international law. There was additionally the widespread feeling that the US as a superpower was interfering in the internal affairs of other countries for reasons that had nothing to do with national security or defense.

TYPES OF RESISTANCE--Hundreds of thousands of American men legally resisted the draft; they found ways to prevent their personal involvement in the Vietnam war. These ways include: C.O. status, staying in school, getting jobs which carried draft exemptions, finding medical excuses often provided by anti-war and sympathetic doctors, etc. The common basis for all these types of actions was the financial ability and availability of information to essentially a middle-class group. These people are usually not counted among figures of resisters, because their forms of resistance carried no penalty, but they in fact form an enormous base of people who acted as they did because of anti-war sentiment, and they ought to realize that their actions were responsible for both the increased anti-war sentiment in the population at large, and also for the necessity of other young men taking their place in the draft. This last fact had particularly high consequences for the working class, poor and third world segment of society. We should look to this group of successful resisters for help in organizing local amnesty campaigns..

REFUSED REGISTRATION OR INDUCTION--The majority of those men who refused to register or who refused induction are still vulnerable to prosecution. It was these acts of resistance which attracted public attention on anti-war resistance to the draft, and which resulted in a tremendous court backlog of cases. The courts are now moving to prosecute these cases after a slowdown of several years. It is clearly the hope of the Nixon administration that the Cease-Fire Agreement has taken public attention away from these cases.

LIVING WITHIN THE US--The government is currently paying particular attention to those resisters who are politically conscious and active, and while it is true that many resisters will be dealt with leniently, we also know that those who are active will be dealt with extremely harshly--the members of groups like the Young Lords Party, Rising Up Angry, etc. Public silence around these trials will help in that direction. Politically conscious people should be aware of this and should be able to make a decision.

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OBJECTIVES:

BACKGROUND:

Historical background; Legal and Illegal Types of Resistance:

Civilian Resisters: Refusal to register or to be inducted; Those living within the US;

Those living in exile abroad:

Military Resisters: Those who left the military before assignment to Vietnam; Those who left after Vietnam duty:

Discharges based on anti-war and anti-

military activities; Criminal prosecution:

Criminal prosecution of civilian protesters:

ANTI-AMNESTY SENTIMENT:

Among the American people; the Gallup Poll

on civilian resisters; Women more

sympathetic initially to amnesty:

The Government's anti-amnesty position; a

further loss of credibility; Nixon's

moral crusade; an economic analysis:

OUR STRATEGY:

Definition of terms: amnesty, pardon:

Case-by-case reviews; for civilians, for military:

Discharge Upgrading; Charges pending:

Principle of Unity in amnesty demand:

Amnesty as part of the anti-war movement; as

part of the anti-imperialist movement:

Amnesty and the end of the draft; the Volunteer

Army; the Nixon Doctrine; Domestic counter-

insurgency:

Amnesty and domestic organizing:

Concluding Thoughts:

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to take place. We can assume that the men involved, for the most part, can be organized around their own defense.

LIVING AS EXILES--There are presently about 200,000 men in America who are either fugitives from the draft or military, awaiting trial, or in prison. Canadian exiles number upwards of 60,000, including both the resisters and their families. These men have been forced to completely change their lives: to leave friends, family and country, in order not to compromise their political and moral beliefs. An economic analysis of this group would show that, for most, legal forms of resistance were not feasible. Resisters who were able to plan their exile in advance were better able to take advantage of Canadian immigration requirements; many have made new lives and have applied for Landed Immigrant Status. Some of the draft resisters and almost all deserters do not have either the skills or the financial backing to attain such status, and it is this group that Canada has recently begun to move against and will eventually deport. They are the most vulnerable of the exiles.

MILITARY RESISTERS--Men who left the military after induction are that group for whom alternatives were very few. They largely came from poor economic backgrounds; many did not have information about legal resistance available in any form, they did not have information about the nature of the war itself and only learned after they were in the military. Many of them believed that the war was necessary in order to protect their country, many were persuaded that it was their patriotic duty to defend us against communism.

This group has always been the "cannon fodder" of any war--they have traditionally regarded the military as a way out of their economic situation, and as a way to help their families. Not only did this group always have difficulty in obtaining good jobs, but over a period of time, they have been forced to be primarily concerned with their own survival, and entering the military, whether by draft or by enlistment, was always seen as one more way of survival among a dismal set of choices. Of this group, many third world young men, particularly believed military propaganda about opportunities for further education and skill training. After induction, they came to realize that the military not only did not provide these opportunities, but by virtue of duty assignments, was in fact relegating them to that group which would take the most risk, and be most likely to be killed or wounded in action.

Figures about the size of this group are difficult to ascertain; the military automatically classifies all AWOL'S as deserters after 30 days. We can get some idea of the potential size of this group, however. In 1966, there were about 16,000 AWOL'S and deserters from the Army alone. In 1970, there were over 65,000 AWOL'S and deserters from the Army. Up until the last few years, the majority of exiles in Canada were draft resisters; during the last two years, 90% of the resisters who went to Canada were military resisters. The majority of the exiles in Europe have always been military resisters.

MILITARY RESISTERS AFTER VIETNAM DUTY--There is a sizeable number of deserters and AWOL'S who left the military after their period of duty in Vietnam. This group reacted in a particularly emotional way to their experiences in Vietnam. They came to hate and distrust the US military machine, based on their only knowledge of what the Vietnam war was all about. Lack of adequate preparation, and understanding that they were being forced to take tremendous risks, this group deserted wherever they happened to be--in western Europe, in the Pacific or in the US itself.

RESISTANCE DISCHARGES--Since 1963, 500,000 G.I.'s have received resistance discharges. This group is currently in stockpiles of various kinds, and is being moved to the war inside the military machine. Many of these acts took the form of direct actions against the racism and oppression of the military.

The general breakdown of military morale, discipline, and credibility was the result of a growing awareness on the part of

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THESE ARE ALSO SEVENTY THOUSAND IN OTHER COUNTRIES

G.I.'s about the responsibility of the military for the war and the manner in which it was waged. It was also a reflection of resistance to the oppression of the military, of a growing sense of unity with other young people whose values, life-styles and politics were in direct contradiction to those of the people in authority. The reaction of those soldiers who had fought in Vietnam was extremely bitter, and although most of them did not leave the military, they did engage in acts of protest, of outrage, and of frustration. For third world G.I.'s, the racism exhibited by the officers and an integral part of the military machine, was even less tolerable after service in Vietnam than before. There was also a growing sense of unity with other resistance movements: the black movement at home for example. A black draft avoider in Canada voiced these sentiments, "I'm not a draft evader, I'm a runaway slave. I left because I was not going to fight white America's war." In 1972, 32.6% of all Dishonorable Discharges, and THIRD WORLD PEOPLES FIGURES.

FOOTNOTE: TO BE ADDED ON SOURCE OF FIGURES. The attempts of the military to stem this wave of protest and rebellion caused even more problems. Discipline became harsher and the general climate of repression became stronger. These conditions produced even more individual acts of protest against the military, and we should be prepared to understand and analyze these unconscious acts of resistance as attacks on a system that was both the target of anti-war sentiment and the oppressive machinery that had helped to create the problem.

This large group of men came out of the military with less than honorable discharges and often with criminal records. They do not receive veterans' benefits, have enormous difficulty in getting a job or education, and have largely been forgotten because they are easy to ignore. Any campaign for amnesty must therefore include a demand to upgrade these discharges and the clearing of these records, along with amnesty for civilian and military resisters.

GOVERNMENT'S CIVILIAN PROTESTERS-- By the state's creation of an illegal war, a draft which was then also illegal, and by virtue of a monopoly of channels of information about the war and protest to it, the state also created the need for "illegal" acts of protest which could break through that monopoly. Just as members of the US military were forced to break military law in order to protest the war, and just as civilian young men who did not have legal means of resistance open to them were forced to break civilian laws in order to not participate in that war -- so there is a group of civilians who engaged in anti-war protests of differing kinds in order to gain public attention and focus it on the nature of US involvement in Vietnam. While their military counterparts serve time in briggs and stockades, the civilian men and women are serving time in prisons and jails. Amnesty should include organizing around all those who were forced to break the state's laws in order to resist and protest US actions in Indochina. Just as we are calling for the clearing of criminal records for those who resisted within the military, so we include the sealing of criminal records and dropping of charges for civilians as well.

ANTI-AMNESTY SENTIMENT

A Gallup Poll taken in February 1973 on the subject of attitudes toward draft avoiders (the figures are available about attitudes toward draft avoiders) showed that 10% of the population feel that non-military service should be required, and another 18% feel that a choice of either military or non-military service should be available. The rest of the population (72%) feel that military service should be required. This is a clear indication of the lack of support for amnesty, or even of conditional, for draft avoiders.

Only when all forms of resistance are taken together, as people can come to understand the nature of discharges and

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Our analysis of feelings about amnesty on the part of the general population include the Gallup Poll note that 4 times as many men as women think that draft avoiders should be given jail sentences (10%). Mrs. Patricia Simon, the mother of a son killed in Vietnam, and a supporter of unconditional amnesty for all military and civilian resisters noted: "I think that men like Nixon are more threatened than women by the idea of amnesty. For them, masculinity is still identified with force and violence. It's an ancient definition, but it still applies." We think that Mrs. Simon's statement explains the Gall. Poll figures and conclude that women of all classes are apt to be more sympathetic than men to the position of amnesty. This should not be seen as a strategy for organizing which would stress classless appeals to a "maternal" sensitivity. We agree that there is a dominant male stereotype in America which works against a position of support for amnesty. But realizing that all women are less affected by a MALE thinking which is destructive for all, neither substitutes for, nor contradicts, the strategy of organizing among those people who are most directly affected by the issue because of their economic and social position in society.

GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-AMNESTY POSITION-- It is possible to reach several conclusions about current administration feeling on amnesty. Historically, there is no precedent in America for such a demand. It is true that Confederate soldiers did receive amnesty, but it was a political solution to the problem of reuniting the country after the Civil War, and it is important to note that Union soldiers were being prosecuted for desertion up to 10 years after the war ended. In addition to the lack of precedent, it is more important to realize that the Nixon administration faces and is highly conscious of a growing general lack of credibility on the part of the people toward the government. It is not difficult to understand the administration's fear that an amnesty would only increase that lack of credibility -- such thinking stems directly from their analysis of what support for the government means: if amnesty is granted, then the government might be seen as admitting that the war was wrong and the resistance was legitimate. The government has expended Indochinese and American lives and resources in order to prove that the war was right -- there are no signs of a change in that position.

A second way of analyzing government sentiment on amnesty is to look at the moral crusade that Nixon is waging: a basic return to reactionary values -- authoritarianism, individualism, male stereotypes, unquestioned racism, and support for America's imperialist spirit. There is no place in such a crusade for a program of amnesty, and we should understand that a victory in the amnesty campaign would be a major defeat for the Nixon administration in terms of fostering an even more widespread distrust and questioning of these basic values.

ECONOMICS-- The US is faced with a crisis of unemployment -- not just a question of the lack of jobs in certain areas, for which training programs might be a cure, but a lack of jobs across all levels, and the inability of the economic system to create them. Therefore, the prospect of tens of thousands of young, employable, largely semi- and unskilled young men is not a desirable one. Additionally, these particular young men have already challenged the government once, and a realistic appraisal of them is that they are likely to do so again. For government's sake, it is better to create jail sentences or military service as a way of breaking this spirit of militancy in order that they return to the economic system as passive participants. The fact that many of them who have taken the greatest risks and have been the greatest martyrs to the war have not made them desirable in a racist economy.

...on the women in their families, puts the blame on the individual,

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and allows the government to maintain the cruel myth that if one doesn't oppose the system a good job is the reward. This is another reason why the government would be opposed to upgrading these discharges. Once the method by which these men are labelled and dismissed as being unemployable is removed, a huge segment of the under- or unemployed work force would themselves have and would encourage others to have a very different response to government propaganda about employment opportunities. An "individual" problem would clearly become the collective problem it is, and public confidence in the US economy would be undermined, and could be focussed upon the real causes of unemployment.

OUR STRATEGY

DEFINITIONS -- There has been some discussion of the appropriate terminology that we should use. Basically, we feel that that we are not asking for forgiveness. We are committed to the position that all forms of resistance to the war were morally, politically, and legally correct, and we support the brothers and sisters in all those actions -- direct or indirect. If no crime was committed, then the state has no authority to forgive.

The term "amnesty" legally fits our requirements: it means "the abolition of the crime", in other words, there is no penalty because there was no crime. The term "pardon" is legally used to mean the abolition of the sentence, while recognizing that a crime did occur. It is true that popular usage of the term amnesty carries the connotation of forgiveness which maintains that a crime did occur. We must weigh this public definition of the term against 2 factors: first, that amnesty is legally distinguishable from pardon, and that it does mean the abolition of the crime, not forgiveness for it. Secondly, the term amnesty is the one which most American people are using, and the concept of unconditional amnesty does indeed signify what we want, provided that all the differing kinds of resistance are included. Our analysis means that we will educate people to the fact that no crime was committed, indeed it will form the basis of our campaign. Since the term will be widely used in any event, we feel that we should attempt to make it our term, with our definition.

CASE-BY-CASE REVIEWS-- We must be particularly careful to avoid the term of pardon, not only because it indicates that a crime was committed, but also because it carries with it the notion of a case-by-case review of each individual "offender." We support unconditional amnesty for any group that is involved, and are opposed to individual reviews for several reasons: First, individual reviews of draft avoiders would allow the government to pick and choose among those who have desirable skills as opposed to those who do not. It would grant the state the opportunity to select its citizens from those in exile, and would mean that racist and class values would always prevail. Secondly, those men who left the military did so for the same reasons that civilian men refused to enter the military: both kinds of actions are specific forms of anti-war resistance for which we want amnesty, and case-by-case reviews allows the government to obscure that fact by employing civilian authority to make the decisions regarding civilians, and keeping military decision-making virtually invisible. Thirdly, our more general political goals involve the stressing of collective actions and collective responsibility. Part of the educational work to be done in an amnesty campaign involves attacking the notion of individual separation. Case-by-case review would reinforce that tendency.

REMARKS ON DISCHARGES-- We feel that all military discharges are massive one type of discharge. Previously both "honorable" and "less than honorable" conditions should be upgraded to this type. Our concept of universal unconditional amnesty means that there will be no case-by-case review of these discharges. The notion of the racism and oppression of the military machine, and the notion that by G.I.'s are a statement of protest and outrage, and are directly an indictment of the American war machine.

Some of these acts resulted in the criminal prosecution of the G.I.'s. Most should have been prosecuted in the military.

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amnesty will be that the military ceases to prosecute its personnel for acts that are considered to be crimes by civilian law. Obviously, G.I.'s who were prosecuted by the military and who have been issued less than honorable discharges as well, bear the burden of paying twice for the same crime. We advocate one type of discharge for the future, the upgrading of all previous discharges, and civilian jurisdiction over judicial matters. For those whose charges are still pending, we feel that amnesty should include having them dropped for both military and civilian resisters.

UNITY IN DEMANDS FOR AMNESTY

Our analysis of amnesty, therefore, brings us to the inescapable conclusion that all forms of resistance must be united. This is the best manner in which to make our political values clear, and it is also the most realistic way of uniting that large body of American citizens who are personally involved in one or another aspect of the issue. The government would undoubtedly prefer to individually bring back the desirable draft avoiders from abroad, to quietly try draft resisters at home, and to select penalties for them which reflect their own racist and class bias. The government would prefer to keep the workings of military "justice" as far from public view as possible; the military would like to be able to deal with its own dissenters according to its own standards of discipline as a way of maintaining absolute obedience. The broadest possible amnesty campaign is the best way to offset the government's preferences in these matters. A campaign which brings draft avoiders into the foreground at the expense of military resisters is politically self-defeating: it reinforces the anti-working class bias of American society, and it reinforces the racist nature of oppression. Including the question of upgrading discharges means that the military would be additionally faced with confronting its own racist machinery.

Our political analysis leads us to the position that the racist and class bias of American society not only structures the form of the ruling class, but also attempts to structure the forms of dissent: those who resisted legally were, for the most part, those who were able to do so; those who resisted illegally were forced to do so. The most vulnerable people have once again taken the greatest risks and are being asked to pay the greatest penalties.

A campaign conducted from this perspective increases its educational value; it prevents it from being only moralistic, and it unites the broad spectrum of the anti-war movement. Historically, the draft resistance orientation of the early anti-war people was based on a moral objection to participation in the Vietnam war or in war in general. This created an unfortunate separation between them and those who were forced -- directly or indirectly -- into the military. With fewer options available, the people who went into the military resisted the war and/or racism and oppression by all means open to them. Far from being the "enemy", as early civilian anti-war people saw them, they were in fact immediate or potential allies. This division, which was antagonistic at times, played directly into the hands of the government. More clearly than the civilian anti-war movement, the government recognized the class nature of the difference between those who fought and those who did not, and sought to exploit that difference by calling attention to the backgrounds of most draft "dodgers." And they tried to get support for the war by appealing to working class resentment against those who were able to resist the draft. Of course the government would not want to admit that this gulf by appealing to racism and class bias. It is necessary to a few draft resisters while ignoring if not directly attacking military resisters. Our amnesty campaign should prevent this from happening because our unity is based on complete support for all forms of resistance.

AMNESTY IS THE BEST WAY FOR AMERICA TO CONFRONT THE VIETNAM WAR -- if we don't confront it, it has been said, it will be lost. The best way for America to confront the Vietnam war is -- if we don't confront it, it has been said, it will be lost. The best way for America to confront the Vietnam war is -- if we don't confront it, it has been said, it will be lost.

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after the protest at Jackson Kent State over the invasion of Cambodia. The issue of amnesty therefore, speaks to the heart of the anti-war movement. It is the recognition of the price that the American people have paid in order to oppose the war. Amnesty does not ignore the fact that thousands of American young men were killed or wounded in Vietnam. It puts that fact into the perspective of the price that the Vietnamese people have paid, and into the realization that Americans should never have been sent to fight the Vietnamese people in the first place.

Secondly, the issue of amnesty is of direct personal importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans whose sons, friends, and neighbors are exiles, fugitives, in jail, or unemployed because of the consequences of opposition to the war. It is perhaps the only anti-war issue that the government is powerless to quiet down with its propaganda about the war being over, because the amnesty issue is just beginning and is crucial to millions of people.

Thirdly, talking about the question of amnesty is a realistic way for anti-war groups and individuals to continue to educate the public around the issues of US involvement in Indochina. The creation of the problem of amnesty belongs to the same government that created unwanted intervention in the affairs of the Indochinese people. Those Americans who blame the anti-war movement for creating the current situation could be re-educated to fix blame where it belongs.

Fourthly, it makes the connection between the G.I. movement and the civilian movement clear, by recognizing the magnitude of the G.I. struggle. The attention and consciousness of the civilian movement to that struggle will help to point out possibilities for future united political work, and will be a clear step forward in the breakdown of class and race bias.

AMNESTY AS PART OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT-- Recognition of US reasons for involvement in Vietnam meant, for many Americans, the beginnings of an understanding about US imperialism. The job of public education has only begun in that area, and we feel that the campaign around amnesty should be regarded as essentially basic to an understanding of the ways in which imperialism functions. We are inescapably led to the conclusion that imperialism abroad hinges on public acquiescence if not support, at home, and specifically in terms of an imperial army, it is crucial that the questions we have discussed about who fights in such armies be raised among the general population. An amnesty campaign supports the basic premise that no army has the right to force people to fight imperialist wars, through either indirect economic pressure or by direct means of a draft or criminal prosecution of military resisters. Resistance to the Vietnam war, both within and outside of the military, provides us with an important guide for future opposition to imperialist wars. If the essentially middle-class draft avoiders are focussed on, it will mean that those politically conscious members of the working class are not recognized as such, and that the working class as a whole is perceived as an opponent, instead of as the class most directly affected, hence the strongest potential ally. In addition to narrowing rather than broadening our base of support, it will also reinforce the racist and class bias of American society by distinguishing "political" and "moral" acts from the "criminal" acts. The breakdown of the US military was directly caused by the political consciousness of basically working-class young men and women -- and this is a crucial fact of our analysis in terms of opposition to future wars of US aggression.

THE END OF THE VOLUNTARY ARMY-- The end to the draft was seen by the right wing as a victory for the anti-war movement. However, we must closely examine the implications of a professional (volunteer) army.

A professional army for the transformation into a police army was a rapid technological development of working class, and the... these current trends to... the different ways in which...

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which will be assigned to the army in the future: ground forces for wars fought abroad will be provided by the governments who seek US intervention. This is the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine--the "Vietnamization" of all third world countries. Another way of looking at the same strategy would state that, in the future, the people of the third world will be forced by their ruling classes to fight for US interests. This does not mean that the US will play a less imperialist or less vicious role in future wars, but on the contrary, means that the US Air Force, Navy, and Special Forces, as well as the entire technological apparatus will intervene more quickly and forcefully in "support" of "indigenous" armies. "Vietnamization" was in some respects more brutal a policy than direct US intervention because it was even more manipulative of the people of Vietnam, and because it allowed government propaganda at home to increasingly ignore the fact of intervention. A professional military has the virtue, therefore, of maintaining domestic ignorance of US imperialist policies on the one hand, and permitting a more rapid and more skillful kind of military intervention on the other.

DOMESTIC COUNTER-INSURGENCY-- At home, a professional army is supposed to play a more vital role as a "law and order" force. It will be used in the streets of the US as a counter-insurgency force in dealing with ghetto rebellions, strikes, demonstrations, etc. Essentially, the ruling class has transformed the ground forces of the US military into a civil war army, in which poor people, recruited by severe direct and indirect economic pressure, will be expected to give a life-time of service.

These expectations will have several effects on the lives of future soldiers: The US military is acutely conscious of the need for a tightening up of discipline and morale for an army which will be called on to fight its own people. Acts of desertion and refusal to obey orders are much more crucial in such a situation. Life in the army will have to be even more isolated, sealed off from civilian life and from movements for social change on the part of civilians. The army will have to be a "state within a state" in order to perform well as a counter-insurgency force, and the influence of a civilian movement within the armed forces will be more difficult than it has been during the last few years. Organizing of soldiers by civilians will be extremely difficult; it is for these same reasons that the army is also making military life much more attractive and personally comfortable.

A broad-based amnesty campaign which stresses the correctness of individual responsibility for resisting criminal orders would help to break down the new ideals of the military machine. It should be seen as a way of opening the minds of new recruits for the volunteer army to the possibility and necessity for refusing orders that they find objectionable on political and moral grounds.

AMNESTY AND DOMESTIC ORGANIZING-- In terms of the organizing efforts of many different kinds of groups, a campaign for amnesty given unconditionally for all forms of anti-war resistance should be regarded as highly useful. We regard such a campaign as lasting between 4 and 6 years, and think that during that period of time, many issues will be raised which community groups would be able to include and use in their work. Most importantly, it points out the ways in which working class people have paid a high price to oppose the war, and the penalties that they face as a consequence. The amnesty campaign will bring the real interests of both working and middle class families that were recruited, and those families are beginning to be organized into active participation in such a campaign. It will be perhaps the first time that the working class can have a direct and active role in participation in an anti-war movement, and this is therefore a good way to begin to build large numbers of people around an issue that is important to the

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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

An amnesty campaign which presents the class analysis we have spoken of should fit in very well with the attempts of people to point out ways in which class structuring operates in America. It should help those who engage in educational and agitational work in combatting US imperialism. It will be possible to use amnesty campaign material in work that may have to be done around the courts-martial of anti-war P.O.W.'s, indeed in the way people talk about the P.O.W. issue in general. Educational work around the people of Indochina can take into account the fact that millions of American people over the last 10 years came to regard them as our friends, not as our enemy. That beginning sense of friendship is certainly part of the reason for refusal to participate in the Vietnam war, and as such is another part of a campaign for amnesty.

The issue of amnesty, then, belongs to those who resisted, opposed, and organized against the war -- whether they refused to fight initially, refused to support a military machine, or as veterans of the Vietnam war brought the meaning of it home to America in ways that others were never able to do. Perhaps the feelings of the exiles and the veterans are the most important for the American people to understand. They are both victims of US intervention in Indochina, and it is significant that those who refused to fight and those who did fight agree: It is the US government who ought to be asking for pardon, not amnesty, from those who it caused to be killed or wounded, to kill or wound others, to resist those alternatives by destroying their own lives, or to live in a society which imposes life-long penalties on them. The history of the anti-war movement is the history of decisions and actions that are among the most fundamentally decent and righteous actions that women and men have ever taken.

For those of us who came to understand, because of all these military and civilian resisters, that the war was white America's war, the war of the ruling class and the defense industry, the war of the rich, the racist, and the imperialist -- for us there would be no more progressive a step in our work than to demand universal and unconditional amnesty. Our work goes on -- to demand that there is never again a US government which violates the basic spirit of its own people or of the people of the world.

END OF ANALYTICAL PAPER. STRATEGY PAPER IS IN PROCESS.

We welcome criticism, support, help and news about what people are doing.

CAMPAIGN FOR AMNESTY
2586 Mission Street Rm. 216
San Francisco, California
94110

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(S) [REDACTED] 61
Memorandum

TO: JTM Director, FBI (100-448092)

DATE: 5/14/73

FROM: Legat, London (105-5841) (P)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
IS - REVACT

[REDACTED]

- 2 - Bureau (Encs. 1)
1 - Foreign Liaison Desk
1 - London
1 - LON 105-5809 (Vietnam Veterans in
WAK:ejg N. Ireland)
(5)

100-448092-2900
12 MAY 22 1973

1 cc Cg info
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1 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- ☒ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552Section 552a☒ (b)(1)☐ (b)(7)(A)☐ (d)(5)☐ (b)(2)☐ (b)(7)(B)☐ (j)(2)☐ (b)(3)☐ (b)(7)(C)☐ (k)(1)☐ (b)(7)(D)☐ (k)(2)☐ (b)(7)(E)☐ (k)(3)☐ (b)(7)(F)☐ (k)(4)☐ (b)(4)☐ (b)(8)☐ (k)(5)☐ (b)(5)☐ (b)(9)☐ (k)(6)☐ (b)(6)☐ (k)(7)

- ☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.
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Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

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100-748092-2900, incl.

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X for this page X
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F B I

Date: 5/17/73

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)
 FROM: SAC, DETROIT (100-39271)(P)
 SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR
 (VVAW/WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION)
 IS - RA
 OO: CHICAGO

Re Buffalo airtel to Bureau, 5/4/73.

Sources of the Detroit Division contacted regarding possible demonstration in conjunction with deserters and draft dodgers in Canada, 5/19/73, with negative results.

- ② - Bureau (RM)
 2 - Buffalo (100-21623)(RM)
 2 - Chicago (100-59772)(RM)
 2 - Detroit
 JFM/ah
 (8)

EX-105

REC-19

100-448092-2901

18 MAY 19 1973

54 MAY 30 1973

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/9/73

FROM : *AK* SAC, LOUISVILLE (176-33) (RUC)

SUBJECT:

PLANNED TRAVEL BY MEMBERS OF
VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW),
REVOLUTIONARY UNION (RU), AND
MOVIN' ON UP (MOU) GROUPS,
3/31/73, CINCINNATI, OHIO,
IN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN INDIANS AT
WOUNDED KNEE, SOUTH DAKOTA
ARL

OO: MINNEAPOLIS

Re Cincinnati teletype to Bureau, 3/29/73.

According to [REDACTED]
concerning captioned matter was [REDACTED]

It was subsequently determined, however, that [REDACTED] and
that the caravan's origin was [REDACTED] Cincinnati,
Ohio.

No information was received from PD and other sources
indicating that [REDACTED] or any other [REDACTED] residents
participated in instant caravan [REDACTED]

No further action is being taken by Louisville
concerning captioned matter at this time.

- ② - Bureau (RM)
 - 2 - Minneapolis (RM)
 - 1 - Cincinnati (Info) (RM)
 - 1 - Louisville
- JMB/jrj
(6)

XEROX

MAY 22 1973

9 MAY 25 1973



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

b7c

EX-109
b7c
REC-10
27102

FBI

Date: 5/9/73

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

FROM: SAC, [REDACTED] (P) b7D

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION
(VVAW/WSO)
IS - RA

Re b7D airtel and LHM to Bureau, 4/30/73. b7C

Enclosed for the Bureau and other receiving offices are 2 copies of the results of the national steering committee meeting of the VVAW held at Placitas, N.M., 4/19-23/73. Also enclosed for the Bureau and each office are 2 copies of the VVAW/WSO position paper on amnesty. b2 b7D

This information was obtained by [REDACTED] on 5/7/73 from national VVAW Headquarters, Chicago, Ill. No further distribution of this information is being made, since it is not known if the Bureau is already in possession of the attached. 5

- ENCLOSURE
- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 4)
 - 2 - Chicago (Enc. 4)
 - 2 - Jacksonville (Enc. 4)
 - 2 - Miami (Enc. 4)
 - 3 - [REDACTED]

TYM:MM
(11)

b2
b7D

1cc each AG info. 2cc minutes
5/14/73
H/c
ELP/wjz

5/14/73

H/c
ELP/wjz

REC

ACT-36

25 MAY 12 1973

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/24/92 BY SP8/BJL

54 MAY 29 1973

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

b2
b7D

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The confidential source furnishing information in

No local dissemination being made of LHM.

The LHM is classified "~~Confidential~~" to protect the source.

b2
b7D

[REDACTED]
In referenced AQ communication, information furnished as identified by source, is probably identical

[REDACTED] probably identical with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] probably identical with [REDACTED]

Source advise [REDACTED] have advised they will [REDACTED]

Source said [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], and advise if they [REDACTED]

If that are, source has to advise [REDACTED]
Also, [REDACTED] want [REDACTED]

Source also said if he was not [REDACTED]

Source said in [REDACTED]

either case, he would [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during telephone call.

Source said if he meet [REDACTED]
the possibility exists that he will [REDACTED]

No leads being set forth in this communication as pertinent leads were set forth in referenced [REDACTED] teletype.

NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING
PLACITAS, NEW MEXICO
APRIL 19 - APRIL 23, 1973

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3/24/95 0652118

NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING
PLACITAS, NEW MEXICO
APRIL 19 - APRIL 23, 1973

REGIONS PRESENT: California/Nevada; New Mexico/Arizona; Colorado/Utah/Wyoming; Kansas/W. Missouri; S. Illinois/ E. Missouri; N. Illinois/Iowa; Texas; Louisiana; Florida; Wisconsin/Minnesota; New York; Connecticut/Rhode Island; New England; Arkansas/Oklahoma; Oregon (proxy); Ohio/Indiana/Kentucky (proxy) Alabama/Mississippi (proxy).

ROUND ROBIN REPORTS

New Mexico: The region has not been very active because most of their time has been spent in preparation for the National Steering Committee Meeting. They have, however, been mobilizing support for the struggle at Wounded Knee.

Colorado: The region now has two chapters. The Denver chapter has joined an anti-imperialist coalition and is doing political education work around imperialism. The regional office was moved because VVAW was evicted as a result of their support for Wounded Knee. The regional newspaper, Hoa Binh, has been published since the last NSCM, and will soon be published again.

Kansas/Western Missouri: Nebraska and South Dakota have been annexed to this region because of the lack of activity within these states. These states will now be coordinated through the Kansas City office. The region gathered supplies for Wounded Knee and conducted a supply convoy to Rapid City, S. Dak. VVAW has been working with AIM in Kansas and are also supporting the Pottawatomie Prairie Band Indian Tribe near St. Mary's, Kansas in their battle for land. On April 7th, the region made another supply convoy to Cairo, Illinois and will be going to Cairo again on June 16th for the 4th Annual National Solidarity Day. Cairo is in desperate need of supplies because of the recent flooding. Cairo is also starting a liberation school for the black community and they need people to work in the school this summer. Specifically, Cairo needs people who can teach First Aid, Reading and Math. They want volunteers to teach -- not guilt-ridden folks or missionaries. The regional newspaper, Veteran's Voice, has been published twice since the last NSCM, but the region is out of money right now and don't know when the paper will be out again.

Southern Illinois/Eastern Missouri: St. Louis sent supplies and people to Rapid City for Wounded Knee. The Military Law Project is still going strong in St. Louis and people should utilize this project. The main priority in St. Louis is the establishment of a coffee house which is to offer cultural and political alternatives for the community. Out of this house, VVAW hopes to begin a food co-op. The region is also working on the changing of discharges. St. Louis has been working steadily with the United Front and Cairo. Cairo is trying to start a chicken farm, and they want to use St. Louis VVAW as a distribution point for eggs.

Northern Illinois/Iowa: The regional office has been moved from Chicago to DeKalb and they are now working in a collective for the regional leadership. The

Chicago chapter is working on the DeMau Mau defense committee and is also busy selling Winter Soldier newspapers on the streets. They sold over 400 copies of the first edition. The Elgin chapter has up-dated their slide show on the war and they need people to order these shows. The chapter does not have enough money to get the slides out of the laboratory, so people should send payment for the show when they order. If chapters have already ordered the show, please send them the money now. This will facilitate Elgin in getting the slides.

Texas: Northern Texas is lacking in activity, but VVAW is gaining strength at the military bases. Houston is conducting a petitioning campaign for amnesty. This chapter is also in the process of suing the federal government in trying to get office space in the federal building because other veterans' organizations have office space there.

Louisiana: The membership in Louisiana is falling off but the people who are staying are becoming more political. They are trying to set up a communal farm and a food co-op which will also serve as a self-help program for veterans. Vets will work in the food co-op which will help with their food bills and give them a small income. They hope that this will help in retaining membership as many members have become inactive because they have to get jobs in order to survive.

Florida: There are seven chapters now active in Florida. Those in the southern part of the state have been working with the United Farm Workers and all of the chapters have been gathering supplies for Wounded Knee. The Tampa chapter is working on the boycott of A&P with UFWOC. The Tallahassee chapter has been talking to the State Legislature for the purpose of increasing veterans benefits, and Florida has also been lobbying for the Equal Rights Amendment. The state is beginning to organize around the raising of money for Bach Mai Hospital. The regional office has moved from Gainesville to Ft. Lauderdale and is working with a regional steering committee for leadership rather than with one coordinator. Florida has a booklet first aid course which deals specifically with trauma injuries (i. e. knife wounds, gun-shot wounds). This can be received upon request by the regions.

Wisconsin/Minnesota: The Milwaukee food co-op is working excellently. It has grown from 5 family units to 22 units and all but 5 of these units are families within the community. This is aiding the chapter to broaden their base. A mechanics co-op is also being established in Milwaukee. The position of the regional coordinator was abolished and leadership is now being provided by a collective. The region has been gathering supplies and support for Wounded Knee but have had some problems working with AIM. Milwaukee has been making contact with the local National Guard unit and is now in the process of planning a week-end camp-out with some of the Guardsmen. The library collected at the PVS Clearing House is growing rapidly. The library is presently out of commission because all of the articles are being transferred to stencils so that they can be re-produced more cheaply. The cost of the library is \$6.00 and can be ordered any time and will be sent out as soon as possible. A bibliography will be included with the library and this bibliography should be regularly checked so

that people can keep their libraries up-dated. An historical event was the establishment of a PVS rap group within the Waupun State Prison.

New York: The regional office has been moved from New York to Buffalo. The region has been busy collecting supplies and support for Wounded Knee and they have also been involved in raising funds for Gainesville. Buffalo has been printing a newspaper, Column Left, and hope that this will be coming out regularly, but as always, the publication is contingent upon funds. New York VVAW has been working hard to kill a state bill proposing that ROTC be offered in high schools. This bill was recently tabled in the Legislature. The region was involved in protesting the Home With Honor Parade for the returning P. O. W. 's. VVAW made their presence affectively noticeable in combatting this PR garbage.

Connecticut/Rhode Island: There are now 9 chapters within this region and most of them are fairly active because of the revival which occurred around January 20th. Some of the chapters are getting into union work. The region was active in supporting the Jake Jacobson trial. Jake was falsely accused of carrying dangerous weapons, but the trial recently ended in a victory and acquittal for Jake. The region has had problems with informers and some of the chapter and regional files have been ripped off.

New England: The regional collective hasn't been working well because of personality problems so they have recently begun to function with two regional coordinators. People within this region have been organizing in Vermont and Maine and will soon begin to work in New Hampshire. All three of these states were previously inactive. The region is planning to conduct a regional amnesty conference sometime in May.

Arkansas/Oklahoma: Nothing is going on in this region. Any information on this region with regard to names of people who might be interested in organizing is much needed.

California: There are 10 active chapters in California and interest has been picking up, thanks to the return of the P. O. W. 's. Los Angeles has been busy serving as a Clearing House for Operation County Fair, and some of the members have also been involved in an Anti-Police Brutality Coalition in Watts. Other projects within the region are PVS rap groups, working on discharge upgrading, an active women's group in San Francisco, debating on amnesty, Indochina medical programs of all kinds, and education programs around the peace treaty. The region has been working with other veteran's organizations on referral programs rather than counseling for vets. The L. A. office has the video tapes on the Last Patrol, and these will be available to regions at cost. The region also is selling bracelets bearing the name of a political prisoner held by the Thieu regime. These bracelets sell for \$1.25 each, or 75¢ each for orders of 100. The region sent supplies to Wounded Knee but they were mysteriously confiscated on the Nevada border and never reached their destination. The Gary Lawton re-trial has been moved to Riverside and is to begin on May 14th. The defense committee is in desperate need of funds. Money should be sent to: P. O. Box 5154, San Bernardino, Calif.

GAINESVILLE REPORT

The next (and hopefully last) pre-trial hearing will be on April 23-26 in Pensacola. Judge Arnow will be ruling on three motions presented by the defense. Two of these motions are precedent-setting and deal with the make-up of the grand jury and with electronic surveillance on defendants and lawyers. It is expected that the gag rule will be enforced upon the defendants at this pre-trial hearing (it was enforced on the attorneys at the last hearing). It looks fairly certain that the trial will be held in Gainesville and we hope to have the date of the trial set at the April hearing. The defense committee is getting together bumper-stickers, leaflets, and buttons which will soon be available to the chapters. Regions will be receiving samples and prices shortly. Judging from past defense costs, it has been estimated that the defense committee will need \$175,000 for trial costs. Chapters and regions should continue in their fund raising efforts and set up speaking engagements for the defendants, benefit concerts, etc. Besides money, the defense needs affidavits from anyone who has been contacted by the FEI for purposes of showing the extent of the harassment from the federal government. These affidavits should be sent to Gainesville immediately.

Addition to the Minutes: The trial date has been set for July 17th, in Gainesville.

NATIONAL OFFICE REPORT

Internal Report: The national office has 15 films which are available for the chapters to use. These will be available upon request. A list of resource materials is being put together and will be sent to the chapters soon. The office needs in-put from the chapters and regions for the newsletter. As it now stands, the regional reports are the shortest section of the newsletter. National knows that there is activity going on which should be gotten out in the newsletters, but this information must first be submitted to the office. Also, the office needs information from all chapters who have programs. There is a lack of unity in the programs which are going on around the country, and if information on these programs was submitted to the national office, the programs could be better coordinated and become more cohesive.

Incorporation: National is now working on getting the organization incorporated. If regions wish to incorporate within their respective states, it is vitally important that offices must keep good books on all money. If your region covers more area than one state, you may incorporate in your "base" state and get a statement of authority to operate under the corporate name in other states. Once again, all financial reports are vitally important because the incorporated state will be held responsible for all of the state/chapter books. When incorporating, your corporate name should be the name of your state followed by Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization, i. e. New York VVAW/WSO.

External Report: We now have communication with over 200 foreign organizations. We are looked up to as a credible organization by these international groups and people. We should always remember that we are tied into an international struggle and people should identify with this idea. ✓ ✓

Structure: The national office is being run as a collective and it is functioning extremely well. Because the collective is still young, there is room for improvement, but the office has succeeded in creating a great deal of unity. All members

of the collective are involved in the decision-making, but individuals are selected to handle specific projects or areas of interest (i. e. Wounded Knee, Amnesty). By working in this collective manner, commitments have been fulfilled with more success. It is important that all members of the collective must be able to work together, as well as live together. Because of this, the national office is suggesting that when there is turn-over in the office (both of coordinators and staff) the collective should have something to say about who is to join the collective. This will facilitate the ability of the collective to work well and effectively together.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Organization: The major weaknesses of VVAW as seen by the national office include the lack of communication within the organization. Also, VVAW is vulnerable to political attack and oppression. This weakness should be obvious after the attack which was made upon us in Gainesville, as well as all of the other numerous busts which have come down on VVAW members throughout the country. Another weakness is that there is a lack of political education present throughout the country. It is vitally important that our membership be educated as to the nature of our struggle, because only in this way will we be able to educate the public. Another problem is that there is a lack of consistency in programs on a national level. Our programs must be coordinated in order to achieve the maximum of effectiveness. Also, by better coordination, we can more readily learn from our mistakes and our successes. We have not spent the time that we should building programs that will build the organization. Specifically, we have not paid attention to building VVAW within our communities. It is necessary that we establish programs and project which will be relevant to people's daily lives. Only by doing this will be able to broaden our base and increase our relations with the people. A final weakness of VVAW is that we have often ignored the importance of fund-raising. It should be obvious that we need money in order to build strong and on-going programs. Consistent fund-raising programs would provide the optimum of effectiveness.

One of the major strengths of VVAW is that we are the only mass organization with a base on the national level, and with a base that is being maintained. Our appeal to specific elements of this society has remained constant. The class base of our organization lies primarily in the fact that we are strong with the working class and the poor. This is the area in which our struggle lies, and this base must be maintained in order to ensure our survival and growth. Another strength of VVAW is that the membership has an understanding of the necessity of on-going struggle. We understand that the problems with this country are not going to be solved in the immediate future, but that we have years of very difficult work ahead of us. We must continue with this understanding of protracted struggle because in it lies our ability to build. Another strength of VVAW is our non-sectarian nature. As an organization, we maintain unity under a common political program which is not exclusive, and this enables to broaden our base. A final strength is that VVAW has validity as an organization. Unlike anti-war groups, VVAW is still viable and very much alive, and this credibility of our is recognized by other organizations inside and outside of the United States. This fact should always be remembered by our membership. Finally, it should be noted by all that our survival is dependant upon our ability to build and grow, to broaden our base, and to continue in our relations with the oppressed peoples of this country and of others.

RESIGNATION OF STEVE HAWKINS

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

At this time I would like to officially submit my resignation from national office. I regret that I cannot come and present it in person but it seems most logical for all the national collective to be present at this meeting that will continue to be in the national office. It is necessary for some one to watch the office, phone and house during the meeting anyway.

My reasons for leaving are several. Most of all, I need a rest. Also I have made several prior commitments which are demanding my presence sooner than I had anticipated. I've come to the conclusion that having the national office in one's home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, isn't the best situation for my personal and political development as this has meant a total annihilation of personal life and privacy.

In all honesty I must say that the past 9 months have been the most productive in my life. I will never consider myself outside of VVAW or the movement, and will always be proud to be a member of VVAW.

I don't know how to summarize in a brief way the progress that I have seen in this office. All I can say is look at the quality and quantity of the internal and public (newspaper) communications now being regularly produced from the national collective, and judge for yourself. I have total confidence in the present collective and ask everyone to continue to give them your full support.

In conclusion, let me encourage you all to keep struggling, because after we have won our liberation and self-determination like the Indochinese have, we will then fully understand the importance of our present work. The better we do our organizing ground work now, the easier and sooner the people's victory will be.

All my love and solidarity,

Steve Hawkins

OPERATION COUNTY FAIR

The logistics of the establishment of the clinic are more difficult than was anticipated, but progress is being made. For example, blue-prints are there and ready to go -- all we need is money and building materials. Communications have been poor, so people should re-read the proposal on Operation County Fair which came out of the Chicago NSCM and stay within the guidelines of that proposal. The Los Angeles office is a Clearing House for the clinic and it is imperative that they know what the regions are doing with regard to what items have been collected. The L. A. office will then compile this information and get it back out to the regions so that everyone can know what we need for the clinic. Regions should consider the possibilities of putting together grant proposals for money and supplies for the clinic. It is vital to build a financial base for the building and operation of the project and grants are a feasible means of getting funds. The people in L. A. and Alabama are now considering putting together a brochure with information on the clinic which can be distributed to interested persons. The Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Clinic has already been incorporated and is tax-exempt. They are trying to get tax-deductable status.

Representatives from the People's Farm were present at the NSCM and expressed their need for an administrator qualified to run the clinic. Also, anyone willing to work on the Farm and who is qualified will be welcome. Regions should screen people wanting to go to Alabama before sending them, and you should make sure that the people sent will be able to stay for an extended period of time, and are willing to work diligently.

1st CASUALTY PRESS

If regions have not received copies of Free Fire Zone, they should check with 1st Casualty Press because several books were returned after mailing. The 3rd book of the series is over half completed. It is entitled Post Mortum, and is a retrospective examination of the war. It will contain poems, stories and essays. Material for this book will be accepted up until June 1. All debts have been wiped off the 1st Casualty books and chapters ordering from this point on should send payment along with their order.

* * * * *

OLD BUSINESS

OBJECTIVE CHANGES

Objective #2: We voted on the two proposed objective changes which read as follows:

To demand the immediate termination of all other operations by the United States government, its agencies, and American business interests that are designed to suppress the rightful struggles for liberation and self-determination of the peoples of the earth. This includes the maintenance of dictatorial governments, economic domination, and the theft of the natural resources of other countries. The United States should make reparations in a project acceptable to the Indochinese for all of the damage done by the United States.

The second proposed objective change reads as follows:

To demand the immediate termination of all other operations by the United States government, its agencies, and American business interests that are designed to suppress the rightful struggle for liberation and self-determination of peoples inside and outside of the United States. . . .
(the remainder of the objective would remain the same as before).

Neither of these proposed objective changes received a 2/3 majority vote: 29 in favor of "peoples of the earth", 25 for no change in the objective, 20 in favor of "people inside and outside of the U. S. " and there were 10 abstention votes. Because of this, the objective will remain as it has been in the past:

To demand the immediate termination of all other operations by the United States government, its agencies, and American business interests that are designed to suppress the rightful struggles for liberation and self-determina-

maintenance of dictatorial governments, economic domination, and the theft of the natural resources of other countries. The United States should make reparations in a program acceptable to the Indochinese for all of the damage done by the United States.

Objective #3: The proposed objective change reads as follows:

To join in the struggle of all active-duty servicepeople, National Guardsmen, and Reservists for those rights guaranteed under the U. S. Constitution and Bill of Rights presently denied under the UCMJ. G.I.'s are exploited and their rights violated both in the U. S. and overseas to ensure the U. S. 's position in the economic world, to suppress wars of liberation, to break strikes and to carry out those policies that the ruling class deems necessary for its interests. G.I.'s control the means of destruction in the military; just as working people control the means of production in a civilian society. G.I.'s have a long and rich history of struggle against oppression; the accomplishments of that struggle cannot be ignored.

This proposed objective change was defeated: 10-yes; 52-1/2-no; 17-1/2 abst. Because of this failure to ratify the objective change, the objective will remain as it has been in the past:

To demand that all active-duty servicemen and women, Reservists and National Guardsmen be afforded the same rights that are guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights that are presently denied by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. We are appalled that our active-duty G.I.'s are treated as less than first class citizens. We endorse the efforts of our active-duty sisters and brothers in their struggle to democratize the military.

Objective #7 and the Third World Workshop: After receiving in-put from Third World communities with regard to the issue of bussing, the NSC voted not to support two-way bussing as a part of organizational policy. We voted on a portion of the Third World Workshop held in Chicago which reads:

Whereas VVAW has adopted as one of its primary national objectives an end to racism in all forms, and whereas VVAW recognizes the existence of institutionalized racism in the American school system, VVAW supports the use of two-way bussing, including across district lines, as one tool, admittedly imperfect, for achieving racial and educational equality.

This proposed objective change was defeated with a vote: 8-1/2-yes; 54-1/2-no; 17-abst.

PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH TROTS

The following proposal is put forward in lieu that certain political organizations (specifically the Socialist Workers Party and their affiliates National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), Student Mobilization

Committee (SMC), and the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WNAAC); the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), and their affiliates Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and Workers Action Movement (WAM); Workers World and their affiliates Youth Against War and Fascism (YAWF), and American Servicemen's Union (ASU) engage in attempts to split or co-opt other organizations in order to achieve their goals.

That in the past these attacks have been made upon VVAW as SWP attacks upon the regions of Illinois, New York, California, Ohio, Texas, New England, Missouri, and Colorado, etc.

That in the past PLP has attacked California, Texas, New England, Florida, and New York.

That in the past Workers World through their affiliates YAWF and ASU have directed attacks against Illinois, New York, etc.

That none of these organizations support the Vietnamese people in their struggle for liberation and self-determination, the 7-point proposal of the PRG, or the 9-point agreement reached by the U. S., the DRV, and the PRG;

We resolve the following:

That VVAW chapters, be they local, regional, or national, shall not form any alliances with any of the above mentioned organizations and parties specifically, and any other parties and organizations which by nature use means of co-optation or splitting tactics on other organizations to obtain their objectives:

That VVAW cadre, be they local, regional, or national, shall not place the objectives of other political organizations to which they may belong before the objectives of VVAW;

That all members of VVAW, after sufficient time for education, must support the Vietnamese people, the 7-point proposal of the PRG, and the 9-point accords of Oct., 1972, and that failure to do so is grounds for expulsion from VVAW.

This proposal was passed with a vote of 40-yes; 15-no; 25-abst. The guidelines set forth in this proposal are now organizational policy and must be strictly adhered to.

HARRY ROMO'S RE-ELECTION:

Harry's one year term in the national office expired at this NSCM. He was unanimously elected to another year term as a national coordinator.

NOMINATIONS FOR NATIONAL COORDINATOR

In lieu of Steve Hawkins resignation from the national office, nominations were taken for a coordinator to fill the vacant position. Those nominated were: John Musgrave (Kansas/W. Missouri); Joe Hirsch (New York); and Rich Bangert (E. Missouri/S. Illinois). According to the policy established in Palo Alto, these nominees have until one month prior to the next NSCM to decide whether or not they wish to be considered for election. They will send out their decisions prior to the next NSCM, and those remaining in nomination will be voted on at the August NSCM.

WINTER SOLDIER INVESTIGATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The WSI on Nukes was brought up because there has been so little in-put on this investigation which was proposed and passed at the Chicago NSCM meeting. People should look at this investigation as a long-range project of research and exposure. The National Office wants to talk to people who have any sort of knowledge on nuclear weapons of any kind and anywhere. Specifically, they need to talk to people who have had experience with Nukes. Steve Hawkins and Bill Eranson have been doing most of the research on nuclear weapons, and since both of these members of the national collective will be leaving, another member of the collective will be taking over this research (name will later be published in the newsletter).

FUTURE OF VVAW

We discussed the workshop report on the Future of VVAW which came out of the Chicago meeting. The sections of this workshop report were voted on one-by-one. Because few of the parts of the proposal received a 2/3 majority vote, the entire workshop report was tabled for discussion and revision within another workshop. The conclusions and votes of this workshop will be included with the rest of the workshop reports.

* * * * *

WORKSHOP REPORTS

FUTURE OF VVAW WORKSHOP

The following is the finalized and accepted form of the restructuring of the organization. The votes will be included under specific sections, but it should be noted at the outset that the following has all been proposed and passed and is now policy for the organization.

- I. The Survival of VVAW -- concerning immediate action by each chapter.
 1. Education on the organization: a. structure; b. functions; c. history
 2. Find out the members' interests: a. What should VVAW be concentrating on? b. What will they (members) themselves work on? c. What resources and skills do they possess?
 3. On-going education around the ten objectives.
 4. Education of the war and imperialism.
 5. Combination of friendship and a sense of common goals and purpose.
(A balance between these should lead to the optimum of effective working).
- II. Internal Restructuring -- original stages
 1. a. The National Steering Committee is empowered to determine whether or not a region is non-functional.
 - b. The National Steering Committee is empowered to annex weak or non-functioning regions to other regions, and this is to be done on a case-by-case basis.
(This section was passed with a vote of: 53-1/2-yes; 11-1/2-no; 5 abst.)
 2. Each region should examine their own area and determine the strategy which will be the most successful in order to more effectively organize

be submitted to the national office.

(This section was passed with a vote of: 57-1/2-yes; 12-1/2-no; 5 abst).

3. This committee suggests that collectivization would be the optimum of effective organization within VVAW on all levels.

III. Transitional Period -- suggestion for restructuring VVAW internally

1. The main function of the regional coordinator is to make sure that chapters are actually strong, functioning chapters. This will prevent the problems of cooptation and the need to incorporate regions. A list of the functioning chapters should be sent to the national office with a synopsis of strengths and weaknesses of that chapter.

2. The National Office will have direct contact with the chapters. All information now sent to the regional coordinator will, in the future, be sent to the chapters.

(The vote on this section is: 41-yes; 19-no; 15 abst.)

3. The national office staff will be increased and expanded so that more time can be devoted to specific areas.

4. A. The National Steering Committee is empowered to develop and implement organization training programs.

1. These training programs may be implemented on a national level with various regions participating.

2. These training programs may also be implemented on a regional level.

- E. National Organizers and national representatives are authorized to travel throughout the organization for purposes of internal liaison. Internal liaison is defined as (1) coordination of national VVAW activities and programs, (2) support of regular VVAW activities and programs as requested, and (3) evaluation and assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of VVAW.

- C. National organizers are authorized to travel and organize in non-functioning regions (as determined by the National Steering Committee)

- D. Regional coordinators/members of the Regional Steering Committee have the obligation and responsibility of traveling as regularly as is practical, throughout their regions to organize and co-ordinate all VVAW activities.

(All of the above section #4 was unanimously accepted. This entire section was discussed and voted on during New Business, but is included here for purposes of clarification).

5. Member: A member is one who works for and supports the objectives of the organization.

Chapter: A chapter is a group of people who continue to work on a day-to-day basis for the objectives, and in accordance with national policy and structure. The size of a chapter should be determined so that the chapter is capable of working in a viable way to be effective within the population of a given area.

A chapter must be accredited by the region.

Each chapter must have a P. O. Box where feasible and sensible so that problems with transient addresses can be alleviated. If a chapter has a permanent office, it need not have a P. O. Box.

IV. Winter Soldier Proposal: That we do in fact accept "Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization" name with no limit set on either name being dropped and with the idea that we will in the future, examine our political situation domestically and abroad to determine that this name is appropriate.

(This proposal was passed with a vote of: 48-yes; 12-no; 15 abst.)

All of the above workshop report is now in effect as organizational policy and is to be immediately and strictly followed.

GAINESVILLE NATIONAL ACTION WORKSHOP

It was decided at the Chicago Steering Committee Meeting that a national action would be held by VVAW during the trial of the Gainesville 8. This workshop drew up a proposed scenario for the action that was accepted by the NSC at the meeting held in Placitas. Given the numerous uncertainties of the trial -- how long the trial will last, how long it will take to select a jury, etc. -- it was decided by the workshop that what would be proposed would be a general planning concept that would be implemented by the Gainesville collective actually planning and implementing the action in light of the realities of the situation, i. e. what is possible and most logical. This means that the following general scenario must remain flexible. It is a concept of the Gainesville action which the Gainesville collective will implement as closely as possible given the conditions that they have to deal with.

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Parade permits for the action have been obtained.
2. Campsites have been obtained for the action in Gainesville. These sites are on private property and can accommodate a very large number of people.
3. As these campsites are on private property, and in view of the necessity for security precautions, no one will get on the campsite without the approval of VVAW security.
4. Medical and Legal support personnel have already been arranged for.
5. Sensitivity sessions have and will be held with the Gainesville Police. Indications are that things will proceed smoothly in this respect. The Gainesville Police Department has agreed to allow VVAW to handle its own security problems and not to interfere unless requested by us to do so.
6. Additional equipment which is needed: CE radios, camping gear, food, medical supplies.
7. People will be able to go to the Eogue Chitto People's Farm to work before or after the action if they so desire.
8. Above all, it is important that everybody understand that this will be a completely LEGAL demonstration.

PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS

Since security precautions obviously must be maintained throughout the trial, the following guidelines on security were set up:

1. Each region is responsible for organizing its own contingent.
2. Each member of a regional contingent must come with identification.
3. Each region is responsible for the security of its own contingent.
4. Each contingent will abide by VVAW/WSO organizational discipline for this action.
5. Regions can take whomever they decide on to the demonstration, but all participants must understand that this is a VVAW demonstration and that they will need to abide by the collective decisions made by VVAW/WSO with regard to the demonstration.
6. No one will participate in the demonstration as a result of a unilateral decision.
7. Lists of names of those participating in the demonstration will be prepared by each region and taken with the contingent to Gainesville.
8. PE will be done around the need for security and how it will be implemented. This will be done within the regions for each contingent.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE GAINESVILLE ACTION

The following are some of the ideas which resulted from the workshop. Nothing has been definitely decided upon, but these are some of the suggestions made.

The basic thrust of the demonstration will be that of combatting political repression within the U.S. Since the U.S. is not, in fact, a democracy, it must necessarily increase its repression of political dissent within the nation as people begin fighting for their rights. In attempts to do this, we see the perversion of the system of "Justice" through the witch hunts of the Grand Jury System as witnessed in the Gainesville 8 Trial, in the Harrisburg Trial, etc. The point of all this being to communicate to people that they must resist this repression or they will be enslaved by it. Resistance must be carried out through unified action. In this way we will be able to defeat our repression. The basic themes and slogans that would be used for the action would center around the following: trying people for "crimes" of peace rather than crimes of war; parallels of Gainesville with the whole issue of amnesty; parallels with the struggle in Wounded Knee; antecedents of our heritage of the American Revolution and repeated examples of political repression throughout American history; Don't Tread On Me; Struggle - Don't Be Afraid; Unity. Struggle, Victory!

Overall, we will try to de-emphasize the defendants as much as possible and concentrate on the issues involved.

GENERAL IDEAS FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ACTION SCENARIO

holding a grand jury play
holding a court house vigil or honor guard
articles in Winter Soldier, regional newspapers and newsletters
local and regional support actions around the country
hanging in effigy of the grand jury system
organized singing
candlelight marches
postering
guerilla theater
people's assemblies/ teach-in's on Gainesville and political repression

holding of a Vietnamese meal
WSI's on Grand Juries
marches
picketing
showing movies on vehicles around the country -- hopefully, a slide show will be developed for this purpose
leafletting
speaking engagements
communal, non-denominational services

GENERAL SCENARIO

- A. Building demonstrations are to be held in regions prior to the Gainesville action. This will build support for the Gainesville 8, build contingents to go to Florida for the national action, and do PE on understanding the requirements for participation in the action (such as security, discipline, etc.)
- B. While the Gainesville action itself is going on, those people in VVAW/WSO who are unable to go to Florida will hold simultaneous actions in their respective regions. Regions should try and coordinate these actions as closely as possible with the Gainesville planning collective.
- C. Gainesville Action

I. Action for the beginning of the Trial

Length: 5-7 days, depending on the planning requirements and situation with the trial

Time: Starting as closely as possible with the 1st day of the trial.

Primary Focus: The focus will be on the actions of the 1st day. Everyone should try and concentrate energy on this action.

Day #1:

- 1. non-denominational communal services held on the evening before, or the morning of the trial
- 2. assembly at the University of Florida
- 3. March to the courthouse
- 4. actions at the courthouse
- 5. March back to the University
- 6. Rally at the University. A major speaker will attend this rally.
(Estimate: 4-5 hours for the entire action)
- 7. a vigil will be held all day at the courthouse during the trial -- this will consist of approximately 100 people

Days #2-7

- 1. The actions on these days are to be planned for a smaller number of people because many will not be able to stay for the entire week.
- 2. The scenario for these actions is to be developed by the Gainesville collective. Their decisions will largely be taken from the suggestions listed above with the "General Ideas"
- 3. These actions will include daily marches to the courthouse, vigils around the courthouse, guerilla theater, etc.

Last Day of the Action

1. A large rally will be held with a major speaker giving the address.
2. The scenario for this day is to be planned by the Gainesville collective.

II. Action for the Conclusion of the Trial

This action is to be planned for the day that the case goes to the jury. Because of this, the date obviously cannot be fixed. The action will concentrate on doing a resume of the trial, how absurd and perverse the entire procedure was, a possible indictment of the grand jury system. A major speaker will be giving the address at this demonstration. Support demonstrations are to be held around the country.

The above workshop report was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

PVS WORKSHOP

The following is the political definition of Post Vietnam Syndrome which resulted from the discussion within the workshop.

Post Vietnam Syndrome is the realization and rejection, either on a political or gut level, of U.S. imperialism. Seeing first hand the racist and genocidal nature of U.S. imperialism in Indochina, we have rejected the Great American Myth of Eringing Peace and Freedom, etc. to the world.

Many veterans saw the Vietnam War as a means to gain recognition in society. We remember from past wars the status and recognition that "heroes" received when they returned to this country.

The failure of our society to recognize the sacrifice of the veterans, the realization on the part of the individual that the government lied to him to motivate him in "Nam" and the feelings of frustration over the loss of a brother in a war that society wants to pretend did not occur combined in general, leads the individual to withdraw into himself, reject concepts such as love and humanity as being hypocritical and in affect becomes a human time bomb programmed for his own destruction and the destruction of those who attempt to break down his defenses and reach out to the individual.

The traumatic experiences of the Vietnam War coupled with unemployment, poor schooling opportunities, inadequate medical care, drug addiction and sometimes the total rejection by society has produced heightened emotional and psychological problems for Vietnam era veterans.

Post Vietnam Syndrome on an emotional level manifests itself in Guilt, Rage, Combat Brutalization, Alienation, Psychic Numbing, Lack of Trust, and a feeling of an inability to love others or themselves.

The VA gave the disenfranchised veteran of the Vietnam era a label -- "Post Vietnam Syndrome" -- but few Vietnam era veterans are successfully treated in VA programs and fewer will approach an agency of a government they feel manipulated by. Existing VA programs for the most part seem to be based either on a highly manipulated environment or chemical control -- bases which seem defeating given the expression of the Vietnam era veterans.

Post Vietnam Syndrome has not been recognized by the VA for two reasons.

1. Political, in that the government would have to acknowledge what we did in Vietnam, and they cannot do that.
2. They would have to recognize it as a service connected disability.

We of Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization recognize PVS and are attempting to realistically deal with it, as the VA does not -- either by the means of rap groups, one-to-one sessions, and political education. In conclusion, the manifestations of PVS will disappear when Imperialism is smashed.

This definition was accepted unanimously by the Steering Committee and will from this time forward be the political definition of PVS for all VVAW/WSO PVS programs.

AMNESTY WORKSHOP

The purpose of the workshop was to discuss our national policy and program on amnesty. The policy statement which resulted from this workshop is not included in this workshop report, but will accompany the minutes. This position was accepted unanimously by the Steering Committee. Also, several proposals came out of this workshop, all of which were accepted by the Steering Committee. The first of these proposals deals with the terminology of our campaign for amnesty. There was a lot of discussion on whether or not we wanted to use the term of "total unconditional amnesty" or "honorable repatriation." The feeling of the workshop was that the term "amnesty" can be used to cover a broader spectrum because it includes people with bad discharges, political prisoners, and resisters underground within this country. Also, the public has got this word in their minds, so it can be more easily related to.

PROPOSAL: To accept the term of "amnesty" to apply to this issue.

A definition of this term is to mean a total restoration of all civil liberties.

This proposal was accepted with a vote of: 60-yes; 11-no; 4 abst.

The workshop also discussed the conference which is to be held in Toronto and is tentatively scheduled for May 26-28. The guidelines for the participation of VVAW/WSO are those which are set down in the adopted position paper of the organization. There is a planning meeting for this conference on April 30th in New York so we discussed the number of delegates that we want to send to this conference.

PROPOSALS: That 10 people be chosen to attend the Toronto Conference.

Regions are to submit names of people working on amnesty projects to the national office where people will be selected according to concrete programs. Background information should be sent along with the person's name in order to facilitate selection. If regions don't have a member who they feel is qualified, then they are not to submit a name.

The above proposals for delegate number and method of selection were unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

The workshop next discussed the establishment of a national clearing house for purposes of gathering and disseminating information concerning amnesty.

PROPOSALS: That a National Amnesty Clearing House Resource Center on amnesty be set up within the next six months. That it provide all pertinent information on amnesty including the implementation of a national VVAW/WSO Amnesty pamphlet which is to be produced and disseminated to all regions within the next six months.

This Clearing House on Amnesty is to be set up within the National Office.

The above proposals were unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

The workshop also made a strong recommendation that each region go back and educate themselves on the politics of amnesty as set forth by the guidelines of our position paper and that we collect information and send it to the Clearing House for the establishment of concrete national programs.

The workshop also discussed ways in which the amnesty issue might be effectively raised. The following are the suggestions made to the Steering Committee:

1. general community educational programs
2. participation with other groups who are working for amnesty
3. speaking engagements -- including debates
4. petitioning campaigns
5. contact with families of war resisters, people with bad discharges, etc. and asking them to write letters to newspaper editors, Congressmen, etc.
6. bracelets -- California is now producing bracelets similar to those made by VIYA which will bear the name of a war resister
7. bumper-stickers
8. in-put from other veterans organizations to find out where they are coming from and the possible establishment of a coalition
9. a week for showing visual support -- i. e. wearing an arm-band for a week
10. direct actions at the V. A.
11. taking a national poll of veterans on amnesty. This is to be done on a chapter level and the results sent to the Clearing House.
12. songs which raise the issue
13. if financially feasible, we hope to make a movie of the Toronto Conference similar to a Winter Soldier Investigation

WOUNDED KNEE WORKSHOP

The Wounded Knee workshop began with a discussion around the American Indian movement and its history. It was decided that in general, whites are ignorant in terms of the culture, history, strengths, weaknesses, and reality of the situation of the American Indian. A proposal was made to attempt to alleviate this weakness within ourselves.

PROPOSAL: To do the best we can to educate ourselves about the Indian culture and in working with Indians in our own communities.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

The national policy of VVAW/WSO with regard to the issue of the Indian struggle was also discussed.

PROPOSAL: In accordance with the objectives of VVAW/WSO, we support the struggle for freedom, self-determination, and justice of all American Indian people throughout the land and we also support whatever action they find necessary to secure their rights under the treaties with the U. S. or any measures they feel necessary to secure freedom, self-determination and justice.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

As a result of some of the problems which have arisen out of the Wounded Knee situation, it was decided that our reliance on the telephone leaves us in deep water in emergency situations. Through the following proposal, we hope to begin dealing with this problem.

PROPOSAL: All chapters and regions of the organization are to research the feasibility of communication facilities in order to circumvent the use of the telephone.

This proposal was unanimously accepted and should be followed as soon as possible.

WOMEN'S WORKSHOP

The women's workshop began with a discussion of the mailing which was recently sent out from Milwaukee to some of the women within the organization. We decided that this newsletter should be given more structure and should be sent out twice between the NSCM's. It was suggested that the next newsletters come out at the end of May and the middle of July. Women should send in letters telling of what they are doing. The newsletter will discuss projects which are now in existence within VVAW/WSO, problems which women have and how these problems have been or can be effectively dealt with. The newsletter will also deal with consciousness raising and political education. Book reviews should be submitted to Milwaukee for publication in the upcoming newsletters. Hopefully, by utilizing this tool, we can open up the lines of communication, get to know and more fully learn to trust each other. For purposes of increasing the audience of this newsletter, copies will be sent to each regional office, and it is the responsibility of the offices to make certain that the women within the respective regions read the newsletter.

The workshop also decided that it would be beneficial for the women of VVAW/WSO to get together. Because of this, there will be a women's national meeting tentatively set up for June 10-11. To help alleviate transportation and distance problems, two meetings will be held simultaneously in different places in the country. One of the meetings has been suggested to be held in Denver, and the other will be either in Cape Cod or Eoston. Information on these meetings will be coming out in the newsletter from Milwaukee.

The above workshop report was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

WAR WORKSHOP

The war workshop discussed the possibility of organizing nationally coordinated regional actions around the war in Indochina. They also suggested that the 9 Point Accords should be disseminated throughout the country and that it is one of our responsibilities to educate the public as to the manners in which the U.S. is violating the "peace" treaty. The workshop also discussed the importance of regionally mobilizing people around the continued bombings in Laos and Cambodia. Local actions should be organized around this issue.

Concrete plans resulting from the war workshop are as following:

PROPOSAL: That there be regional, autonomous, anti-war actions coordinated through the National Office on Armed Forces Day, May 19, 1973, and that there be full support of the 4 Points of the Stockholm Conference and that the regions be allowed to expand these 4 points. The 4 points are:

1. Demand that Nixon and Thieu abide by the Peace Treaty.
2. Free all Vietnamese patriots in prisons in the South.
3. Demand official diplomatic recognition of the PRG as an official representative of the people of South Vietnam.
4. Rebuild Vietnam and Rebuild America not with the People's budget but with the Military budget.

The above proposal was unanimously accepted. In essence this is a plan for an anti-war demonstration and it is vital that all regional actions be a success.

PROPOSAL: We feel it vital that in the event of a major re-escalation of the war in Indochina, that a plan be drawn up to immediately implement militant responses to any escalation. We propose that the following 7-Point Contingency Plan/Guideline be implemented:

1. That each chapter develop ideas for imaginative responses and that plans for these ideas be kept in a safe place where they can be recalled upon when needed.
2. That after the initial crisis unfolds, certain members of the chapter would call for an emergency meeting of the membership for that night or the next.
3. That at that meeting the plans would be discussed and put into effect.
4. That there be one person in charge of publicizing the action and that others would, if necessary, enlist the support of other groups who could work with VVAW/WSO on the action.
5. That this action be followed up with appropriate actions until such time that the crisis is over.
6. That whatever the action, a phone call should go to the National Office and regional offices so that a complete list of the actions could be compiled for press releases.
7. That after the crisis period, the chapter again draw up contingencies for response to the next possible crisis.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

NEW BUSINESS

FUTURE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETINGS:

PROPOSAL: Instead of holding National Steering Committee Meetings four times a year, in the future, they should be held three times a year. We will be having NSCM's every four months rather than every three months.

This proposal was unanimously accepted.

SITE AND DATE OF NEXT NSCM:

There were five locations suggested for the holding of the next NSCM. These sites were: Gainesville, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Pogue Chitto and Los Angeles. Through a run-off vote, the sites were narrowed down to St. Louis and Gainesville. The final vote was:

Gainesville -- 40

St. Louis -- 30

Thus, the next NSCM will be held in Gainesville, Florida. The dates selected for this meeting are August 16-21.

NATIONAL GENERAL MEMBERSHIP FESTIVAL OF LEARNING:

The Wisconsin region suggested that it is important for us to inter-act with the general membership more than we have done in the past. Because of this, they proposed that VVAW/WSO hold a National General Membership Festival of Learning for the purposes of doing Political Education work and getting to rap with members in order to better find out what is going on in our respective regions and around the country. The Steering Committee felt that this was next to impossible within the immediate future because of the up-coming Gainesville, actions, the August NSCM, and the Women's National meeting. Because this Festival of Learning will require a good deal of planning, it was suggested that a workshop on this idea be conducted at the next NSCM with the possibility of holding this sort of action next spring. This idea should be discussed within the regions so that the planning of such an event can be done easily.

FUTURE OBJECTIVE CHANGES:

PROPOSAL: Each region should pick the objective which they are working around most and simplify that objective to a more concise form. Position papers on the objective should be brought to the next NSCM and dealt with in a workshop.

This proposal was made in light of the fact that some of our objectives are wordy and difficult to understand on first reading. The purpose of simplifying the objectives is not to take away the meaning, but to make them more concise. It was suggested that chapters and regions check around and find out how people would best understand our objectives. We must realize how important these objectives are and discover the manner in which our ideas can best be communicated. (An example would be to have a bold face sentence explaining the idea of the objective followed by a short explanatory paragraph). It would be a good idea to get feed-

back from those people reading the Winter Soldier to discover their opinion of our objective form.

It was also suggested that proposed objective changes be sent to the national office so that proposed changes can be included in the newsletter. This would enable us to vote on the changes at the next NSCM, rather than having to wait for eight months while the regions discuss the changes.

WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH CONFERENCE:

The World Federation of Democratic Youth will be holding their 10th annual Youth and Student Festival in East Berlin from July 28 - August 4. This will be a meeting of revolutionary youth from around the world. Some VVAW/WSO members have been accepted to attend this conference. Because of past problems surrounding spokespeople from VVAW who were not qualified to speak for the organization, it was decided that any spokesperson from VVAW/WSO is to be a representative from the national organization and not from specific regions. To avoid problems at this up-coming conference, the Steering Committee unanimously accepted the following proposal.

PROPOSAL: Rich Fanger (St. Louis) is to be the official spokesman and national representative for the VVAW/WSO delegation at the Youth and Student Festival. Other regional representatives are to be considered as members of the delegation. If more members are accepted by WFDY, their names and a short biography is to be sent to the National Office for coordination and for publication in the newsletter so that the regions can be made aware of the members of the delegation. Each region has the responsibility to vote on the people suggested from their region, and then a decision on the make-up of the delegation will be made by that specific region and the National Office.

DELEGATE SELECTION FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS:

PROPOSAL: Any time that there is an international or national meeting and there is not time to coordinate the delegate selection with the National Steering Committee, then regions are to elect representatives and send the names and biographies to the National Office for coordination. The biographies are to state who the member is, what he/she is doing and why they are going. The National Office is to give each representative a letter prior to the meeting stating that he/she is an official VVAW/WSO representative. All of the above information is to be published in the newsletter so that the regions will be aware of who is attending conferences as official VVAW/WSO representatives.

The above proposal was unanimously accepted.

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN REGIONS:

PROPOSAL: Whenever possible, regions should submit names of individuals working on specific projects. This information is to be sent out in the

national newslett so that projects and program can be better coordinated throughout the country. This will facilitate the establishment of good lines of communications around projects and programs between chapters, regions, and national. All chapters should send a list of their specific programs and projects (i. e PVS, Amnesty) to the National Office so that a comprehensive list of all projects can be compiled and made available to other chapters.

This proposal was unanimously accepted by the Steering Committee.

INTERNAL SECURITY:

The National Steering Committee strongly recommends that when people come into a region saying that they are from another region, the visited region should call the region from whence they came for purposes of checking out the visitors story.

PROPOSAL: The National Steering Committee hereby levels the responsibility upon the National Office for the development of a comprehensive security packet for immediate dissemination to all chapters.

This proposal was unanimously accepted, but the development of such a packet is contingent upon the in-put received in National from the regions. It is the responsibility of the regions to inform the National Office of specific problems with security and how these problems are dealt with.

REGION INCORPORATIONS:

PROPOSAL: Alabama/Mississippi wishes to annex the state of Tennessee to their region.

This proposal received unanimous acceptance.

PROPOSAL: Kansas/Western Missouri wishes to annex Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota to their region for purposes of coordination. Because of the size of this area, Kansas/Western Missouri retains the option to drop these additional states if the activity in this area grows stronger.

This proposal was unanimously accepted.

PROPOSAL: Eastern Missouri/Southern Illinois wishes to temporarily annex the states of Arkansas and Oklahoma to their region for purposes of trying to build up this area through a stronger regional office.

The vote on this proposal was: 49-yes; 16-no.

PROXY VOTES:

Once again the subject of proxy votes was brought up. The following proposals were accepted and are now procedural policy.

PROPOSAL: Each region can only have one written proxy and this proxy is to apply to all votes on specific issues unless otherwise specified. These proxies are to be turned into the chair at the beginning of the meeting.

This proposal was accepted with a vote of: 67-1/2-yes; 2-1/2-no.

PROPOSAL: That the National Office be considered one region with regard to the holding of proxy votes.

This proposal was passed with a vote of: 42-yes; 23-no; 5 abst.

MEDICAL AID FOR INDOCHINA:

Because of some problems with the terminology of the proposal for Medical Aid for Indochina which was presented at the Chicago Steering Committee Meeting, an alternate proposal was presented and the original proposal was withdrawn. The following proposal was unanimously accepted.

1. That VVAW participate in local coalitions to promote and develop local and regional consciousness of the need for continuing aid and support to the people of Indochina from the people of the United States.
2. That VVAW/WSO participate in and organize fund-raising and educational medical programs for Indochina.
3. That VVAW/WSO remove the Nguyen Van Troi Hospital as a national priority. That individual chapters support any medical program to Indochina that they wish.

Our commitment to the Indochinese is one which is based on our continuing relationship and solidarity. Our programs should reflect that same commitment.

* * * * *

In the name of the blood flowing in my heart,
In the name of the ardour burning in your chest,
Let's respond to the call of the future,
Rise up and shoulder to shoulder
March forward.

UNITY

UNITY

STRUGGLE

STRUGGLE

VICTORY!

VICTORY!

Grasp firm my hand
And let's tighten our lethal stranglehold
Around those who take guns and bullets for power,
Prisons for weapons,
Violence for glory.
Without regret we willingly lay down our lives
Smiling an everlasting smile.
And with eternal remembrance,

APPENDIX A

These items are needed to stock the MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. MEMORIAL CLINIC. PLEASE forward donations and/or items from the list to:

PEOPLES' FARM
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VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION

POSITION PAPER ON AMNESTY

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AMNESTY STATEMENT OF DELEGATES OF EXILES, ACTIVE-
DUTY GIs, AND VETERANS
PARIS, FEBRUARY 19-21, 1973

At a time when we are told the war is coming to an end, American troops, material and advisors still remain in Indochina and U. S. intervention in the affairs of the Indochinese peoples continues. We, war resisters in exile, active-duty GIs, and veterans demand that the U. S. government withdraw all its troops from Indochina and strictly adhere to the January 27 agreement to end the war.

The American government's illegal intervention in Southeast Asia has been opposed by a majority of the American people. Hundreds of thousands of men and women in the U. S. have suffered a loss of civil rights, liberty, and jobs because they have been in opposition to the war or subjected to the racism and oppression of the American military and draft systems. Contrary to Nixon's deliberate distortion about the "few hundred" anti-war exiles, there are in fact 60,000 to 100,000 of them. But the majority of war resisters are inside the U. S. where an estimated 200,000 live underground. Thousands are behind bars; many have court records; and over 500,000 veterans have less than honorable discharges.

We demand universal, unconditional amnesty (with no alternative service or other punitive measures, or case-by-case judgment) for:

1. All military resisters (so called "deserters") and draft resisters in exile or underground in the U. S.;
2. All people who are or have been in civilian and military prisons, or or those who are sought for prosecution because of their opposition to the war -- this includes a clearing of their records;
3. The more than half million veterans with less than honorable discharges.

War resisters are not criminals; the real criminals are the American Government leaders who have violated the U. S. Constitution and International Law in waging this war. It is these people who are responsible for the death and destruction in Indochina and for the hundreds of thousands of Americans killed or wounded in combat.

The perpetration of this illegal war by the United States has violated the honor that should surround one's service to one's country. Only an amnesty which is universal and unconditional will truly mark an end to the U. S. government's disastrous policy in Indochina and at the same time serve to prevent all such future wars.

(The following is a more detailed explanation of the national position of VVAW/WSO on amnesty. This paper was written by representatives of RITA-ACT, the National Lawyer's Guild, Pacific Counseling Service, Campaign for Amnesty and Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization. It was adopted as the official position of VVAW/WSO at the National Steering Committee Meeting held in Placitas, New Mexico from April 19-23.)

BACKGROUND

There are several basic starting points which are relevant to any discussion of the amnesty issue; first, that US intervention in Indochina has been by Presidential decree only, without the declaration of war by Congress, and therefore has always been an illegal war. In addition to illegal entry, the US has violated the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, the International Rules of War and the Nuremberg principles that it stated in the Nazi trials after World War II. The latter held that an individual is personally responsible for his or her own acts, no matter what orders may have been given by a higher civilian or military authority. Resistance to fighting in that war, therefore, came from several conclusions about both the spirit and letter of domestic and international law. There was additionally the widespread feeling that the US as a superpower was interfering in the internal affairs of other countries for reasons that had nothing to do with national security or defense.

TYPES OF RESISTANCE-- Hundreds of thousands of American men legally resisted the draft; they found ways to prevent their personal involvement in the Vietnam war. These ways include: CO status, staying in school, getting jobs which carried draft exemptions, finding medical excuses often provided by anti-war and sympathetic doctors, etc. The common basis for all these types of actions was the financial ability and availability of information to essentially a middle-class group. These people are usually not counted among figures of resisters, because their forms of resistance carried no penalty, but they in fact form an enormous base of people who acted as they did because of anti-war sentiment, and they ought to realize that their actions were responsible for both the increased anti-war sentiment in the population at large, and also for the necessity of other young men taking their place in the draft. This last fact had particularly high consequences for the working class, poor and third world segment of society. We should look to this group of successful resisters for help in organizing local amnesty campaign.

REFUSED REGISTRATION OR INDUCTION-- The majority of those men who refused to register or who refused induction are still vulnerable to prosecution. It was these acts of resistance which focused public attention on anti-war resistance to the draft, and which resulted in a tremendous court backlog of cases. The courts are now moving to prosecute these cases after a slowdown of several years. It is clearly the hope of the Nixon administration that the cease-fire agreement has taken public attention away from these cases.

LIVING WITHIN THE US-- The government is currently paying particular attention to those resisters who are politically conscious and active, and while we may predict that many resisters will be dealt with leniently, we also think that those who are active will be dealt with extremely harshly--the members of groups like the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Workers Organization, Rising Up Angry, etc. Public silence around these trials will result in that division of visibility politically conscious people from others, and we should not allow that division to take place. We can assume that the men involved, for the most part, can be organized around their own defense.

LIVING AS EXILES-- There are presently about 200,000 men in America who are either fugitives from the draft or military, awaiting trial, or in prison. Canadian exiles number upwards of 60,000, including both the resisters and their families. There are also several thousand in other countries. These men have been forced to completely change their lives: to leave friends, family and country, in order not to compromise their political and moral beliefs. An economic analysis of this group would show that, for most, legal forms of resistance were not feasible. Resisters who were able to plan their exile in advance were better able to take advantage of Canadian immigration requirements; many have made new lives and have applied for Landed Immigrant Status. Some of the draft resisters and almost all deserters do not have either the skills or the financial backing to attain such status, and it is this group that Canada has recently begun to move against and will eventually deport. They are the most vulnerable of the exiles.

MILITARY RESISTERS-- Men who left the military after induction are that group for whom alternatives were very few. They are largely coming from poor economic backgrounds; many did not have information about legal resistance available in any form, they did not have information about the nature of the war itself and only learned after they were in the military. Many of them believed that the war was necessary in order to protect their country, many were persuaded that it was their patriotic duty to defend us against communism.

This group has always been the "cannon fodder" of any war--they have traditionally regarded the military as a way out of their economic situation, and as a way to help their families. Not only did this group always have difficulty in obtaining good jobs, but over a period of time, they have been forced to be primarily concerned with their own survival, and entering the military, whether by draft or by enlistment, was always seen as one more way of survival among a dismal set of choices. Of this group, many third world young men in particular believed military propaganda about opportunities, but by virtue of duty assignments, was in fact relegating them to that group which would take the most likely to be killed or wounded in action.

Figures about the size of this group are difficult to ascertain; the military automatically classifies all AWOLs as deserters after 30 days. We can get some idea of the potential size of this group, however. In 1966, there were about 16,000 AWOLs and deserters from the Army alone. In 1970, there were over 65,000 AWOLs and deserters from the Army. Up until the last few years, the majority of exiles in Canada were draft resisters; during the last two years, 90% of the resisters who went to Canada were military resisters. The majority of the exiles in Europe have always been military resisters.

MILITARY RESISTERS AFTER VIETNAM DUTY-- There is a sizeable number of deserters and AWOLs who left the military after their period of duty in Vietnam. This group reacted in a particularly strong way to their experiences in Vietnam. They came to hate and distrust the US military machine, based on their only too acute perceptions of what the Vietnam war was all about. With virtually no advance preparation, and understanding that they were being forced to take tremendous risks, this group deserted wherever they happened to be; in western Europe, sometimes in Canada or in the US itself.

RESISTANCE DISCHARGES-- Since 1963, 500,000 GIs have received discharges under less than honorable conditions, and thousands more are currently in stockades and brigas as a result of their resistance to the war inside the military machine. Many of these acts took the form of direct actions against the racism and oppression of the military.

The general breakdown of military morale, discipline, and creditability was the result of a growing awareness on the part of GIs about the responsibility of the military for the war and the manner in which it was waged. It was also a reflection of resistance to the oppression of the military, of a growing sense of unity with other young people whose values, life-styles and politics were in direct contradiction to those of the people in authority. The reaction of those soldiers who had fought in Vietnam was extremely bitter, and although most of them did not leave the military, they did engage in acts of protest, of outrage, and of frustration. For third world GIs, the racism exhibited by the officers and an integral part of the military machine was even less tolerable after service in Vietnam than before. There was also a growing sense of unity with other resistance movements: the black movement at home for example. A black draft avoider in Canada voiced these sentiments, "I'm not a draft evader, I'm a runaway slave. I left because I was not going to fight white America's war." In 1972, black soldiers received 20.7% of all Bad Conduct Discharges and 32.6% of all Dishonorable Discharges. This is an example of disproportional numbers of less than honorable discharges given to Third World people.

The attempts of the military to stem this wave of protest and rebellion caused even more problems. Discipline became harsher and the general climate of repression became stronger. These conditions produced even more individual acts of protest against the military, and we should be prepared to understand and analyze these unconscious acts of resistance as attacks on a system that was both the target of anti-war sentiment and the oppressive machinery that had helped to create the problem.

This group of men came out of the military with less than honorable discharges and often with criminal records. They do not receive veterans' benefits, have enormous difficulty in getting a job or education, and have largely been forgotten because they are easy to ignore. Any campaign for amnesty must therefore include a demand to upgrade these discharges and the clearing of these records, along with amnesty for civilian and military resisters.

CIVILIAN PROTESTERS-- By the government's creation of an illegal war, a draft which was then also illegal, and by virtue of a monopoly of channels of information about the war and protest to it, the state also created the need for 'illegal' acts of protest which could break through that monopoly. Just as members of the US military were forced to break military law in order to protest the war, and just as civilian young men who did not have legal means of resistance open to them were forced to break civilian laws in order to not participate in that war -- so there is a group of civilians who engaged in anti-war protests of differing kinds in order to gain public attention and focus it on the nature of US involvement in Vietnam. While their military counterparts serve time in brigs and stockades, the civilian men and women are serving time in prisons and jails. Amnesty should include organizing around all those who were forced to break the government's laws in order to resist and protest US actions in Indochina. Just as we are calling for the clearing of criminal records for those who resisted within the military, so we include the sealing of criminal records and dropping of charges for civilians as well.

AMNESTY SENTIMENT

A Gallup poll taken in February, 1973, on the subject of attitudes toward draft avoiders (no figures are available about attitudes toward amnesty for military resisters) shows that 29% of the population already favors unconditional amnesty. An additional 10% feel that non-military service should be required, and another 18% feel that a choice of either military or non-military service must be required.

Eighteen percent more feel that military service must be required. Thus, 75% of those surveyed are sympathetic to some form of amnesty, conditional or unconditional, for draft avoiders. We feel that these people are educable to a position of complete and unconditional amnesty for all war resisters and protesters. Particularly when all forms of resistance are taken together, we feel that people can come to support the upgrading of discharges as well.

Our analysis of feelings about amnesty on the part of the general population include the Gallup Poll note that four times as many men as women think that draft avoiders should be given jail sentences (10%). Mrs. Patricia Simon, the mother of a son killed in Vietnam, and a supporter of unconditional amnesty for all military and civilian resisters noted: "I think that men like Nixon are more threatened than women by the idea of amnesty. For them, masculinity is still identified with force and violence. It's an ancient definition, but it still applies." We think that Mrs. Simon's statement explains the Gallup Poll figures and conclude that women of all classes are apt to be more sympathetic than men to the position of amnesty. This should not be seen as a strategy for organizing which would stress classless appeals to a maternal sensitivity. We agree that there is a dominant male stereotype in America which works against a position of support for amnesty. But realizing that all women are less affected by a MALE thinking which is destructive for all, neither substitutes for, nor contradicts, the strategy of organizing among those people who are most directly affected by the issue because of their economic and social position in society.

GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-AMNESTY POSITION--It is possible to reach several conclusions about current administration feeling on amnesty. Historically, there is no precedent in America for such a demand. It is true that Confederate soldiers did receive amnesty, but it was a political solution to the problem of reuniting the country after the Civil War, and it is important to note that Union soldiers were being prosecuted for desertion up to ten years after the war ended. In addition to the lack of precedent, it is more important to realize that the Nixon administration faces and is highly conscious of a growing lack of credibility on the part of the people toward the government. It is not difficult to understand the administration's fear that an amnesty would only increase that lack of credibility. Such thinking stems directly from their analysis of what support for the government means; if amnesty is granted, then the government might be seen as admitting that the war was wrong and the resistance was legitimate. The government has expended Indochinese and American lives and resources in order to prove that the war was right. There are no signs of a change in that position.

A second way of analyzing government sentiment on amnesty is to look at the moral crusade that Nixon is waging: a basic return to reactionary values; authoritarianism, individualism, male stereotypes, unquestioned racism, and support for America's imperialist spirit. There is no place in such a crusade for a program of amnesty, and we should understand that a victory in the amnesty campaign would be a major defeat for the Nixon administration in terms of fostering an even more widespread distrust and questioning of these basic values.

ECONOMICS--The US is faced with a crisis of unemployment, not just a question of the lack of jobs in certain areas, for which training programs might be a cure, but a lack of jobs across all levels, and the inability of the economic system to create them. Therefore, the prospect of tens of thousands of young, employable, largely semi- and unskilled young men is not a desirable one. Additionally, these particular young men have already challenged the government once, and a realistic appraisal of them is that they are likely to do so again. The government can be expected to advocate jail sentences or military service as a way of breaking this

spirit of militancy in order that they return to the economic system as passive participants. The fact that many of them who have taken the greatest risks and hence face the greatest penalties are third world does not make them desirable in a racist economy.

Less than honorable discharges which prevent men from being considered for most jobs and places an additional financial burden on the women in their families, puts the blame on the individual, and allows the government to maintain the cruel myth that if one doesn't oppose the system a good job is the reward. This is another reason why the government would be opposed to upgrading these discharges. Once the method by which these men are labelled and dismissed as being unemployable is removed, a huge segment of the under- or unemployed work force would themselves have and would encourage others to have a very different response to government propaganda about employment opportunities. An 'individual' problem would clearly become the collective problem it is, and public confidence in the US economy would be undermined, and could be focussed upon the real causes of unemployment.

OUR STRATEGY

DEFINITIONS-- There has been some discussion of the appropriate terminology that we should use. Basically, we feel that we are not asking for forgiveness. We are committed to the position that all forms of resistance to the war were morally, politically and legally correct, and we support the brothers and sisters in all those actions -- direct or indirect. If no crime was committed, then the state has no authority to forgive.

The term 'amnesty' legally fits our requirements; it means 'abolition of the crime', in other words, there is no penalty because there was no crime. The term 'pardon' is legally used to mean the abolition of the sentence, while recognizing that a crime did occur. It is true that popular usage of the term amnesty carries the connotation of forgiveness which maintains that a crime did occur. We must weigh this public definition of the term against two factors; first, that amnesty is legally distinguishable from pardon, and that secondly, the term amnesty is the one which most American people are using, and the concept of unconditional amnesty does indeed signify what we want, provided that all the differing kinds of resistance are included. Our analysis means that we will educate people to the fact that no crime was committed, indeed it will form the basis of our campaign. Since the term will be widely used in any event, we feel that we should attempt to make it our term, with our definition.

CASE-BY-CASE REVIEWS-- We must be particularly careful to avoid the term of pardon, not only because it indicates that a crime was committed, but also because it carries with it the notion of a case-by-case review of each individual "offender." We support unconditional amnesty for any group that is involved, and are opposed to individual reviews for several reasons. First, individual reviews of draft avoiders would allow the government to pick and choose among those who have desirable skills as opposed to those who do not. It would grant the state the opportunity to select its citizens from those in exile, and would mean that racist and class values would always prevail. Secondly, those men who left the military did so for the same reasons that civilian men refused to enter the military; both kinds of actions are specific forms of anti-war resistance for which we want amnesty, and case-by-case reviews allows the government to obscure that fact by employing civilian authority to make the decisions regarding civilians, and

keeping military decision-making virtually invisible. Thirdly, our more general political goals involve the stressing of collective actions and collective responsibility. Part of the educational work to be done in an amnesty campaign involves attacking the notion of individual separation. Case-by-case review would reinforce that tendency.

DISCHARGE UPGRADING-- We feel that all military personnel should receive one type of discharge. Previously issued discharges under less than honorable conditions should be upgraded to this type. Our concept of universal, unconditional amnesty means that there will be no case-by-case review of these discharges. All of them reflect the racism and oppression of the military machine, and actions taken by G.I.'s are a statement of protest and outrage, and are directly or indirectly a result of the Indochina war and the institutions that created it.

Some of these acts resulted in the criminal prosecution of the G.I.'s. Most should have been prosecuted in the civilian courts, and we hope that one of the results of the campaign for amnesty will be that the military ceases to prosecute its personnel for acts that are considered to be crimes by civilian laws. Obviously, G.I.'s who were prosecuted by the military and who have been issued less than honorable discharges as well, bear the burden of paying twice for the same crime. We advocate one type of discharge for the future, the upgrading of all previous discharges, and civilian jurisdiction over judicial matters. For those whose charges are still pending, we feel that amnesty should include having them dropped for both military and civilian resisters.

UNITY IN DEMAND FOR AMNESTY

Our analysis of amnesty, therefore, brings us to the inescapable conclusion that all forms of resistance must be united. This is the best manner in which to make our political values clear, and it is also the most realistic way of uniting that large body of America citizens who are personally involved in one or another aspect of the issue. The government would undoubtedly prefer to individually bring back the desirable draft avoiders from abroad, to quietly try draft resisters at home, and to select penalties for them which reflect their own racist and class bias. The government would prefer to keep the workings of military "justice" as far from public view as possible; the military would like to be able to deal with its own dissenters according to its own standards of discipline as a way of maintaining absolute obedience. The broadest possible amnesty campaign is the best way to offset the government's preferences in these matters. A campaign which brings draft avoiders into the foreground at the expense of military resisters is politically self-defeating; it reinforces the anti-working class bias of American society, and it reinforces the racist nature of oppression. Including the question of upgrading discharges means that the military would be additionally faced with confronting its own racist machinery.

Our political analysis leads us to the position that the racist and class bias of American society not only structures the form of the ruling class, but also attempts to structure the forms of dissent: those who resisted legally were, those who resisted illegally

were forced to do so. The most vulnerable people have once again taken the greatest risks and are being asked to pay the greatest penalties.

A campaign conducted from this perspective increases its educational value; it prevents it from being only moralistic, and it unites the broad spectrum of the anti-war movement. Historically, the draft resistance orientation of the early anti-war people was based on a moral objection to participation in the Vietnam war or in war in general. This created an unfortunate separation between them and those who were forced -- directly or indirectly -- into the military. With fewer options available, the people who went into the military resisted the war and/or racism and oppression by all means open to them. Far from being the "enemy," as early civilian anti-war people saw them, they were in fact immediate or potential allies. This division, which was antagonistic at times, played directly into the hands of the government. More clearly than the civilian anti-war movement, the government recognized the class nature of the difference between those who fought and those who did not, and sought to exploit that difference by calling attention to the backgrounds of most draft "dodgers." And they tried to get support for the war by appealing to working class resentment against those who were able to resist the draft. Of course the government would now seek to maintain that gulf by appearing to reluctantly and quietly grant amnesty to a few draft resisters while ignoring if not directly attacking military resisters. Our amnesty campaign should prevent this from happening because our unity is based on complete support for all forms of resistance.

AMNESTY AS PART OF THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT--A white deserter from the Military Police now in Canada said: "I want amnesty because amnesty is the best way for America to confront what the Vietnam war was -- if we don't confront it, it will happen again." He deserted in 1970, after the protests at Jackson and Kent State over the invasion of Cambodia. The issue of amnesty therefore, speaks to the heart of the anti-war movement. It is the recognition of the price that the American people have paid in order to oppose the war. Amnesty does not ignore the fact that thousands of American young men were killed or wounded in Vietnam. It puts that fact into the perspective of the price that the Vietnamese people have paid, and into the realization that Americans should never have been sent to fight the Vietnamese people in the first place.

Secondly, the issue of amnesty is of direct personal importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans whose sons, friends, and neighbors are exiles, fugitives, in jail, or unemployed because of the consequences of opposition to the war. It is perhaps the only anti-war issue that the government is powerless to quiet down with its propaganda about the war being over, because the amnesty issue is just beginning and is crucial to millions of people.

Thirdly, talking about the question of amnesty is a realistic way for anti-war groups and individuals to continue to educate the public around the issues of US involvement in Indochina. The creation of the problem of amnesty belongs to the same government that created unwanted intervention in the affairs of the Indochinese people. Those Americans who blame the anti-war movement for creating the current situation could be re-educated to fix blame where it belongs.

Fourthly, it makes the connection between the G.I. movement and the civilian movement clear, by recognizing the magnitude of the G.I. struggle. The attention and consciousness of the civilian movement to that struggle will help to point out possibilities for future united political work, and will be a clear step forward in the breakdown of class and race bias.

AMNESTY AS PART OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT--Recognition of U.S. reasons for involvement in Vietnam meant, for many Americans, the beginnings of an understanding about U.S. imperialism. The job of public education has only begun in that area, and we feel that the campaign around amnesty should be regarded as essentially basic to an understanding of the ways in which imperialism functions. We are inescapably led to the conclusion that imperialism abroad hinges on public acquiescence if not support; at home; and specifically in terms of an imperial army, it is crucial that the questions we have discussed about who fights in such armies be raised among the general population. An amnesty campaign supports the basic premise that no army has the right to force people to fight imperialist wars, through either indirect economic pressure or by direct means of a draft or criminal prosecution or military resisters. Resistance to the Vietnam war, both within and outside of the military, provides us with an important guide for future opposition to imperialist wars. If the essentially middle-class draft avoiders are focussed on, it will mean that those politically conscious members of the working class are not recognized as such, and that the working class as a whole is perceived as an opponent, instead of as the class most directly affected, hence the strongest political ally. In addition to narrowing rather than broadening our base of support, it will also reinforce the racist and class bias of American society by distinguishing "political" and "moral" acts from the "criminal" acts. The breakdown of the U.S. military was directly caused by the political consciousness of basically working-class young men and women. This is a crucial fact of our analysis in terms of opposition to future wars of U.S. aggression.

AMNESTY AND THE VOLUNTEER ARMY--The end to the draft was seen by the middle class as a victory for the anti-war movement. However, we must closely examine the implications of a professional (volunteer) army.

A fundamental reason for the transformation into a volunteer army was a rapid technological development of weaponry, and the resulting need for highly trained soldier whose careers would be long-term. Related to this fact is the different strategic role which will be assigned to the army in the future; ground forces for wars fought abroad will be provided by the governments who seek U.S. intervention. This is the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine -- the "Vietnamization" of all third world countries. Another way of looking at the same strategy would state that, in the future, the people of the third world will be forced by their ruling classes to fight for U.S. interests. This does not mean that the U.S. will play a less imperialist or less vicious role in future wars, but on the contrary, means that the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Special Forces, as well as the entire technological apparatus will intervene more quickly and forcefully in "support" of "indigenous" armies. "Vietnamization" was in some respects more brutal a policy than direct U.S. intervention because it was even more manipulative of

the people of Vietnam, and because it allowed government propaganda at home to increasingly ignore the fact of intervention. A professional military has the virtue, therefore, of maintaining domestic ignorance of U.S. imperialist policies on the one hand, and permitting a more rapid and more skillful kind of military intervention on the others.

DOMESTIC COUNTER-INSURGENCY--At home, a professional army is supposed to play a more vital role as a "law and order" force. It will be used in the streets of the U.S. as a counter-insurgency force in dealing with ghetto rebellions, strikes, demonstrations, etc. Essentially, the ruling class has transformed the ground forces of the U.S. military into a civil war army, in which poor people, recruited by severe direct and indirect economic pressure, will be expected to give a life-time of service.

These expectations will have several effects on the lives of future soldiers. The U.S. military is acutely conscious of the need for a tightening up of discipline and morale for an army which will be called on to fight its own people. Acts of desertion and refusal to obey orders are much more crucial in such a situation. Life in the army will have to be even more isolated, sealed off from civilian life and from movements for social change on the part of civilians. The army will have to be a "state within a state" in order to perform well as a counter-insurgency force, and the influence of a civilian movement within the armed forces will be more difficult than it has been during the last few years. Organizing of soldiers by civilians will be extremely difficult. It is for these same reasons that the army is also making military life much more attractive and personally comfortable.

A broad-based amnesty campaign which stresses the correctness of individual responsibility for resisting criminal orders would help to break down the new ideals of the military machine. It should be seen as a way of opening the minds of new recruits for the volunteer army to the possibility and necessity for refusing orders that they find objectionable on political and moral grounds.

AMNESTY AND DOMESTIC ORGANIZING--In terms of the organizing efforts of many different kinds of groups, a campaign for amnesty given unconditionally for all forms of anti-war resistance should be regarded as highly useful. We regard such a campaign as lasting between 4 and 6 years, and think that during that period of time, many issues will be raised which community groups would be able to include and use in their work. Most importantly, it points out the ways in which working class people have paid a high price to oppose the war, and the penalties that they face as a consequence. The amnesty campaign represents the real interests of both working and middle class families whose sons rebelled, and those families are beginning to be organized into active participation in such a campaign. It will be perhaps the first time that the working class can have a direct and visible means of participation in the anti-war movement, and amnesty is therefore a good way in which to unite large numbers of people around an issue that is important to the largest segment of the population.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

An amnesty campaign which presents the class analysis we have spoken of should fit in very well with the attempts of people to point out ways in which class structuring operates in America. It should help those who engage in educational and agitational work in combatting U.S. imperialism. It will be possible to use amnesty campaign material in work that may have to be done around the court-martials of anti-war P.O.W.'s, indeed in the way people talk about the P.O.W. issue in general. Educational work around the people of Indochina can take into account the fact that millions of American people over the last 10 years came to regard them as our friends, not as our enemy. That beginning sense of friendship is certainly part of the reason for refusal to participate in the Vietnam war, and as such is another part of a campaign for amnesty.

The issue of amnesty, then, belongs to those who resisted, opposed, and organized against the war; whether they refused to fight initially, refused to support a military machine, or as veterans of the Vietnam war brought the meaning of it home to America in ways that others were never able to do. Perhaps the feelings of the exiles and the veterans are the most important for the American people to understand. They are both victims of U.S. intervention in Indochina, and it is significant that those who refused to fight and those who did fight agree. It is the U.S. government who ought to be asking for pardon, not amnesty, from those who it caused to be killed or wounded, to kill or wound others, to resist those alternatives by destroying their own lives, or to live in a society which imposes life-long penalties on them. The history of the anti-war movement is the history of decisions and actions that are among the most fundamentally decent and righteous actions that women and men have ever taken.

For those of us who came to understand, because of all these military and civilian resisters, that the war was white America's war, the war of the ruling class and the defense industry, the war of the rich, the racist, and the imperialist -- for us there would be no more progressive a step in our work than to demand universal and unconditional amnesty. Our work goes on -- to demand that there is never again a U.S. government which violates the basic spirit of its own people or of the people of the world.

Routing Slip
FD-4 (Rev. 12-22-69)

To: ☒ Director

Date 5/21/73

Att.: INTD
(Pencuski)

FILE

☐ SAC (RM)

Title

Counter-Spy

☐ ASAC

☐ Supv.

☐ Agent

☐ SE

☐ IC

☐ CC

IE:

☐ Steno

☐ Clerk

☐ Rotor #:

ACTION DESIRED

☐ Acknowledge

☐ Assign Reassign

☐ Bring file

☐ Call me

☐ Correct

☐ Deadline

☐ Deadline passed

☐ Delinquent

☐ Discontinue

☐ Expedite

☐ File

☐ For information

☐ Handle

☐ Initial & return

☐ Leads need attention

☐ Return with explanation or notation as to action taken.

☐ Open Case

☐ Prepare lead cards

☐ Prepare tickler

☐ Return assignment card

☐ Return file

☐ Search and return

☐ See me

☐ Serial #

☐ Post

☐ Recharge

☐ Return

☐ Send to

☐ Submit new charge out

☐ Submit report by

☐ Typ

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APC John F. Malone

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
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COUNTER-SPY

THE BULLETIN OF:
THE COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH
ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

MAY, 1973
VOL. 1
NO. 2

75¢



Phung - Hoàng

Counter-Spy is the official bulletin of the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC) and is a collective effort of the Committee. Each issue will present information and analysis on different aspects of the U.S. Intelligence effort. None of the information presented, no matter how embarrassing to the U.S. government, will pose a threat to national security. It has been estimated by a Congressional committee that 90% of government information now classified should not be classified at all. Our information comes from publically available sources. We welcome comments and suggestions from our readers and supporters, and encourage anyone interested in doing similar work to contact us.

In this issue, CARIC takes a critical look at the current F-6 program, as conducted in Vietnam. F-6 is the new title for the old "Operation Phoenix" assassination program, originally designed to neutralize the infrastructure of the National Liberation Front. The new title has not meant the abandoning of old ways however, the U.S. government still supports this "intelligence program" based on indiscriminate arrest, torture, and murder.

We would like to thank the Indochina Resource Center for their assistance in this issue of Counter-Spy. We would also like to thank all of you who took the time to write us about our first issue of Counter-Spy, and we hope that even more people can take the time to give us their thoughts on this issue.

Responsible for this issue: Tim Butz, Bart Osborn, Winslow Peck.

This is the last issue of Counter-Spy that we will be able to mail to those who have not subscribed. Those who would like to continue to receive Counter-Spy on a monthly basis can subscribe for one year by using the coupon in this issue.

COVER: The Phoenix or Phung Hoang Program was named after the all-seeing mythical bird which selectively snatches its prey--but the techniques of this operation are anything but selective. For many Vietnamese, the Phung Hoang Program or as it is now known as the F-6 program is a constant menace to their lives. "The Phoenix is a bird of death."

COUNTER-SPY, the official bulletin of the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC), is a monthly publication with this issue. Subscriptions are \$6.00 per year for individuals, \$10.00 for institutions, and \$75.00 for government agencies. Individuals may become CARIC sponsors by donating \$15.00 or more, which includes a free subscription to Counter-Spy and allows us to continue our work. Prisoners and GI's may receive free copies. Address all correspondence to CARIC, PO Box 647, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044. Copyright 1973 by CARIC.

Don't Read This Out Loud!

The headlines in American newspapers have for years told of Army surveillance of civilians, U.S. spy planes being shot down over other countries, attempted coups and intrigue initiated by the CIA, and unrestrained FBI wiretapping. We all know that Big Brother is watching, but no one in our government has taken the time to explain who is being spied upon, and why we are being watched. Too often, we American citizens don't even know who Big Brother is.

In 1955, President Eisenhower accepted the report of the Hoover Commission on U.S. Intelligence. Among other recommendations, the Commission emphasized the need for two "watchdog" committees on intelligence within the executive and legislative branches of government. Although a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was established to serve the President, Congress by a overwhelming majority has refused to establish a committee within the legislative branch. With Congress abrogating its responsibilities, there is no agency of government directly responsible to the public monitoring U.S. intelligence.

Now former intelligence workers, Viet Nam Veterans, and concerned citizens have formed the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC), to serve as an independent "watchdog" on the government spy apparatus. We have formed the committee to provide the vital information an aware public needs to know about government operations. The secrecy with which the government surrounds itself must stop.

CARIC will serve as an independent publicly sponsored source of analysis and information on the practices, organization, and objectives of U.S. Intelligence. What clandestine actions are being carried out in the name of America? Is the CIA preparing to entangle us in another war similar to Indochina? What information is going into federal data banks on innocent American citizens? Did the White House direct the Watergate bugging caper? Is the FBI becoming a "secret police force" responsive only to the Republican Party? Whose phones are tapped in America? These are some of the questions CARIC hopes to answer.

Although CARIC does believe that a massive government spy apparatus is at work in the world, we hope to dispel some of the paranoia citizens naturally feel when there is talk of spies and wiretaps. We know that the FBI does not have agents behind every tree, but there are agents in every major town in this country who have spied on innocent private and public citizens. Only a full and undisguised look at this hidden world can displace unwarranted fears, and guide the public effort to end this illegal and unjustified espionage.

CARIC knows that tens of thousands of American citizens from all walks of life were mobilized over the past decade to help bring an end to the government's war in Indochina, a war that has taken new forms under the direction of U.S. intelligence agencies. CARIC hopes that these same concerned citizens will continue to oppose the government's policies and bring an end to this new form of covert war. It is now time for thousands of Americans to mobilize to stop the spying as we stopped the dying. We encourage everyone to join us in our effort.

Thank you,
CARIC

CARIC PO Box 647
Ben Franklin Sta, Washington DC 20044

- ____ Enclosed is my contribution of \$15.00 to help sustain CARIC's work. (Please send my free subscription to "Counter-Spy.")
- ____ Subscription only. (\$6.00 individuals, \$10.00 institutions.)
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PACIFICATION:

THE 100 YEAR FLIGHT OF THE PHOENIX

WHAT IS PACIFICATION?

There have always been two wars in Indochina. The obvious one of bullets flying, bombs dropping, babies screaming and people dying has been paralleled by another war which has been just as important to the designers of the fighting war and in the end has had the same terrifying results. This other war is pacification. Pacification in Vietnam has been a military, political, and economic process of establishing and maintaining control over the Vietnamese people.

General William C. Westmorland defined pacification in these terms:

"Pacification is the very difficult process of establishing or reestablishing effective local self government within the political framework of the legitimate central government and its constitution."

From the beginning of America's involvement in Vietnam, pacification experts had noted the revolutionary axiom that for the revolution to succeed the revolutionary force must move among the people like the "fish in the sea." Thus, reasoned the pacification experts, the best strategy for defeating the insurgent force would be to deny the "fish" access to the "sea".

With this thought in mind, the United States Mission to Vietnam and the Government of Vietnam (GVN) in Saigon conducted various pacification efforts all designed to deny the Viet Cong or National Liberation Front (NLF) access to the people. These pacification programs were euphemistically termed "Wining Hearts and Minds" or WHAM. Each of the pacification efforts failed precisely because the Vietnamese people chose to be "liberated" by other Vietnamese people in the NLF rather than be "WHAM'd" by American forces.

Although rivalries among the Americans, corruption in the GVN, and bureaucratic instability in a time of war aided the failure of pacification, the root cause of each failure lies in the objective situation of American influence in Vietnam attempting to deny self-determination to the Vietnamese. In this situation the only logical result of WHAM was not a peaceful, pacified, non-communist Vietnam but the My Lai massacre and

the Phoenix assassination program.

Pacification has two objectives. The first is enlisting the aid of the people in the government programs because they believe the government serves their best interests (WHAM). The second and equally important objective is to secure the overt rejection of the theories and practices of the NLF. The steps to achieving these two goals are:

Occupation of a populated area - The GVN had to gain military supremacy in the area to be pacified. Under the various pacification programs devised over the years, the Saigon government often "bit off more than it could chew", attempting to occupy areas far from the lines of supply, support and reinforcement.

Organize the people - Political stability had to be maintained if pacification was to be achieved. Law and order were the goals of the pacification effort with little regard to self-determination. The tactics of achieving this goal were most often intimidation and bribery. As John Paul Vann, a pacification expert for many years, said, "... the majority of the people are apathetic and responsive only to force. To organize this segment of the population requires force. The people cannot be left to choose... The nature of this war is such that the people must be on one side or the other."

Elimination of the political opposition - Concurrently with the organization of the population, the Saigon government, with US assistance, set about identifying and neutralizing the political apparatus of all opposition forces including the NLF, the various non-communist nationalist forces, the religious groups and the students. This has been accomplished through massive imprisonment and assassination. Today more than 200,000 men, women and children, all political prisoners, languish in GVN prisons. The number of those assassinated by the agents of the GVN will probably never be known but 47,000 were known to be slain by 1971.

Stabilization - If and when the combined effort of organizing the people and eliminating the political opposition have been obtained, the government then goes about maintaining political supremacy through the holding of local elections in the village or hamlet. The presence

of armed occupation forces in the area for an indefinite period after the formation of a local government insures the continuation of the pacification process. After a time the occupying forces are converted into police or security forces. The pacified area is then used as a "base" to move into other areas for pacification.

In reality, the GVN under US guidance has never been able to achieve ultimate pacification and today only controls a few large cities, some coastal areas and a few base camps in the interior. The rest of the countryside is under the authority of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) established by the NLF and the GVN is losing more and more pacified areas every day.

The ultimate outcome of the conflict will be the political supremacy in south Vietnam of the NLF/PRG because the pacification effort has been doomed to failure from the inherent contradiction of the American involvement - trying to make peace by waging war (WHAM). The GVN and the US government have tried for many years to prevent just this outcome of the conflict. After each pacification effort failed, the GVN and the US government escalated their tactics towards the inevitable point of mass murder. As an American infantry major once told American reporters, "We had to destroy the village in order to save it." It is probable with this thought pattern guiding the pacification effort that the presence of the US government in Vietnam has only strengthened the National Liberation Front.

EARLY APPROACHES TO PACIFICATION

The first attempts at pacification in Vietnam in modern times occurred during the Japanese occupation in WWII. The Japanese Army's secret police, the Kemp-eitai, created "neighborhood associations" to control populations in invaded areas. The Kempeitai ran the "neighborhood associations" as authoritarian extensions of the Japanese Imperial Army. Naturally this pacification effort only strengthened the determination of the Vietnamese nationalists, especially the Vietminh, to force the foreign occupiers out of Vietnam which they did with assistance from the forerunner of the US CIA, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

The French had first occupied Vietnam in 1884. They began an early pac-

ification attempt about this time, although the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) of the French Union Forces (Foreign Legion) had complete authority for both civil and military affairs. French troops were deployed around key population and commercial centers with orders to "win the confidence of the local population." When security was restored, the French troops were shifted to the outer periphery of the pacification area and internal defense turned over to the Vietnamese *supplittiefs* who worked for the French. This basic strategy was not altered from 1885 until the Japanese occupancy.

After the defeat of the Japanese, the French reoccupied their old colonies in Indochina. However, the Vietnamese nationalists - the Vietminh later the NLF called Viet Cong in some American reports - were strong enough by this time to demand an independent Vietnam. During the French/Vietminh conflict, a number of special pacification areas were established by the French. Vietnamese loyal to the French, the *supplittiefs*, - many of whom are still in the Saigon government including Premier Thieu - protected the interior of each area, while French regulars operated outside as a mobile reserve against the Vietminh. Within the secure zone, the French organized Vietnamese cadres for civil development work. The cadres were called GAMO's (Groupes Administratives Mobile Organization) and were under French military authority. The French called their area technique the "Oil Spot", hoping that the pacified areas would grow outward, as does a spot of oil on water, from the base areas. This technique was later adopted by the US pacification effort.

The French failed in their pacification efforts because they refused to seek the support of the peasants. They then became tied down in fixed points along major supply routes where they were no match for the superior guerilla strategy of the Vietminh, who preferred to destroy the French power piecemeal while blocking their pacification effort. Eventually the French were tied down in a final fixed engagement at Dien Bien Phu and defeated. Following the French/Vietminh accords at the Geneva conference in 1954, the French retired to Saigon. The French maintained up to 80,000 troops in Vietnam up to 1956 and the GAMO's continued in some form until 1957.

NGO DINH DIEM AND EARLY PACIFICATION

After the Geneva Accords, the French supported Emperor of Vietnam Bao Dai appointed, at the insistence of the French, a well known non-communist nationalist Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister with instructions to form a new government in Saigon as Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh were doing in Hanoi. The early years of his regime were marked by intrigue from the French, the other nationalist forces and the United States. The US Government was paying up to 78% of the French military and pacification effort by this time and sent the senior American expert on pacification, Major General USAF (ret.) then Col. Edward Geary Lansdale, to Vietnam to advise the Diem government on pacification. The Mission Liaison Group (MLG) headed by Lansdale gained great influence over the Diem family and convinced Diem and his closest political advisor and brother Ngo Dien Ngu to unite the various nationalist forces in the south under his government. This upset the French who believed that the Americans were gaining more influence in Vietnam at the expense of French influence. The French then instigated a coup by the Binh Xuyen sect with the support of Bao Dai who was living in Paris. The Binh Xuyen were the Vietnamese version of Chicago gangsters who were given control of the Saigon police by the Emperor. This is roughly equivalent to Al Capone becoming Chicago's chief of police during the 1930's. Diem fought against this and on October 26, 1956 proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon.

As the US Government gained more influence over the Diem regime and the GVN, pacification became a prime concern. Lansdale suggested a program which became known as Civic Action or "National Security Action", which was modeled after the attempts at pacification in the Philippines during the conflict between the Manila government of Ramon Magsaysay and the insurgent force of the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Anti-Japanese Army) or "Huks." The attempts at pacification by the Manila government were also conceived by the US advisor Lansdale.

The programs, under the Diem government, consisted of rural development designed to lead "the inhabitants, treated as loyal subjects of a liberating regime...to chose

for themselves the regime which they will defend against any current sabotage or any future threat." The bulk of the pacification efforts during this period centered on the Catholic refugees who moved to the south from Hanoi as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was proclaimed by the Vietminh. This Catholic population formed an anti-communist element in the countryside that was loyal to Diem who was also Catholic. In 1956, many of these Vietnamese Catholics were forced by the Diem government to move from the coastal lowlands into the interior chiefly to the high plateau area. Diem, guided by US advisors, desired to place reliable groups in the strategically important areas of Vietnam which was essential to both the refugee resettlement program and pacification.

In the mean time, the US advisory effort had increased as the French lost more influence and eventually retired from Vietnam. Besides the MLG, the US government sent a group of scholars and experts to Vietnam as part of the Michigan State University, Vietnam Advisory Group (MSU/VAG) to devise a large scale rural resettlement plan for Vietnam. This was not to be the last time that US civilian experts would advise the Saigon government and the US Mission to Saigon on pacification. Many "think tank" groups, especially the RAND Corp. would become involved in pacification.

The first "think tank" approach to pacification, the MSU/VAG, developed an ambitious plan to construct "agrovilles" throughout the Mekong Delta. The agrovilles were designed to place the rural population along the major roads and arteries of communication to expedite the movement of security forces. The agrovilles would be protected with walls, moats and local security. A major emphasis of the Agrovillage Program was eliminating NLF recruitment, taxation, and information gathering. The NLF was a Vietnamese nationalist force - composed of Vietminh members who had stayed in their ancestral homes in the south, rather than go north to the DRV, and fresh recruits driven by the brutality of the Diem and French authority to join in the new effort for self-determination. The NLF was never completely dominated by the Vietnamese Communist Party, a point noted in some US intelligence re-

ports but ignored by a vast segment of the US press.

By 1959 only twenty-three agrovilles had been constructed when the program was abandoned by the Saigon government. The agrovilles had been operated by the GVN under several naive assumptions. First the GVN anticipated that the peasants would have a spontaneous enthusiasm for the program, their enthusiasm being sparked by bribes and rewards. This did not happen because the peasants would more often be beaten by the governments agents who kept the rewards for themselves.

The second naive assumption was the belief that competent cadres for administrative posts would emerge from the rural population. Instead, corruption became instilled in the GVN. For the most part the agrovillage effort tried to instill pacification by fear and terror. The NLF did the exact opposite and won the confidence of the rural population. As the NLF's strength in the countryside increased, Diem lost more and more control of the population and by 1961 the Agrovillage Program had failed.

STRATEGIC HAMLETS

To meet the increasing presence of the NLF, the Saigon government initiated the first of the truly massive pacification efforts - Ap Chien Luoc or Strategic Hamlets. The program was officially instituted in March, 1962 with both US Mission and Diem's brother Ngu being the chief proponents. The Saigon government created the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets which assumed all responsibility for the program.

The purpose of the program was to achieve the widest possible control over the population by the Saigon government. The immediate security objectives of the program were two-fold; first, to sever the communication and control lines of the NLF to the rural population and thus deny the "fish" from the "sea". Second, to promote a nation-wide self-defense effort. In addition to these immediate objectives, the Strategic Hamlet program was designed to have important implications for the long-range development of the GVN. It was hoped by Diem and his US advisors that the program would create a social, economic and political infrastructure in the countryside which would uproot the

ancestral ties of the peasants and thus their loyalty to the community-based NLF and implant a lasting political administration at the local level loyal to Saigon.

The hamlet is the smallest organized community in rural Vietnam. Several hamlets make up a village, however under the Strategic Hamlet program both hamlets and villages were fortified.

PARTIAL LIST OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR PACIFICATION/PHOENIX/F-6

ADVISORS/DESIGNERS

E.G. Lansdale, Major Gen., USAF(ret.)
Sir Robert G.K. Thompson
Dep. Amb. William J. Porter
Amb. Robert Komer
Amb. William E. Colby
Amb. Norman L. Sweat
FSR George D. Jacobson, SAAFFO

AMBASSADORS

Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge
Amb. Maxwell D. Taylor, Gen. ARMY(ret.)
Amb. Ellsworth Bunker
Amb. Graham Martin

COMUSMACV

Gen. William C. Westmoreland
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams
Gen. Fredrick Weyland

CIA Station Chiefs/CAS SAIGON

John Richardson
Peer De Silva
Mr. Jorganson
John Hart
Ted Shackley
Thomas Polgar

PRESIDENTS

Dwight David Eisenhower
John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Lyndon Baines Johnson
Richard Milhaus Nixon

The primary security force created in the Strategic Hamlet period of pacification was the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). The largest component of the RVNAF, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was created at the end of the war by decree of Bao Dai, and many of the

original units can trace their history back to Vietnamese *supplittiefs* operating as part of the French Union forces. Under Diem many of the independent nationalist forces were also incorporated into the ARVN.

Another element of the RVNAF created about this time were the Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF). The Regional Forces were created from the old Guard Civile (CG) left over from the French occupation and would come under eventual control of the Province Chiefs who in most areas were officers in the ARVN. The Popular Forces were developed from the Self Defense Corps (SDC) created to protect the hamlets during the early years of the Diem regime and were primarily used in static defense near each platoon's home village. In practice, the RF/PF were deployed and led in local operations by the district chief who was an officer in the ARVN.

The Strategic Hamlet plan's major emphasis for reorganization, however, was the police. The plan called for increased use of National Police Forces which were being trained by the Saigon government from proposals of both the US Mission and the British Advisory Mission (BAM) headed by Robert GK Thompson, the former Secretary of Defense in Malaya. Although the several plans submitted by the US Mission differed somewhat from the Thompson plan, consensus was finally reached among the parties and the Strategic Hamlet program was formed. The differences among the US, British, and GVN would continue to disrupt the efficiency of the program and would aid in its eventual demise.

Until this time police efforts had been maintained in the rural areas by the old CG and SDC. In the cities, the Surete had been destroyed during the struggles between the Binh Xuyen sect and Diem with most of the competent detectives forming the new intelligence branch of RVNAF, the Military Security Service (MSS). The ARVN had by this time taken responsibility for policing Saigon and a few other cities.

Under the revised Thompson plan the National Police Force was created to play an important role in pacification. At approximately the same time in 1959, the US Mission began its Public Safety Program in Vietnam, incorporating earlier police advisory efforts of the MLG under Lansdale and the MSU/VAG. This program

would be operated by the United States Agency for International Development (AID), nominally operated by the US Department of State but under heavy influence by the US CIA. Another element of the US Mission also had control over AID efforts in the Public Safety Program - CAS SAIGON, the operational unit of the US CIA in Saigon operating under the light cover of Office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA). The field offices of CAS SAIGON sometimes operated under the light cover of Combined Studies Group (CSG) in the Provinces.

The initial phase of the Strategic Hamlet program called for moving the population into more central locations and constructing defenses around their hamlets. The initial stages of the program appeared to have been successful with construction of many good hamlets. But the Diem government equated mechanical construction of the hamlets with "completion" of the pacification effort. The training of civil servants and cadres to administer the hamlets was also conducted during this period. The training was rushed and incomplete, and many of the Strategic Hamlet Construction Cadre were simply not prepared for the pacification effort.

During this period, the first census was conducted as an information source or data bank for population control. ID cards were issued and right-wing cells were formed from the remaining non-communist nationalist groups, most notably the Catholics, the Vietnamese National Patriotic Party (VNQDD, or Vietnam Quang Dach Dong), the Hoa Hoa, the Cao Dai, and others. Their primary function was assisting in eliminating the political structure of the NLF, termed by the US as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Another group developed during the Diem regime played a leading role in politics as well as pacification. Secret cells of the new party, the Can Lao, were formed by Diem's brother in almost every aspect of the civil and military divisions of the GVN. The Can Lao developed from an old labor party in which Ngo had gained leadership. The members of the party had to swear complete loyalty to Diem and were asked to kiss his picture in initiation ceremonies. A faction of the Can Lao are believed to have been formed into the GVN Central Intelligence Service by the US CIA. The CIS to this day still is

reported to be under operational control of the CAS SAIGON.

The American government - through USAID - sent money, foodstuffs, and building materials for use by the local governments; but due to the increasing corruption in the Diem regime, most of this aid found its way onto the black market. USAID also funded the cadres and USAID Public Administration advisors set up training courses for newly elected hamlet officials. In addition, simple radio networks were installed by USAID Public Safety as part of the warning network of the Strategic Hamlet Program.

But the program failed for much the same reasons that the earlier Agrovillage Program failed. Corruption at every level of the Diem regime, brutal relationships between GVN officials and the population, bureaucratic rivalries in both the GVN and the US Mission, increased repression of the opposition political forces by the police and intelligence apparatus of the Diem government all led to a strengthening of the NLF and a weakening of the GVN. In the end, the failures of the Strategic Hamlet Program would lead to the overthrow and death of Ngo Dinh Diem and political instability within the GVN.

THE INTERUM: 1963-66

Following the overthrow of Diem, there followed a succession of generals seizing control of the Saigon government. The US Mission was likewise thrown into turmoil; however, the American response in Vietnam became invariably predictable:

- (1) the pacification plan must be at fault. Draw up a new one.
- (2) Material, money, and personnel were insufficient. Add more of everything.
- (3) The US Mission organization is at fault. Reorganize. Dispatch a new top flight team from Washington.
- (4) The concept does not cover a sufficiently wide spectrum. Draw up new programs and dump them on an already over-burdened Vietnamese system which has neither the interest, technicians, nor capability to implement them.
- (5) The Vietnamese must do more to help themselves. Find some means of leverage, push them into reforms, give them more arms. more

equipment, more money. This last step was ultimately articulated as "Vietnamization."

The US advisory effort had grown from a modest beginning as the Mission Liaison Group and other elements of the early US Mission. Diem, before the coup that resulted in his death, had requested increased military aid many times. In 1961, the authorized number of advisors was increased from 746 to 3,400. Most arrived by June, 1962. Additionally, US tactical aircraft were provided to the newly formed Vietnamese Air Force of the RVNAF and US Army helicopter units were deployed to Vietnam to support the ARVN. The old Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) of the US Mission was reorganized as the US Military Assistance Command - Vietnam (USMACV). By the end of 1962 there were 12-15,000 US advisory and support personnel authorized to be in Vietnam. Many more were operating on a temporary duty basis. It is suspected that most of the personnel operating clandestinely were not included in the official US government figures.


The influx of advisors during this period and later periods would not bring peace and stability to Vietnam. The increase in advisors and the pacification plans they devised, operated and then abandoned only to devise new plans, were just as ill-prepared and based on naive assumptions as the earlier attempts at pacification. The US had little or no experience with the strategy and tactics of a people's war which were employed by the NLF. Accordingly, advisory efforts failed to recognize the root causes of the Vietnamese insurgency (self determination); the huge increase in personnel in 1961-63 was a reaction to a situation that had already been seized by the NLF. Advisors were dispatched with little or no preparation and were given assignments based more on availability than on aptitude for duties. Another problem, which would continue to plague US efforts in Vietnam for many more years, was that the advisors had no time to learn or be taught that the insurgency was probably more political than military. In fact, the NLF did not maneuver for military effect as one moves on a chess board, but for the political advancement of their cause of self-determination. Sir Robert Thompson had observed earlier that, "I really don't think the military side can 9

be separated from the economical or political." Most of the advisors ignored this observation simply because of the tradition in the US military since the founding of the Country that ranks below the General Staff do not become involved in politics. Yet many of these same advisors were working with Vietnamese counterparts who were political appointees.

During this period the provision was made for US military advisors at province level in roles other than purely military.

the early Special Forces of the US Army, but even these highly-trained men did not receive enough training before being sent to Vietnam.

MACV, the military element of the US Mission, in the early years, was thus unable to aid in the pacification programs and even after the overthrow of Diem would continue to operate in a political vacuum. The end result of which was a failure of the Army to understand that the war was political and that the Presidents of the



All arms of the US-GVN government have been extended from Saigon in an effort to convince the rural population to reject the NLF and "rally" in support of the GVN. Because it has historically represented corruption and exploitation in the minds of the Vietnamese, the GVN's only chance for support has been by intimidation. As a part of this psychological-warfare effort, the US Marines and their RVNAF counterparts in CTZ I adopted the informal SOP of providing these 'calling cards', which admonish the Vietnamese that to follow the way of the Viet Cong (or to be neutral) is to invite the same fate as the card's accompanying corpse.

The US military advisors in most of the provinces were the only advisors; the province chiefs thus did not receive economic or political advice during this period, which aided in the increased corruption and failures at pacification.

Many of these advisors were part of

United States during the Vietnam conflict could only behave in their political roles rather than their military role of Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces. The President of the United States was always forced to deal with the NLF on the political level thus making a mil-

itary solution of the conflict impossible. Although many Generals urged "bombing the Vietnamese back to the stone age," this was never a realistic option for the Presidents. Although they would from time to time initiate massive bombings in Indochina, they were politically prevented from implementing plans of total innihilation; the only positive way for military victory over the NLF. General William C. Westmorland became Commander of MACV in June, 1964 and immediately institutionalised the Army's political blind spot. Until General Westmorland took command, the US advisors had operated only down to province level. General Westmorland changed this status in order:

"To help strengthen the military province and district chiefs in their roles as sector and subsector military commanders, we decided to expand the US advisory effort to district level and to increase the number of advisors at province level."

The decision to place advisors at district level (there are approximately 235 districts in Vietnam) is important not only because it substantially increased the number of advisors, but also because it placed military advisors at a level where it was unlikely that there would ever be a "balancing" US civilian advisor. This inequality was one of the failures of pacification during this period and would continue to plague pacification efforts.

By the end of 1965, US Military strength in Vietnam had reached a total of 184,000, from a 1964 year-end strength of about 23,000. What was to be called the "build-up" had begun. By December of 1968, the build-up had leveled off with a peak US forces strength of 538,000.

The wisdom of this build-up was debated by the various elements of the US government. The result was that service in US regular military units was considered more desirable and prestigious than advisory jobs. The US Army took an instant dislike to the elite Green Beret corp devised for the counter-insurgency and pacification effort by the Kennedy Administration. The Fifth Special Forces Group in Vietnam would come under more operational control of the CIA (CAS) at the expense of MACV, especially in the areas of covert warfare, cross border

operations, and political operations. The Special Forces during this time also began training of the Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB) - the Vietnamese Special Forces. The LLDB and their US advisors command the Civilian Irregular Defense Force (CIDG) - 45,000 specially trained warriors from the minority group tribesmen (Montagnards) from the jungle mountains. The US Special Forces, the LLOB and the CIDG all formed a vast network that was under operational control of the CIA rather than the Pentagon which controlled the RVNAF.

The other elements of the military/paramilitary forces in Vietnam such as the National Police operated under the joint advisorship of USAID Public Safety, the United States Information Agency - propaganda specialists - and CAS SAIGON. As a result, of the bureaucratic rivalries in the US Mission, the quality of advisors deteriorated as better officers sought assignments in stateside units.

CAS SAIGON initiated a program aimed at pacification during this period called People's Action Teams (PAT) - later called Province Reconnaissance Units (PRU's) - which operated under the province chiefs and was charged with a five-fold mission"

- . To win the confidence and support of the people.
- . To protect the people and their property from the Vietcong(NLF).
- . To destroy the Vietcong's 'government' and paramilitary organizations.
- . To carry out psychological and political warfare and civic action projects.
- . To gather intelligence.

The teams, who dressed in distinctive uniforms dyed purple were sometimes called "Purple People Eaters" referring not only to their clothes but to their brutal treatment of the villagers. The PAT's were paid directly by the CIA and recieved other forms of support, including intelligence. The CIA established intelligence centers in each province to coordinate the flow of pacification information between districts, provinces and operational units. The CIA also recieved and directed all the civic action programs of not only the PAT's but of other elements of the US Mission. Support for the PAT's came in the form of maintenance at both district and province headquarters of adequate ammunition stocks, replacement weapons, replacement clothing and such accoutrements. Direct cash payments were made to district and province chiefs 11

and death and funeral benefits were paid to the families of district chiefs killed in action. The CIA also maintained contact with the families of partisan team members in order to assist them in time of sickness or hardship. This was done to maintain the members moral and confidence that the local authorities were taking an active interest in himself and his family. This program failed just as other programs had failed and for the same reasons.

THE REEMPHASIS ON PACIFICATION: 1965-67

Pacification had become a major ingredient of US strategy in Vietnam by the summer of 1967. The years prior to this, however, were used in debate over the "role of pacification". The programs during this period were almost exclusively American, due to the continual upheavals in the Saigon government. Revolutionary Development (RD), as pacification came to be called during this period, grew from the original programs of 1964-65 which had little emphasis, guidance or support to an almost equal priority for the US as that given the Strategic Hamlet Program of 1962-63. The American advisory effort grew during this period of the build-up and the debate over pacification would lead to three major reorganizations of the US Mission in one 15 month period, each designed primarily to improve the management of the pacification programs.

The major pacification program in Vietnam, other than the PAT, from 1964-65 was the HOP TAC Program. Although many members of the US Mission to Saigon supported the program, it now appears to have been a faultily conceived and clumsily executed program. It was conceptually unsound, lacked the support of the Saigon government and intensified the disagreement within the US Mission.

HOP TAC was officially announced by out-going Ambassador Lodge at the Presidential Conference in Honolulu in February 1966, although the program had been operating haphazardly for several years. The new Deputy Ambassador William Porter was given broad new authority to run the civilian agencies of the US Mission after this conference, and, due to his efforts and the support of his superiors - Ambassador Taylor and General Westmore-

land, pacification took a new emphasis. The low priority given pacification by MACV during 1965, due to the unprecedented size of the battles in the central highlands and the coast, the air war intensifying and moving northward towards Hanoi and the continual state of disarray in the Saigon government, was completely reversed during this period.

The HOP TAC program was designed to put whatever resources are required into the area surrounding Saigon to pacify it. First called PICA (Pacification Intensification Capital Area) and then redesignated HOP TAC by its American designers, the program was to incorporate the old familiar pacification programs of relocation, militia training and self-help.

So unsuccessful was HOP TAC that during its life span the NLF was able to organize a regiment in the Saigon area. MACV was forced by the failure of HOP TAC to commit three US Infantry battalions in late 1966 to protect Saigon, as part of Operation Fairfax.

In the meantime, the ARVN were defeated in a major battle at Binh Gia near Saigon which marked the nadir of the ARVN as a fighting force and they have never been able to recover. The NLF grew in strength and destroyed what remained of pacification in the countryside and many hamlets became what the Americans called Viet Cong Combat Hamlets.

With the ARVN becoming more and more an ineffective fighting force the US committed American Ground Forces in 1965. First ashore were the Marines, as usual, at Da Nang. The Marines, under General Lewis W. Walt, quickly discovered that the toughest war for them was the war in the villages behind them near Da Nang Air Base rather than against the main force of the NLF, which had retreated to the hills to build up.

In the first twelve months of the Marines landing in March of 1965, the Marines turned toward support of the on-going rural construction program (pacification). General Walt emphasized that the main opposition was the "Viet Cong guerilla inter-mingling with the population." The Marines decided to emphasize destruction of the VCI, which led them into a number of conflicts with the "body-count" orientated MACV under General Westmoreland.

of an over-taxed and exploited rural population. In addition, added to the history of illegitimate rule of the GVN over decades of abuse of power, the crudity of the Phung Hoang assassination program became one of the most effective recruiting devices for the NLF. In the provinces such as Quang Ngai (where the village of My Lai is located), where the NLF has had strong support, the Saigon arm of Phung Hoang had long been identified. But in February of 1968, the political success of the NLF's TET offensive changed Saigon's approach to political assassination and the other war. Because the TET offensive demonstrated the NLF's ubiquity much beyond US-GVN estimates, the decision was made to centralize all lists of NLF sympathizers for a systematic approach.

Based on the assumption that NLF or VC sympathizers were in the great minority and only needed to be intimidated to be dealt with, the concept was developed -- much in the tradition of French and Japanese colonial techniques -- that the "VC infrastructure" (VCI), if neutralized according to the plan, would be the key to demoralizing support of the NLF. This approach allowed Saigon to continue the myth that the menace of the opposition would go away if only dealt with severely enough. Therefore, in the spring of 1968, freshly reeling from the shock of the first spring offensive, directives were issued by the desperate Saigon government to all security organizations within the GVN that political information was to be channelled from all sources to the local Phoenix Coordinator. In turn, the people responsible for collecting intelligence (both military and civilian) took as one of their main priorities the collection of long lists of names which were submitted by their agent nets (South Vietnamese civilians who were reporting their neighbors for alleged political variation). Under the covers and budgeting of USAID, CORDS, pacification survey, public employment and other supposedly benevolent agencies, Phoenix representatives collected and submitted tens of thousands of names of suspected NLF sympathizers. Two major problems were immediately apparent. First, the South Vietnamese who were used as neighborhood spies throughout the country were found to be reporting their own personal enemies

(such as creditors and subjects of family feuds) for liquidation. The overload and overlapping of names became quickly apparent. In a rush effort to neutralize the growing NLF threat to Saigon, whole military operations were mounted on the basis of Phoenix intelligence information. One example of this SOP in March of 1968 is Operation Barker, which is remembered as the My Lai massacre. This is an example of how Phoenix information was used to justify the slaughter of whole hamlets. In his account of how the My Lai story was obscured, Seymour Hersh explains the ludicrous process which resulted in the massacre of an entire hamlet.

"Who told Task Force Barker that all civilians in the hamlet of My Lai 4 would magically disappear -- on their way to market -- shortly after 7 A.M. on March 16?"

"Where did the task force receive information stating that 400 members of the 48th Viet Cong Battalion would be in Son My village on March 16?"

"These two questions remained unanswered throughout the lengthy hearings into the My Lai 4 massacre. Witnesses were consistently asked if they could cite any documents or individuals who provided such information; the answers were invariably vague. 'No, sir, I cannot cite any document,' Captain Rotouc said confusedly in response to one such question, 'but it was through interrogation of people I had talked to. This was always -- this was the part we were trying to figure out, how they moved in the area. They all came and went about the same time... If I recall, part of it (the intelligence) came from Colonel Barker. Information, I think, he received from his contacts or somewhere like that. It is very difficult for me to pin it down.'

"Other witnesses testified that the task force worked very closely with Major David C. Gavin, the senior American advisor to the Vietnamese at Son Tinh, one of the six administrative districts of Quang Ngai Province... Gavin and Barker conferred a number of times before the March 16 operation, but Gavin, as he testified, was not the originator of much fresh intelligence. His district headquarters was

then in the process of setting up a District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC) under the control of the Phoenix program. This was a joint American-Vietnamese venture aimed at identifying and then "neutralizing" -- either through imprisonment, assassination or forced defection -- local members of the Viet Cong infrastructure, known as VCI" .

In Quang Ngai at the same time, one of the largest military intelligence nets was gathering information of both combat and political nature. The priority on quantity of information was so great as to ignore most checks on the accuracy of information submitted. As a result, the second major problem of the escalation of Phoenix was felt: the amount of raw information -- names, places, dates, organizations, plans -- reported by these agents became uncontrollable. So did the number of agents in nets such as the one in Quang Ngai. The agent handler found this situation out of control, and when finally pressed to diagram his net for the approval of the 525th Military Intelligence Group in Saigon, he found that the net diagram covered one entire wall of his battalion headquarters in Danang. Reflecting their exasperation at the mercenary approach of those reporting, and in typical lack of sensitivity to this appalling situation, the people of the MI battalion nicknamed the entire agent net "Ali Baba and his forty thieves".

Many similarly overgrown apparatuses led to the inevitable US solution to the growing problem of dealing with the mere paper load of the VCI neutralization program. In the summer of 1968, the names in the Phoenix store were computerized, in a desperate attempt to control the endless lists. With this computerization and the resultant software store, a monster was born -- unique to the age of the Vietnam war -- which would have in another time served the administration of the Third Reich's final solution to the "Jewish problem". Because it was computed at that time, the official US and GVN documents which refer to Phoenix mark its date of inception at August 1, 1968. This is obviously inaccurate, as is shown in the

above reference to My Lai 4. However, by the spring of 1970, the mass of files on NLF suspects had grown as large as to stimulate directives advising the disposal of "VCI" at the local province level. A GVN directive dated 24 April 70 states: "It has been specified in Annex II of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan that local authorities must provide an accurate solution to two-thirds of the total number of VCI's arrested monthly so as to preclude backlog of cases in local areas."

This has long been understood by the Vietnamese local authorities in the South to constitute authority for these detainees' murder. As we will see later, US personnel were directed in the late fall of 1971 -- after Congressional inquiry brought attention to the Phoenix program -- to disassociate from direct involvement in assassination procedures, and to ask for reassignment if anyone might "object to participation in the program". However, the training provided the US personnel who have been responsible for the murderous modus operandi, understand fully that the US government simply uses such directives to assert that while the administration of the Phoenix program is necessary, it must be voluntary on the part of the advisor. This no news to a CIA mercenary, nor to a Foreign Service Officer, grade #1 (full ambassador), whose career training programs require that each be "functionally knowledgeable" in the techniques and necessity of espionage and torture as they are employed in counterinsurgent efforts.

But what efforts have been made to stop this authorized "neutralization" program sponsored and nurtured by the US mission in Saigon? Aside from statements of former Phoenix workers who had spoken out publicly about the awesome facts, the subject was only briefly examined in testimony taken by the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information in July and August of 1971. At that time, Ambassador William E. Colby (former director of Phoenix in RVN) came before the committee and swore under oath that Phoenix was a respectable

program aimed at eliminating a practical problem -- the VC infrastructure. When questioned concerning the unaccounted-for 1.7 billion dollars which had financed much of the covert aspect of Phoenix (agent payments, PRU equipment, etc.), Ambassador Colby assured the committee that, while Phoenix was less than well-controlled at its "early stages" (referring to the pre-computer days), all the main problems had been resolved and that the Congress could rest assured that aberrations of brutality would remain at a minimum. No, he did not know how many innocent victims the program had killed, maybe 5,000, maybe more. No, he did not have the authority to discuss the reasons why the Congress could not audit 1.7 billion dollars' worth of taxpayers funds which went to CORDS. This is as close to the truth as the Congress has ever come. (see insert)

The significance of the above testimony, however, is not that a high-ranking official has misled Congress. Rather the fact that the laws, directives and practices of what was until 1971 actively known as the Phoenix Program have not been repealed. In fact, the only change which has been made in the continuing policy of VCI neutralization is, like all other covert operations, that its cover name has been changed. The program has been re-designated, and now takes its name from the rating given to the least verifiable type of intelligence information which justifies VCI neutralization. The name of the program is now "F-6". In an attempt to call attention to the fact that, among other crimes, Phoenix and F-6 have now generated close to 300,000 political prisoners in the South Vietnamese prisons, a member of the GVN House of Deputies, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, wrote in a Jan. 18, 1973 article that:

"A new program, with only the name of F-6, is being secretly installed to replace the (US) CIA-organized Phoenix program, discontinued recently. Like its predecessor, the new program is aimed at "neutralizing" suspected Viet Cong cadre and sympathizers.

"Suspects, under F-6, can now be arrested for an immense range of reasons, and the accusation of one person is enough for capture. Individuals and families who might, in the past, have had some contact with "the other side", perhaps only a relative in the North or in the NLF, are now under suspicion.

There is hardly a family in the South free from "taint", including the highest ranking government officials. Even Thieu's own people are complaining privately about F-6 which hangs over everyone's head like a guillotine."

Two first-hand accounts of torture and brutality have recently been published by Jean-Pierre Debris and Andre Menras, two French schoolteachers who had been arrested and imprisoned under Phoenix/F-6 authority in July of 1970. Tortured and kept at Chi Hoa prison for two and a half years, Debris and Menras were fin-

WE DEMAND WILLIAM E. COLBY'S RESIGNATION

Ambassador William E. Colby, in his role as Director of the US Cords mission in Vietnam, headed the Phoenix Program at the height of US ground troop involvement. Under his direction, Phoenix agents practiced some of their most brutal forms of assassination and torture.

Under oath before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, Ambassador Colby lied concerning the nature of the Phoenix Program and misrepresented its cost in both number of victims and amount of mis-used public funds. As a reward for his having been the CIA's apologist for Phoenix, Mr. Colby has recently been appointed the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations (clandestine services -- an office which constitutes 60% of the CIA's total operations).

CARIC feels that a man who, like the fabled Old Man of the Mountain, has had a career of directing assassination and torture programs can play no legitimate part in US government. We encourage all citizens to write their Congressional representative, the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency to demand his resignation.

ally released in late December of 1972, after their plight was brought to the attention of the French people who in turn put the pressure of public outrage on the French government and obtained the two's release. Their view if "F-6" is that: "the idea that F-6 will yield less than the hundreds of thousands of victim which Phoenix did is naive, and probably very underestimated."

It is important to examine the arrest procedure which allows such people as the above Frenchmen to be included in

the insane pursuit of "political prisoners". Whoever falls into the Phoenix/F-6 process goes through a local version of this general picture:

--The suspect is either arrested on a military sweep or by specific fingering by an informant, or in the streets by the National Police.

--Once detained, the suspect loses all access to the legal system. With no right to be heard, he is assumed guilty of treason.

--Judged by the local committee whose job is already complicated by the priority directive to dispose of two-thirds of the detainees at the local level, the detainee becomes legally impotent in his incarceration.

--If there is not enough evidence to convict the detainee, he is brought before a Provincial Security Committee and may be imprisoned for two years, at which time his sentence is renewable.

The criteria for suspicion and arrest under F-6 are clearly stated in South Vietnamese law, to be as all-inclusive as possible; and this explains the worry among Thieu's people which was referred to above. The law reads as follows:

"Residents of the area who make suspicious utterances, such as, (1) expressions which distort the Government of Vietnam policies and the action of the Government of Vietnam cadres; (2) false rumors which confuse and frighten the people; (3) creation of division and hatred among the populace and between the populace and the cadres of the Government of Vietnam.

"Those who act suspiciously:

(a) the hesitation or fearful attitude of a dishonest person;

(b) contact with those whom we suspect; or

(c) regular secret colloquies of a certain group of people in the area.

Such are the facts of continued repression and US-sponsored brutality and murder within the current practices of the GVN. As the early Phung Hoang program and later Phoenix were covertly run under the guise of Civil Operations,

Rural Development Support (CORDS), so is the new F-6 program run covertly under its guise -- that of the office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations (SAAFFO), which is the cover organization through which the US mission will again fund and advise the murder programs of the Thieu government.

CARIC remains concerned that, after years of operation to the demise of countless innocent Vietnamese civilians, pacification and neutralization programs continue to be sponsored by the American citizenry. Only through the continued exposure of the facts will there be the possibility of correcting this abominable and illegal situation.

Due to space limitations, CARIC is unable to provide a bibliography in this issue. A complete bibliography of the more than 100 books, periodicals, articles and unclassified government documents used in preparing this summary of pacification in Vietnam and our analysis of Phoenix/F-6 is available from CARIC's Intelligence Documentation Center (IDC). Copies of Phoenix support documents are available from CARIC. For information write to CARIC/IDC.


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British Advisor Returns to Saigon

CARIC has recently learned that Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, who served as an advisor to early pacification techniques and programs, dating back to the 1950's, has recently returned to Saigon to assist the GVN during the coming era of the "F-6" program.

* * * *

BASIC PHOENIX COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE PRIOR TO THE CEASE-FIRE




ACRONYMS

ADP - Automatic Data Processing
 AID - US Agency for International Development
 APT - Armed Propaganda Team
 ARVN - Armed Forces Viet Nam
 BAM - British Advisory Team; Thompson
 CAS - Chief At Station SAIGON; CIA field unit
 CAP - Combined Action Platoon
 CIA - US Central Intelligence Agency
 CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group
 CIS - GVN Central Intelligence Service
 CORDS - Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support
 COMUSMACV - Commander US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
 CTZ - Corps Tactical Zone; region
 DGNP - Directorate General National Police
 FEC - French Expeditionary Corps
 FWMAF - Free World Military Armed Forces
 GAMO - Groupes Administrative Mobile Organization
 GVN - Saigon government

HES - Hamlet Evaluation System
 JUSPAO - Joint US Public Affairs Office
 LLDB - Luc Luong Dac Biet; Special Forces
 MACV - Military Assistance Command Viet Nam
 MLG - Mission Liaison Group; Lansdale
 MSS - Military Security Service
 NERP - National Identification Registration Program
 NLF - National Liberation Force
 NP - National Police
 NPFF - National Police Field Force
 OCO - Office of Civil Operations
 PAT - Pacification Action Team
 PIC - Province Interigation Center
 PIOCC - Province Intelligence Operations Coordination Center
 PSC - Province Security Committee
 PRG - Provisional Revolutionary Government
 RCP - Resources Control Program
 RF/PF - Regional Forces/Popular Forces
 RVNAF - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
 SAAFFA - Special Assistant to the Amb. for Field Operations
 SDC - Self Defense Corp
 SP - Special Police branch
 SMPD - Saigon Metropolitan Police Directorate
 VCI - Viet Cong Infrastructure

CURRENT F-6 STRUCTURE



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TO ACTING DIRECTOR --ATTN: INTD--

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VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR DEMONSTRATION AT OLYMPIC
HOTEL, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, 5/18/73, IS - VVAW, 00: SEATTLE.

ON 5/15/73, SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN
PAST, REPORTED VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW) ARE
PLANNING TO ATTEND HEARING OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM
AFFAIRS BEING CONDUCTED UNDER JOINT SPONSORSHIP WITH NATIONAL LEAGUE
OF CITIES AT OLYMPIA HOTEL, 5/18/73, FROM 10:00 A.M. TO 3:00 P.M.
HEARING REPORTEDLY HAS WITNESSES ALREADY SCHEDULED TO TESTIFY,
BUT VVAW WILL ATTEND MEETING AND DEMAND THAT ALL VETERANS BE ALLOWED
TO TESTIFY ON VETERANS PROBLEMS. IF VVAW MEMBERS NOT PERMITTED TO
TESTIFY, THEY WILL FORM A PICKET LINE OUTSIDE HOTEL. NO VIOLENCE
PROPOSED.

VVAW IS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF WAR VETERANS
WHICH HAS ORGANIZED AND PARTICIPATED IN NUMEROUS DEMONSTRATIONS
AGAINST VIETNAM WAR SINCE 1971, INCLUDING SEIZURE OF STATUE OF
LIBERTY, NEW YORK CITY, AND OCCUPATION OF BETSY ROSS HOUSE, MAY 18 1973
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, IN DECEMBER, 1971. SIX VVAW MEMBERS WERE

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5/23/73

From: Acting Director, FBI (100-448092)

1 - Mr. [REDACTED]

1 - Mr. [REDACTED]

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For information of [REDACTED]

"The Poor Man's James Bond" [REDACTED] VVAW in Tampa and furnished to its members. Source had no information concerning original sources of manual and no indication that any individual members of VVAW intend to use manual for overt acts.

For information of Tampa, Kurt Saxon is undoubtedly identical with Donald Eugene Sisco, subject of San Francisco case captioned "Donald Eugene Sisco, aka, EM - White Hate." Sisco is self-admitted "extreme-rightist" who has distributed publications containing formulas for explosives in many instances indiscriminately throughout U. S. He has formerly been associated with John Birch Society, American Nazi Party and Minutemen. He testified before Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 8/5/70 freely admitting past extremist activities and claiming no present organizational affiliation. He also circulated manual titled "The Militant's Formulary" which contained formulas for explosives, and he indicated motive for circulating publication, was concerned for New Left extremism and an interest in making profits. Sisco furnished copy of "The Poor Man's James Bond" to San Francisco Office during 5/72 and claimed he used pen name of Saxon because his mother gets very upset when she sees his name in print.


[REDACTED] if any [REDACTED] manual or whether any comments were made by VVAW members who received copy of manual. Tampa continue to follow closely through informants possible future

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowens _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conny _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

2 - San Francisco
1 - 157-668 (Sisco)

1 - 157-7447 (Sisco)

RLP:mjg
(8)



SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

54 MAY 30 1973


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DATE 2/28/85 BY SP6 BJA/MB

100-448092-290



TX

Airtel to Tampa
Re: Vietnam Veterans Against the War
(VVAW)
100-448092

use of manual by VVAW or other organizations for terrorist activities. In view of information contained concerning counterfeiting, Tampa furnish copy of manual to Secret Service.

NOTE:

Tampa informant obtained copy of 91-page manual entitled "The Poor Man's James Bond" which dealt in great depth with formulas for making various types of bombs and explosives and other forms of illegal activity including counterfeiting. Review of Bureau files reveals that manual was authored by individual named Sisco, author of similar publications in past and well known to San Francisco Office. Both Tampa and San Francisco being made aware of current situation.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 21 1973

TELETYPE

NR002 SE PLAIN

9:36 PM NITEL 5/20/73 DCA

TO ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

PORTLAND (100-12313)

FROM SEATTLE (100-32257) (C)

3P

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Baker	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Gebhardt	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, E.S.	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Mr. Thompson	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Bates	_____
Mr. Barnes	_____
Mr. Bowers	_____
Mr. Herington	_____
Mr. Coamy	_____
Mr. Mintz	_____
Mr. Eardley	_____
Mrs. Hogan	_____

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, DEMONSTRATION AT FORT LEWIS,
WASHINGTON, 5/19/73, IS - VVAW. 00: SEATTLE.

DEMONSTRATION

ARMED FORCES DAY/OBSERVED AT FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON, 5/19/73,
BY SPECIAL AGENTS FBI AND REPRESENTATIVES 115TH MIG, FORT LEWIS.
BEGINNING ABOUT TWELVE NOON, DEMONSTRATORS APPEARED AT MADIGAN GATE
OVERPASS, FORT LEWIS. DEMONSTRATORS AT PEAK NUMBERED APPROXIMATELY
55 - 60. DEMONSTRATION HERE CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF LEAFLETS BEING
PASSED OUT TO MOTORISTS ADVERTISING SUBSEQUENT SPEECHES AND ENTER-
TAINMENT AT LOCAL PARK IN TILlicum, WASHINGTON, SPONSORED BY VIETNAM
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW). FLAG HELD BY ONE DEMONSTRATOR
READ "SEATTLE VVAW." LEAFLETS PASSED OUT BY DEMONSTRATORS PRIMARILY
OBJECTED TO RACISM AND ARMED FORCES.

DEMONSTRATION SPONSORED BY FORT LEWIS CHAPTER OF VVAW AND

20 MAY 23 1973

END PAGE ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/24/95 BY SP6 BJA/HAS

59 MAY 29 1973
Adm. data deleted

PAGE TWO

SE 100-32257

SHELTER HALF COFFEE HOUSE, TACOMA, WASHINGTON.

VVAW, A NATIONAL ORGANIZATION, HAS PUBLICLY DECLARED ITS OBJECTIVES ARE TO DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE SUCCESSION OF ALL FIGHTING IN AND WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM INDO-CHINA. THE ORGANIZATION CONSISTS OF VIETNAM WAR VETERANS AND A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF ANTI-WAR ACTIVISTS WHO ARE NOT VETERANS.

SHELTER HALF IS PUBLICLY DESCRIBED COFFEE HOUSE AT TACOMA, WASHINGTON, CATERING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL. b7C

ACCORDING TO CHIEF CRIMINAL DEPUTY [REDACTED] PIERCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, BETWEEN 2:00 AND 2:15 PM, DEMONSTRATORS MARCHED FROM OVERPASS TO SMALL PARK IN TILlicum, WASHINGTON, WHERE SPEAKERS AND ENTERTAINERS WERE PROGRAMMED. SIGN ON PAVILION AT PARK READ "INDICT U. S. GOVERNMENT." ACTIVITY IN PARK CONSISTED OF TALKS AND MUSIC BY THE DEMONSTRATORS.

DEMONSTRATION ENDED ABOUT 6:20 PM AT PARK. ENTIRE DEMONSTRATION WAS PEACEFUL WITH NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS.

ABOVE BEING FURNISHED TO U. S. SECRET SERVICE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, AND U. S. ATTORNEY.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

SE 100-32257

///// ADMINISTRATIVE /////

RE SE TEL 5/15/73; ALSO RE PD TEL TO BU 5/16/73, CAPTIONED
"DEMONSTRATION SPONSORED BY VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, FORT
LEWIS, WASHINGTON, 5/19/73, MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING."

(PDFILE 100-12313); ALSO RE PD TEL TO BU 5/17/73 CAPTIONED

[REDACTED] (PDFILE [REDACTED]

b2, b7D

AGENTS OBSERVING DEMONSTRATORS WERE [REDACTED] AND

[REDACTED]
b7C

NO LHM.

E N D

JPS FBIHQ CLR

[REDACTED] b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

DATE: 5/21/73

FROM : SAC, MILWAUKEE (100-15674) (P)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)
IS - RA
OO: CHICAGO

b7C

b2
b7D

For information of the Bureau and receiving offices, the following was obtained by [REDACTED] while attending a local VVAW meeting on 5/17/73:

The Milwaukee Chapter will be sending a contingent to the Gainesville trial in Florida. The size and identity of people attending from Milwaukee will be decided upon at a later date. The Milwaukee contingent is tentatively scheduled to depart Milwaukee from Water Tower Park on 7/18/73 and will be in Gainesville approximately six or seven days. The Milwaukee contingent will meet with other contingents from Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, at some park in southern Illinois. (It should be noted that VVAW used Lake of the Woods State Park, Champaign, Illinois, as a meeting place during "Operation Last Patrol.") Everyone traveling will be issued ID cards by their local VVAW chapters. This will be done in order to tighten security while in Florida.

Sh...

LEADS:

Recipient offices will contact sources to develop any further information and keep Bureau, Chicago, and Jacksonville apprised of any further developments.

TC

- 2 - BUREAU (RM)
- 2 - CHICAGO (RM)
- 2 - DETROIT (RM)
- 2 - JACKSONVILLE (RM)
- 2 - ST. LOUIS (RM)
- 2 - SPRINGFIELD (RM)
- 2 - MILWAUKEE

AJE/lav
(14)



5010-108-02

JUL 11 1973

REC-4 / 4/1/73 2707

ST-104

10 MAY 24 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/21/95 BY SP6/bj

MI 100-15674

MILWAUKEE DIVISION

At Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Will maintain contact with VVAW sources and keep Bureau, Chicago, and Jacksonville apprised of any further developments.

FBI

Date: 5/21/73

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority)

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (65-5431)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] b7C
ESP - A
(REVACT SECTION)VIETNAM VETERANS
AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
IS - RACLASS. & EXT. BY 3908 b7C
REASON: FCIM 1-2.4.2 2.8
DATE OF REVIEW 5-21-93
Routing slip sent 10-22-79
deleted category 3-70320 PWK/df 9-5-80
see 190-1755[REDACTED] advised that on 5/14/73
[REDACTED] visited [REDACTED] of one [REDACTED] in
Illinois. At this gathering, attended by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] spoke freely of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that he [REDACTED]

He said that he passed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He stated that many months were spent in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] were utilized for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] were utilized and the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] enabling him to carry out nothing [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] advised that he plans [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] travel to Washington, D.C. in the near future [REDACTED]

NOT RECORDED

184 MAY 20 1973

MAY 23 1973

- ② - Bureau (RM)
- 2 - WFO (RM)
- 1 - Columbia (INFO) (RM)
- 2 - Chicago
- RLN/bak (7)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Per _____

b2
b7C
b7D

7/24/95-8669114

CG 65-5431

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7C
b7D For information of WFO, Chicago is conducting
espionage investigation concerning [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and his activities concerning [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], subsequent to his release from the
United States Air Force. (u)

Information copy being sent Columbia because of
continuing interest in this matter. (u)

LEAD

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D.C. Contact any VVAW sources in
the WDC area in an attempt to determine activities of [REDACTED]
while in the District of Columbia. (u)

b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNIT 7 [REDACTED] b7D

9:54 PM FTEL 5/16/73 DMF

TO ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-45079)

ATTN: [REDACTED]

NEW YORK (100-161952)

NY 100-161952

FROM [REDACTED]

7D
P) 2 P

MARCH ON WASHINGTON, D.C., 5/19/73, AMERICAN SERVICEMEN'S
UNION, IS - C (TROTSKYIST), OO: NEW YORK.

RE [REDACTED] TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU 5/15/73, AND BUNITEL 5/16/73.

ON 5/16/73, [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT DURING A TELEPHONE
CALL [REDACTED] VVAV NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO,

[REDACTED] ADVISED THE NATIONAL OFFICE HAD LEARNED THE
DEMONSTRATION AT WASHINGTON, D.C. WAS BEING SPONSORED BY
A TROTSKYIST ORGANIZATION. [REDACTED] SAID BECAUSE OF THIS, THE
NATIONAL VVAV WAS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE DEMONSTRATION,
AND WAS RECOMMENDING THAT REGIONAL CHAPTERS ALSO NOT
END PAGE ONE

b2
b7C
b7D

5-11-73
70-100-161952
100-161952
100-161952

NOT RECORDED

141 MAY 30 1973

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

[REDACTED]
PAGE TWO

PARTICIPATE. HE SUGGESTED THE [REDACTED] WVAH NOT ATTEND THE DEMONSTRATION, BUT HAVE SOME LOCAL ACTION. HE STATED THE WVAH WILL NOT BACK A TACTICIST ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATION. b7D

SOURCE ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] WVAH REGIONAL COORDINATOR, FEELS THE REGION SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT THE DEMONSTRATION, AND AS SUCH, SOURCE AND POSSIBLY SEVERAL [REDACTED] WVAH MEMBERS WILL STILL BE ATTENDING THE DEMONSTRATION AS PLANNED.

ALOVE FURNISHED FOR INFO TO FELIX WELLES OF WVAH CONCERNING DEMONSTRATION.

END

ARM FIELD OFFICE FOR ONE TEL

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1 Mr. [REDACTED]
1 - Mr. [REDACTED]

CODE

TELETYPE AND CABLEGRAM

NITEL

TO SAC [REDACTED]

LEAD [REDACTED]

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR FBI [REDACTED]

SM - VVAW

RECGTEL 5/23/73, NO COPY TO LEGAT OTTAWA.

FOR INFORMATION LEGAT, OTTAWA, [REDACTED]

b7D THIS CONFIRMS AUTHORITY GRANTED TELEPHONICALLY ON [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ADVANCE INFORMANT UP TO \$120 FOR ANTICIPATED EXPENSES IN
CONNECTION WITH THIS [REDACTED] OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING UPON
INFORMANT'S RETURN. [REDACTED] INSURE INFORMANT UNDERSTANDS OUR
PRIMARY INTEREST IS IN COVERAGE OF INFLUENCES EXERTED AT CONFERENCE
BY SUBVERSIVE GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS AND IN OBTAINING ADVANCE INFOR-
MATION AS TO PLANS THEY FORMULATE TO USE AMNESTY ISSUE IN FUTURE
ACTIVITY.

- b1
- (S)
- ① - 100-448092 (Vietnam Veterans Against the War)
 - 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)
 - 1 - Mr. [REDACTED] (6221 IB)

b7C FBG:klj

(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

59 JUN 1 1973

DUPLICATE YELLOW OF
WIRE TRANSMITTED

100-448092 -
NOT RECORDED
MAY 30 1973

Teletype and Cablegram to [REDACTED] Ottawa

Re: [REDACTED]

b2
b7D

NOTE:

The conference referred to above has attracted wide-spread attention and support in New Left circles and coverage of it is deemed desirable. Authority to advance funds given telephonically to [REDACTED] by Bureau Supervisor [REDACTED] [REDACTED] contacted Inspector [REDACTED]

b7C

5-113a (Rev. 3-21-73)

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 5/11/73

Attached from Washington Field Office
advisee of planned American Servicemen's
Union march on Washington, D. C., 5/19/73.

At "press conference" in front of the
Veterans Administration Building, Washing-
ton, D. C., it was announced march would
begin at 12 noon, 5/19/73, at 7th and K
Street and proceed to White House. Purpose
of march is to demand from Government
\$2,500 for each veteran, decent jobs, free
quality education and abolition of "less
than honorable discharges."

Information in attached furnished by
teletype to Secret Service. Copies of
attached also furnished Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division (copy for
Internal Security Section and copy for
General Crime Section, attention Special
Litigation Unit.)

JHK:mcl

EM/wml GCM

WAC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/24/95 BY [signature]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 11 1973

TELETYPE

NR018 WF COOE

540 PM NITEL 5-11-73 FMK

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

ATTENTION INTO

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-50913)

Mr. Felt	
Mr. Lister	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Cleveland	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Tele. Room	
Mr. Holmes	
Mr. Gandy	
Mrs. Hagan	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/24/95 BY SP6 JHL

MARCH ON WASHINGTON, D. C. 5-19-73- AMERICAN SERVICEMEN'S
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
UNION (ASU) ., IS-C (TROTSKYIST).

Operation Veterans Against the War

FOR INFORMATION BUREAU AND NY, UPI REPORTED ON INSTANT
DATE THAT THERE WOULD BE A NEWS CONFERENCE AT ONE PM INSTANT DATE
BY THE AMERICAN SERVICEMEN'S UNION, "REPRESENTING RANK AND FILE
VETERANS," IN FRONT OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION (VA) BLDG,
VERMONT AVE, N. W., BETWEEN H AND EYE STREETS, NW, WASHINGTON, O. C.,
(WDC). SUBJECT: PLANS FOR A VETERANS MARCH ON THE WHITE HOUSE
MAY NINETEEN. CONTACT: LEON DANIELS, SIX SEVEN FIVE OASH TWO FIVE
TWO ZERO.

AT ONE PM REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FBI OBSERVED SIX
INDIVIDUALS ARRIVE IN FRONT OF THE RECD BLDG, WDC AND UNFOLD A
BANNER WHICH READ, " VETERAN COMPENSATION AND NO BENEFIT CUTS
AMERICAN SERVICEMEN'S UNION".

MAY 15 1973

LEON DANIELS, WEARING AN AIR FORCE ENLISTED MAN'S SHIRT,
BEGAN THE " PRESS CONFERENCE" AT ONE FIFTEEN PM, ALTHOUGH THERE
WERE NO PRESS MEMBERS VISIBLE AT CONFERENCE. DANIELS, SHOUTING

END PAGE ONE
MAY 29 1973

5-11-73
9 MAY 30 1973

XEROX
MAY 18 1973

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

PAGE TWO

IN ORDER TO GET THE ATTENTION OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS PASSING BY ON THE SIDEWALK, ANNOUNCED THE VETERANS MARCH MAY NINETEEN NEXT IN WDC.

DANIELS READ THE INFORMATION FROM A PREPARED STATEMENT AND STATED THAT THE MARCH WOULD BEGIN AT TWELVE NOON, MAY NINETEEN NEXT AT SEVENTH AND K STREETS, N. W. WDC AND THEN WOULD TAKE A DOWNTOWN ROUTE TO THE VA BLDG AT EIGHT ONE ZERO VERMONT AVE. AFTER A SHORT RALLY, THE GROUP WOULD PROCEED DOWN THE STREET TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

DANIELS STATED THE PURPOSE OF THE MARCH WAS TO DEMAND OF THE GOVERNMENT TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR EACH VET; DECENT JOBS, FREE QUALITY EDUCATION AND ABOLITION OF "LESS THAN HONORABLE DISCHARGE".

PRESS CONFERENCE ENDED AT ONE TWENTY THREE PM.

THE ASU FOUNDED IN 1968 BY THE WORKERS WORLD PARTY (WWP). ITS OBJECTIVES ARE TO CAUSE DISCONTENT AMONG MILITARY ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND CALL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SERVICEMEN'S UNION. ITS MAIN PROPAGANDA WEAPON IS THE PUBLICATION "THE BOND- THE SERVICEMEN'S NEWSPAPER".

THE WWP WAS FOUNDED IN 1959 BY INDIVIDUALS WHO DISAGREED WITH POLICIES OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP). THE WWP OPPOSITIONISTS ADVOCATED UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

AND THE BUILDING OF A REVOLUTIDNARY PARTY GEARED TO THE DVER THROW
OF CAPITALISM. MORE RECENTLY, THE WWP HAS CALLED FOR PEACEFUL
SOLUTIONS TO SIND-SDVIET BORDER DISPUTES HOWEVER, THE WWP GENERALLY
SUPPDRTS THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC DF CHINA IN ITS IDEOLDGICAL DIFFERENCES
WITH THE SDVIET UNIDN. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO
EXECUTIVE DRDER 12450.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

REPRESENTATIVES DF THE FBI DBSERVING THE " PRESS CDNFERENCE"
WERE SAS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] b7c
WFD FDLLDWING.

END

MBT FBIHQ CLR

cc [signature]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :

ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/16/73

FROM :

SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-54955) (C)

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] aka
SM - VVAH
(OO:PHILADELPHIA)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/25/95 BY SP6BZP/DA

Re Philadelphia teletype to Bureau dated
2/14/73, captioned, "SCOTT CAMIL, ET AL; APL -
CONSPIRACY, EID; "VIETNAM" VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR
(VVAH); IS - REV ACT."

Referenced teletype indicated that **[REDACTED]** b7C
veteran, residing at **[REDACTED]** Phila-
delphia, had indicated plans to take over and occupy the
Veterans Administration Center, 1421 Cherry Street,
Philadelphia, to protest cutbacks in VA appropriations.

Investigation has determined that subject works at
his home address for a firm called **[REDACTED]**
and that he is an honorably discharged **[REDACTED]**
veteran.

On 3/28/73, **[REDACTED]** b2 b7D advised that **[REDACTED]** b7C
veteran who **[REDACTED]** the VVAH **[REDACTED]** in January
1973. He was vocal about his attitudes for possible action
and "appeared to radicalize the place for his own benefit."
He was not well received by the VVAH membership and has not
been seen since. **[REDACTED]** and others resented his overbearing
manner and felt that he was a loud mouth.

- b7C
- ② - Bureau
 - 5 - Philadelphia
 - 2 - 100-54955
 - 1 - **[REDACTED]**
 - 1 - **[REDACTED]**
 - 1 - 100-51647 (VVAH)

RTK/wjk
(7)

SL 113
REC-19 100-447072-2909

9 MAY 25 1973

64 JUN 5 1973
64 JUN 11 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

PH 100-54955

b2
b7C
b7D

On 5/2/73 [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] has not been seen at the VVAW Office in several months. He originally expressed an interest in the VVAW and asked for VVAW assistance in late January and early February 1973 when contemplated cuts in Veterans benefits were announced. He sought to have the VVAW demonstrate with him at the Veteran's Administration Center at Broad and Cherry Streets, to protest these cuts. [REDACTED] no longer comes to the VVAW Office and is no longer interested in the VVAW since the above cuts in benefits were made.

b7C

Subject's military records were obtained. They indicated that [REDACTED] DOR [REDACTED] served in the [REDACTED] from 7/25/63 to 4/25/71 when he was retired with the following medical condition:

- b6
b7C
1. Traumatic [REDACTED]
Traumatic [REDACTED]
 2. [REDACTED]
 3. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
 4. [REDACTED]
 5. [REDACTED]
 6. [REDACTED]
 7. [REDACTED]

Subject fails to meet ADEX criteria.

b2
b7D

In view of subject's medical condition and the information furnished by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], no further investigative effort will be expended.

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

1973

Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
Service Unit - Room 6524
Forward to File Room
Attention to File Room
Return to [redacted]

Type of References Requested:
☒ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☒ Nonsubversive References Only
Main

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of [redacted]
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup
☐ Variations

Subject [redacted]
Birthdate & Place [redacted]
Address [redacted]

Localities Philadelphia
R# [redacted]
Prod. [redacted]
Date 6/1

Searcher Initials RPH
SERIAL

FILE NUMBER

100-448092-2509
NR/Mf

RECEIVED
DATE 3/24/95 BY [signature]

The Marines developed by trial and error three pacification techniques as they became the first service in the US Armed Forces to support pacification. The first of these programs was the use of Kit Carson Scouts. The Kit Carson Program - aptly named after the advisor to the old US Cavalry who placed a reward for Navaho scalps in the Southwestern US - integrated former members of the Viet Cong (NLF) into US Marine units as guides, lead scouts and intelligence personnel. The program was praised by most observers at the time, although many of the scouts maintained double loyalties. The Kit Carson Scouts were just another addition to the growing list of paramilitary units in Vietnam under US control.

The second pacification program of the Marines was the County Fair, which was essentially the joint Marine/ARVN tactic of occupying and clearing a hamlet of the NLF structure. The third tactic was the use of the Combined Action Platoon which joined a Marine rifle squad with a platoon of RF/PF which the Marines called "Ruff/Puffs".

The NLF resisted the Marine efforts. Every man, woman and child in the hamlets was mobilized to impede the Marines and keep them out of the hamlets. The Marines kept up pressure on the areas which belonged to the NLF since the fall of Dien Bien Phu, but were unable to irradiate the NLF presence. The NLF, in turn, during this period began to understand the long range implication of pacification.

In the late summer of 1966, the DRV increased the supply of aid to the NLF coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail or across the DMZ. With the increased aid and the defeat of the ARVN, the NLF forces were able to concentrate on the Marines. This increase in activity forced the Marines out of their pacification roles and back into larger more conventional units. As pacification declined, the NLF presence at the hamlet level moved back into their old positions to organize for continued resistance to the US/GVN pacification programs.

With the defeat of the HOP TAC and the US government being forced to commit infantry troops in Operation Fairfax and with the defeat of the ARVN, and the Marines in trouble, the US Mission was reorganized, the first of three major reorganizations to occur during the next 15 months. After the Presidential Con-

ference with leaders of the GVN in Honolulu, Deputy Ambassador Porter was put in direct charge of the civilian agencies involved with pacification. Porter never received the full support of Ambassador Lodge, who had never been fully in favor of the reorganization. Handicapped from the start, Porter was unable to accomplish as much as Washington hoped he would.

Meanwhile in Washington, President Johnson appointed Robert W. Komer to be his Special Assistant on non-military activities in Vietnam. Komer pushed the ideas of pacification hard, and became the first senior US official, with apparently ready access to the President, who put forward the pro-pacification position consistently in high level meetings of the US government. During the summer of 1966, Komer applied great pressure to both the US Mission and the Washington agencies with a series of cables and visits to Vietnam, often using the President's name. For this he earned the nickname of "Blowtorch" from Ambassador Lodge.

Komer and Porter initiated a series of Task Forces and Study Groups to produce papers that gave a better rationale and strategy to pacification. These included the US Army study called PROVN, the Priorities Task Force in Saigon and the Roles and Missions Study Groups in Saigon. The effect of this was to force MACV under General Westmoreland to take more interest in pacification. Finally Westmoreland, who in January of 1966 would not even mention pacification in his year-end report, prepared a new long range strategy which emphasized pacification.


The US Mission and agencies in Washington then began heated debate to decide whether or not one single manager should be appointed to direct pacification in Vietnam. The result was another Presidential conference, this time in Manila.

At this conference for the first time the GVN committed itself to the pacification effort now called Revolutionary Development (RD). The President directed Porter to form a new organization within the US Mission which would incorporate the various pacification programs of the different mission elements - USIS, CAS, and AID. The organization was called the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). The OCO was plagued from the beginning. Por-



Phung - Hoàng


ĐÂY, NHỮNG CÁN BỘ CÔNG SẢN MÀ
CHIẾN DỊCH PHỤNG HOÀNG ĐANG TRUY NÀ



MAI VĂN TỐC



TRẦN VĂN ANH



Phó Ban Binh Vận
Xã An Thái Trung
Quận Giáo Đức

Trưởng Ban Nông Hội
Xã An Thái Trung
Quận Giáo Đức

Trưởng Ban Quân Sự
Xã An Thái Trung
Quận Giáo Đức

Áp An Nhứt
Xã An Hữu
Quận Giáo Đức

Đồng bào thân mến,

Nếu đồng bào biết nơi an trôn của các cán bộ Công Sản trên đây. yêu cầu thông báo cho nhân viên Cảnh Sát Quốc Gia hoặc Chánh quyền và Quân đội VNCH gần nhất. Đồng bào sẽ được thưởng và tên tuổi đồng bào sẽ được giữ kín.

Cũng các hân cán bộ Công-Sản

Các ban không thể lần trôn mãi được vì mọi người đã nhận diện các ban.

Các ban hãy ra hội chánh để hưởng sự khoan hồng của Chánh phủ. Các ban sẽ được tiếp đón niềm nở và đối xử tử tế.

**ỦY BAN PHỤNG HOÀNG
TỈNH ĐỊNH TƯỚNG**

US/GVN USE OF TORTURE: THE PAIN OF DEFACTO POLICY

One of the side products of the US intervention was the formation of defacto operating policies concerning the conduct of the war. Among these defacto policies was an "understanding" on the use of torture to elicit information from civilian detainees and prisoners of war. The Phoenix Program was no exception to this standard operating procedure, the use of torture by both military and civilian representatives of the US and Saigon government is documented in several sources.

From these existing sources, a fairly complete analysis of the methods of torture can be made. Some of the torture is new, relying on the misuse and abuse of modern technology. Other methods of torture are as old as the history of repression. All of them are cruel beyond the words used to describe them.

RAPE: The use of rape as a torture technique has taken four distinct forms in Vietnam. The first technique is the threat of rape as an intimidation factor. Second is the actual rape by a man or group of men. Third is rape through the use of live eels and snakes. Fourth is rape through the use of hard objects. Rape is often followed by murder.

ELECTRICAL SHOCK: The use of portable generators, field telephones, jeep batteries and other sources of electrical energy to shock and burn victims has been used all classifications of prisoners and detainees. The electrical wires were applied to sensitive areas of the body, in particular the genital areas, breasts and tongue, and increasing amounts of voltage are regulated to the person. This method is sometimes referred to as the "Bell Telephone Hour" or "ringing up" the victim. The use of this torture has produced death by dehydration, shock, cardiac arrest and internal bleeding.

WATER TORTURE: Water is forced down the victim's throat until he or she gags and loses consciousness. This is done by the use of hoses or by dunking the victim's head into a river, paddy or vat of water. If the victim survives this torture, the use of water usually damages the inner ear, causing temporary or permanent loss balance. If the water is

from a putrified source, the victim runs the chance of contracting disease.

HANGING FROM CEILING: This form of torture is especially popular in the interrogations centers of Saigon. Most Saigon students who have reported torture have told of being hung from a hook in the ceiling, ropes trussed around the upper arms and draped over the hook. The victim, once hung in this fashion, is then subjected to a variety of beatings, or is spun continually in a circle in an attempt to produce feelings of nausea, dizziness and vomiting.

BEATINGS: Even the oldest form of torture, physical beating, had taken new forms under US assistance. In addition to the use of rubber hoses, whips, fists and pistol whippings, the new techniques of counter-insurgency brought in the use of "police" dogs used to bite victims, these victims being dragged behind jeeps and armored personnel carriers, and the scientific application of blows as not to leave marks.

INCARCERATION: The physical conditions that constituted jail or prison for suspected NLF or North Vietnamese cadre, sympathizers, supporters or family members of the above is in itself a form of torture. The "tiger cages" and "cow cages" used by the Saigon government have been built by both the French and US governments. In addition, former US military personnel have testified as to the use of exposure to the elements as a form of torture. Barbed wire cages, eight feet long by three feet wide by two feet high were used to hold prisoners captured by Special Forces units. If the prisoner moved to relieve the pain caused by the barbs digging into his or her flesh, new wounds were opened by the movement.

EXECUTION: The killing of prisoners as an end to torture is an accepted fact. As one Vietnam veteran has publically stated, "...Prisoners I treated this way (tortured) were executed at the end because there was no way that we could take them into any medical aid and say, 'This dude fell down some steps or something...' (John Drolshagen, former member of the 635th Military Intelligence Detachment, Vietnam)

In addition, interrogation often took the form of "airborne sessions." Congress has taken testimony from former US Intelligence personnel who witnessed this technique and the resultant deaths of detainees who were flung from helicopters in an attempt to intimidate other detainees to produce desired information.

These descriptions do not constitute a full documentation of the torture techniques used in South Vietnam. Other forms of torture are devised and refined on a daily basis, restricted only by the number of victims with which to experiment. The accounts of prisoners released from GVN prisons shows that often US personnel were present or directed the torture.

SOURCES: The documentation of the use of torture by both the US and GVN forces can be found in many sources. The information used in this instance has come from: *Congressional Record*, March 1, 1971, remarks by Cong. Ronald Dellums; *Congressional Record*, April 6 & 7, 1971, extension of remarks by Sen. Mark Hatfield; *Report of the US Mission on Repression in South Vietnam*, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Nyack, NY, 1971; *The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam*, Vintage Press, 1972; *The Winter Soldier Investigation*, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Beacon Press, 1972; *Saigon, USA*, Alfred Hassler, Robert Baron, 1970; *Hos-tages of War*, Don Luce and Holmes Brown, Indochina Resource Center, 1973; and various press reports on file with CARIC.



The "rope trick" (as described by American POW's) has been applied to this man by GVN soldiers. After this photo was taken, he and 8 others were executed without trial. Photo by Doug Hostetter.

ter was unable, due to other duties, to devote full time to the program although he did appoint several Regional Deputies who would influence pacification for many more years including John Paul Vann, the controversial former MACV advisor who would become the highest ranking US civilian killed in the war.

But the rivalries between the different US agencies were too strong for OCO to accomplish much. At another Presidential conference, in Guam in March of 1967, the President scrapped OCO and then reorganized the US Mission. Ellsworth Bunker was appointed Ambassador. General Westmoreland was replaced by General Creighton Abrams and Komer was sent to Saigon to take charge of the reorgan-

ization of OCO into the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) which was placed under MACV with Komer as its first director.

CORDS would continue until the cease fire to be the guiding agency with in the US Mission dealing with pacification and thus, although it was officially under MACV, its importance was equal to that of the military. In fact, pacification would often be the sole justification for many of the ground operations of MACV over the next years of the American involvement in Vietnam.

Komer introduced the computer to pacification and established many automatic data processing (ADP) programs for CORDS. One of these ADP programs was the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) which listed each populated area and evaluated

its relative degree of control by the GVN or the NLF. The HES figures always over-estimated the strength of GVN control which led to criticism of the program and of Komer from the US agencies, who believed that statistics are not meaningful measures of political attitudes. Komer also instituted ADP programs for national census.

The census which would be called the Family Census Program registered all pertinent data on members of a particular family. A group photo of the entire family was placed in the census dossier. US advisors emphasized that it was vitally important for the NP to obtain information concerning families since "This can be useful in exploiting family sentiment to obtain his arrest..."

Almost every aspect of Vietnamese life would eventually be programmed into the US computers. The overall program would eventually be called the Resources Control Program (RCP). The program was designed to "regulate the movement of people and goods" and "restrict the flow of information and supplies." The RCP was made available to all GVN and US agencies participating in pacification.

One of the sub-programs under the RCP would become the National Identification Registration Program (NIRP) which aimed to register and identify everyone over 15 years of age. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation loaned men and equipment to operate the NIRP. In every person's dossier in the data bank was a photograph, fingerprints of both hands, a description of the person and biographic data including political opinions, personal feelings

about the GVN cadres, wealth, family status and any hearsay or reputation offered by friends, relatives or informers. The NIRP succeeded in registering nearly everyone in south Vietnam except the NLF, who eluded the census takers.

Pacification or Revolutionary Development became the leading edge of pacification efforts and expanded the control of the GVN. The first efforts of RD were designed to establish economic development as well as involve more hamlets in the GVN. The program relied more and more on technology and the pre-

sence of US troops which further separated the Saigon government from the rural communities.

During this period the NP were reorganized by CORDS advisors. Eventually under the Thieu regime the NP would become the primary operational arm of pacification. A school was established near the Vietnamese resort of Vung Tau and designated the National Training Center. Here Vietnamese in the NP were trained by US advisors in the techniques of counter-insurgency including electronic bugging techniques, interrogation including torture, infiltration and assassination. The courses were thinly disguised in the Public Safety rhetoric of "law and order" long since established in the pacification effort in Vietnam.

The Directorate General of the NP was established on June 27, 1962, uniting representatives of the various police agencies into one single governing body for police efforts and was placed under the Ministry of the Interior of the GVN. From a force level of 22,000 in mid-1964 the NP jumped to 94,000 by the end of 1968, and would climb to over 120,000 by 1972.


Each Corps Tactical Zone, the military regions of south Vietnam, were assigned a police directorate and police were placed at every level in the provinces. In Saigon, a Metropolitan Police Directorate was formed and assigned much the same duties as the NP in the provinces. The influx of millions of refugees into Saigon during the next years severely taxed the SMPD and added to the ineffectiveness in maintaining law and order; they had to be supported many times by the ARVN.

In addition to the regular police, who were called "White Mice" by the US troops, the Marine Police and the National Police Field Force (NPFF) were formed. The Marine Police were assigned pacification duties along the rivers and streams, primarily in the delta. The NPFF became a paramilitary force primarily assigned to eliminating the NLF political structure in the rural area. The NPFF would number over 25,000 by 1972. The NPFF like all branches of the NP was under operational control by CORDS.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATIONAL POLICE OF VIETNAM

This is the GVN's chart of their National Police, in the early months of Phoenix computerization.

CARIC



CORDS advisors created another directorate within the NP, the Special Police branch, responsible for eliminating NLF cadre and repressing all forms of dissent in south Vietnam. They are well known for their practices of infiltrating opposition political groups and torturing arrested suspects.

RD as conceived by the US and programmed for implementation by the GVN differed little from the earlier Strategic Hamlet Program. The main differences being that RD had the use of more troops, more planning, more coordination, more support and more money than any of the earlier efforts. But RD, like the programs before it, failed. When the NLF launched their Tet offensive in 1968, the US and GVN were forced to divert all their pacification resources to recovery of lost positions and the RD program came to an end.

In 1969, under the Thieu regime, a new plan for pacification was launched that was of course quite similar to previous attempts, except that by now pacification was considered an art and both the US and the GVN had many experts on the subject. However, many of these experts were military men who kept the same anti-political bias that helped destroy the programs of earlier years. This along with the ever-increasing corruption in the Saigon government, predetermined the ultimate failure of all pacification efforts.

The 1969 program called for eight different programs all incorporating the different attempts made in the past. The first step was to provide territorial security. This involved the military occupation activities of the RVNAF, the NP, the RD cadres, the People's Self Defense Force, and the FWMAF composed of the troops of the US and its allies.

The second part of the program involved the establishing of local government in the villages. This activity was organized by the RD cadre. The third part of the program, organizing People's Self Defense Forces was also the responsibility of the RD cadre.

The fourth program was the "Chieu Hoi" or Open Arms program which invited elements of the NLF to defect to the GVN. Hoi Chanh or "ralliers" were processed at Chieu Hoi Centers in each province

under the guidance of the CORDS Chieu Hoi Directorate. The Hoi Chanh after being processed, interrogated, and politically indoctrinated were either given vocational training, or immediately transferred to either civilian employment, the ARVN, the Kit Carson Scout program or formed into Armed Propaganda Teams. The APT's were charged with bringing in more Hoi Chanh and worked under the PSYOPS (psychological operations) committees in each province.

The 1969 Pacification Campaign also called for the intensification of propaganda on all levels and the stimulation of the rural economy. The biggest problem of the campaign was the number of refugees which were increasing due to the increased use of American air power and the reduction of these refugees was of prime concern to the GVN.

The final program of the 1969 campaign called for the elimination of the VCI. The program became known as Phung Hoang or Phoenix. During the earlier Strategic Hamlet program each province was given a different codename for pacification efforts. In Quang Nai province, south of Da Nang, the program was called Phung Hoang or Royal Phoenix. The name would eventually become the name for the overall effort to eliminate the VCI.

Phoenix became official in June, 1968, but actually this is just the date the program was fed into the computers. Phoenix had been operating country-wide for some time before this computerization. When all other pacification programs were failing, the US Mission escalated the tactics of pacification to total war on the NLF infrastructure. This came to involve mass imprisonment, torture and assassination.

In each province the Province Chief established a Province Phung Hoang Committee or Province Security Committee (PSC). The committee had the power of life and death over everyone in the province. The PSC controlled the NPFF and the SP who maintained Province Interrogation Centers (PIC's) where interrogation came to mean torture. The PSC also control the RD cadre, the PSDF, the APT's the RF/PF and the Province Reconnaissance Units (PRU's). The Phung Hoang Committee also maintains the PIOCC's and the DIOCC's which keep all the dossiers on

individuals in Vietnam. The DIOCC's are actually the operational centers for many Phoenix operations.

In every province and in every district the GVN Phung Hoang structure was paralleled by an US Phoenix structure. Before 1970, the CORDS directorate was dominated by the CIA but as the military gained more control over pacification the program came to be operated by Military Intelligence of the US Army. The Phoenix coordinators made up a part of the Advisory Teams in every province and district and came to be such a special function that the Army created a Phoenix Career Program to hold on to experienced Phoenix operatives.

By 1972, even Phoenix was failing to achieve the goals of pacification. The program was corrupted into a mass terrorist program highly comparable to the mass terrorist campaign conducted by the German Third Reich against dissenters and minority groups.

When the NLF launched their successful offensive in October of 1972, they dismantled all of the US pacification efforts in the rural countryside and forced the US to sign the cease fire and withdraw US ground forces from Vietnam.

After the cease-fire, pacification continued, however. COROS was redesignated the Redevelopment and Relocation Program and is operated by the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations, George O. Jacobson who will work under the new Ambassador Graham Martin when Bunker leaves. This post of SAAFFO will continue to advise the Phoenix program which has been renamed F-6. Although many former CORDS advisors are staying on in Vietnam - including Jacobson who was the former Deputy COMUSMACV for CORDS - most agencies of the US government are shying away from SAAFFO and F-6 due to the stigma of the Phoenix assassination program. Many more former Viet Nam "hands" are convinced that pacification is doomed in Vietnam and that the GVN will collapse and that the PRG will ascend to power in Saigon. In the mean time the Thieu regime is continuing the program of mass arrest, torture and assassination begun under Phoenix with the aid of the new SAAFFO.

Of course any examination of a tax-supported public program must include a close look at not only the laws and directives which constitute the authority for its execution, but also as close a look as can be had at how these regulations are actually carried out "in the field". Throughout the history of US involvement in Vietnam, one of the main weaknesses in checking the growth of ill-conceived policies has been the inability or unwillingness of those charged with investigating or reporting -- be they Congressional or press -- to find mobility beyond Saigon. This remains as large a problem today as it was five years ago. However, due to the fact that the Phoenix program -- officially presented as a responsible public safety program -- has been and remains a systematic murder program, much more information has come to light on it and its successor program "F-6" than would have if these had not become indiscriminate. Over the last five years, enough honest people have been sufficiently repulsed with what they saw in Phoenix and now F-6 as to have retained enough documentation for an in-depth study of what the US has spent billions of dollars to conceive, execute in the name of public safety, and then deny in the name of national security.

FROM PHUNG HOANG TO PHOENIX

Prior to the spring of 1968, US advisors had been working hard with their GVN counterparts to establish a list of those who were active with the NLF and who were vulnerable to assassination. The thought was to make their elimination as visible as possible to the general population and therefore create a popular feeling of ubiquity by the Saigon government. The symbol chosen for the Phung Hoang program -- translated "royal phoenix" -- was the mythological phoenix bird, designed to convey the psychological warfare message that the Saigon government was all-present. This sad practice of intimidation by proxy, while it probably looked good on paper at the US embassy and the presidential palace, had the counterproductive effect in the provinces of instilling fear and hate for the GVN in the hearts and minds

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAW)

He stated this group did not have permanent office space at the Democratic National Headquarters and has no idea where Mr. McCord got this bit of information. He stated this "Vets for McGovern" group was operating out of McGovern campaign headquarters located at approximately 19th and K Street, N.W., WDC. This group did, however, have access to certain facilities located at the Democratic National Headquarters, such as the leased telephone lines and use of mimeograph machines and on several occasions members of the "Vets for McGovern" group would walk down to Democratic National Headquarters, located in the Watergate Building, and use these facilities. Source stated that to the best of his knowledge, there was no veteran group permanently assigned office space in the Democratic National Headquarters located in the Watergate Building.

Source further stated that it is more than coincidence that shortly after the exposure of the Watergate break-in and just before the Republican Convention was opened in Miami, Florida, that eight VVAW members were arrested in Florida and charged with conspiracy to disrupt the Republican Convention. He stated VVAW now feels that the arrest of these eight veterans, including Scott Camil, was a political reprisal by the Republicans to justify the "bugging" of the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate Building.

Source stated that if the American people could be shown that those VVAW members arrested in Miami and charged with conspiracy to disrupt the Republican Convention were from the same veterans organization that was using the facilities of the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate Building, than it would help to justify the break-in at Watergate.

Source advised that VVAW will now "take the televised hearings on the Watergate break-in and run with them." He stated what he meant by this is that the defense for Scott Camil and the others arrested in Miami would now attempt to show these arrests had been politically motivated and then proceed on the basis of this to have the case against these veterans thrown out of court.

This document contains neither
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distributed outside your agency.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

St. Louis, Missouri

May 22, 1973

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW),
ALSO KNOWN AS VETERANS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
ABBREVIATED SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
CHARACTERIZATION
BUREAU FILE 100-455107
ST. LOUIS FILE 100-21603

A source advised Veterans for Peace was first organized in June of 1969, to attract veterans of all ages to the anti-war movement. Due to lack of ability to recruit members, the organization was dissolved in January of 1970. The group was reorganized in October of 1970 and has continued to function as an anti-war organization since that time. From June, 1969 to January, 1970, organization was under partial control and influence of members of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party. Since its reorganization in October, 1970, these organizations have had no influence in the group's activities.

A second source advised that during 1971 this group affiliated with the national organization, Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). St. Louis members have attended national VVAW meetings and subsequently, changed the name of the St. Louis organization to Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/24/95 BY SP6BJA/KD

Sources: Former [REDACTED]

b2, b7D

*Do not use
See revised &
approved characterization*

APPROVED _____
Date _____

54 AUG 2 1973

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

St. Louis, Missouri

May 22, 1973

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW),
ALSO KNOWN AS ST. LOUIS VETERANS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
CHARACTERIZATION (ANTI-WAR)
BUREAU FILE 100-455107
ST. LOUIS FILE 100-21603

A source advised in June of 1969 that captioned organization had been formed to attract veterans of all ages who were opposed to the Vietnam War. According to the source, from June, 1969 to January, 1970, the organization was under partial control and influence of members of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party. In January, 1970, source advised that the organization was dissolved due to its lack of ability to recruit members. The group was reorganized in October of 1970 and has continued to function strictly as an anti-war organization since that time. Since the reorganization the group has not been controlled or influenced by the above-mentioned groups.

During April of 1971, the captioned organization published the following statement of its history, plans and purposes:

The St. Louis Veterans for Peace was organized in mid-1969 by honorably discharged veterans who believed the Vietnam War was in fundamental disagreement with the American democratic ideals. Since then, the group has grown to approximately 60 members, more than half of them Vietnam Veterans.

The group has or plans to take part in traditional veterans activities, such as patriotic parades, work in hospitals and veterans benefits, but has a special purpose.

Mail Room ☒

APPROVED

Date

See 54 AUG 6d 1973

Approved Characterization

TD-117

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW),
ALSO KNOWN AS ST. LOUIS VETERANS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION
CHARACTERIZATION (ANTI-WAR)
BUREAU FILE 100-455107
ST. LOUIS FILE 100-21603

to work for peace. Thus, the group is especially concerned with civil rights for minority groups in the United States and the extravagant power of the U. S. military industrial complex at the expense of the common good.

A second source advised that during 1971, this group affiliated with one national organization, Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). St. Louis members have attended National VVAW meetings and have been leaders in local St. Louis area anti-war demonstrations, and subsequently, changed the name of the St. Louis organization to Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

Sources: ~~FOUO~~ [REDACTED]

b2, b7D

FBI

Date: 5/25/73

ESM
JMITransmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

FROM: SAC, LITTLE ROCK (100-4158) (P)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
SM - VVAW

b7C
Re Little Rock report of [redacted] aka [redacted]
5/14/73, entitled, [redacted] SM - RA; VVAW, OO: LITTLE ROCK," (no copy to
Jacksonville), and Kansas City letter to Newark, 5/21/73,
entitled, "NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, LAS PLACITAS,
NEW MEXICO, 4/19-23/73, IS - RA."

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies and for
Jacksonville one copy of referenced Kansas City letter.

LEADS:NEWARK DIVISIONAT PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Will verify residence of [redacted] at [redacted] Road,
Princeton, New Jersey, but do not attempt to interview until
advised to do so by Bureau.

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
1 - Jacksonville (100-1745) (Enc. 1) (Info)
2 - Newark (100-53565)
3 - Little Rock
(2 - 100-4158)
(1 - 100-4407)

RJOC/ssc
(8)

REC-12

EX-112

MAY 28 1973

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DATE 7/24/95 BY SP6 BJS/ML

Approved

57 JUN 7 1973

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

SAC, NEWARK

5/21/73

b7D

SAC [REDACTED]

P

NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING
LAS PLACITAS, NEW MEXICO
4/19-23/73
IS - RA

The following is being provided for information
of receiving offices:

b2.b7D

[REDACTED] who recently attended captioned
meeting, advised that [REDACTED] a [REDACTED]
of SCOTT CAMIL, [REDACTED] attended the captioned
meeting. Source noted that [REDACTED]

b7C

b7D

indicated [REDACTED] resides in [REDACTED] but was representing
the [REDACTED]

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/24/95 BY SP6BJA

2 - Newark (RM)
② - Little Rock (RM)
3 - Kansas City (2)
CM:cd (1)
(7)

b2
b7D

100-442-3111
[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 1 1973

TELETYPE

NR 618 LA CODE

524PM 5/25/73 LDM

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

CHICAGO

FROM LOS ANGELES (173-77753)

b7C

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR - UNITED SOLDIER ORGANIZATION,
IS - EA, OO: CHICAGO.

b7C

INSTANT DATE SOURCES WHO HAVE FURNISHED RELIABLE
INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT [REDACTED]
DEPARTED [REDACTED] THIS DATE ON AN AIRLINE FLIGHT
BOUND FOR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] WILL BE ATTENDING
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AMNESTY TO BE HELD
MAY 26-28, 1973.

b7C

REC-3

29/8

[REDACTED] IS DESCRIBED AS CAUCASIAN, MALE, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], [REDACTED] BORN [REDACTED] IS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OF THE [REDACTED] CHAPTER OF THE VIETNAM
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR.

b7C

END PAGE ONE

18 MAY 31 1973

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DATE 3/24/95 BY SP6 BJA/LWS

5

b7C

70 JUN 6 1973

540

LA 100-77723

PAGE TWO

ADMINISTRATIVE

THE SOURCES WHO HAVE FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN THE PAST ARE:

[REDACTED]

b2, b7D

[REDACTED]

END

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: April 18, 1973

FROM : LEGAT, TOKYO

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)

IS - EVACT

(BUfile 100-448092)

(TOKfile 100-1005)

SM - RA

(PKfile 100-1137)

SM - RA

(TOKfile 100-1138)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASS. & EXT. BY: 3908 DAK/mk

REASON: FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2 3,1

DATE OF REVIEW: 4/18-2003

add category 1 - 10320 PWH/et

9-5-80

(P)

(P)

(P)

Re: Chicago letter to Bureau 4/3/73.

Enclosed for information of the Bureau and Chicago are the following:

- 1) Six copies of report by 500th MI Group, 3/27/73, re VVAW
- 2) Six copies of report by U.S. Naval Investigative Service, 3/20/73, re [redacted] and [redacted] b7C
- 3) [redacted]
- 4) [redacted]

The Bureau has already received items 3 and 4.

- 7 - Bureau (Enc. 18)
- 2 - Chicago (65-5431)
- 1 - Foreign Liaison Desk
- 3 - Tokyo (1 - 100-1005; 1 - 100-1137; 1 - 100-1138)

RNB:lmg

JUN 19 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



MARCH 1st. BIKINI-DAY FUJI ACTION.
JAPAN COUNCIL AGAINST A & H BOMBS

Brothers at Fuji-base,

GENSUIKYO and V.V.A.W. are here to support you
at Fuji-base.

March 1st Bikini-day is a very memorable day for the Japanese. I think you know, 19 years ago, the U.S. Military tested a tremendously dirty and powerful blow of an Hydrogen Bomb over the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific.

The 5th Lucky Dragon, a tuna-bonito-fishery boat on which 23 fishermen were boarded, and one of them, Aikichi Kuboyama, the wireless operator died of the nuclear fall-out caused by the H-Bomb test.

The test was conducted by the U.S. Military to intimidate the rising people in Indochina at the moment when the French troupes were sieged around Dien Bien Phu. Since then, the U.S. began to be involved in the war in Vietnam.

This demonstration is being held in connection with the 19th Anniversary of the H-Bomb disaster Bikini-day National Convention held in Shizuoka city yesterday for 1973.

We ask you to support the following demands:-

Peace now around Mt. Fuji!

U.S. Military return Fuji-base at once!

Demand all the U.S. bases in Japan be wound down immediately!

Demand the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty be abrogated!

Join the G.I. Movement!

We support your struggle to return home as soon as possible!

We support your struggle for your freedom of expression against the War and stationing abroad!

United, we will win!

Yours in solidarity,

Japan Council Against A & H Bombs

Vietnam Veterans Against the War

Office : 6-19-23, Shimbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo

Telephone : (03)-436-3205.

7CH (4)

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXXFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

14

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- ☒ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552Section 552a☒ (b)(1)☐ (b)(7)(A)☐ (d)(5)☐ (b)(2)☐ (b)(7)(B)☐ (j)(2)☐ (b)(3)☐ (b)(7)(C)☐ (k)(1)☐ (b)(7)(D)☐ (k)(2)☐ (b)(7)(E)☐ (k)(3)☐ (b)(7)(F)☐ (k)(4)☐ (b)(4)☐ (b)(8)☐ (k)(5)☐ (b)(5)☐ (b)(9)☐ (k)(6)☐ (b)(6)☐ (k)(7)

- ☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.
- ☐ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.

Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of _____

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): _____

- ☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

100-448092-~~291~~ 2919

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/4/73

FROM : *ae* LEGAT, TOKYO

SUBJECT: PACIFIC COUNSELING SERVICE (PCS)
SM - RA
BUfile 14-3079
TOKfile 100-731

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
IS - RA
BUfile 100-448092
TOKfile 100-1005

b7C
BUfile 100-474183
TOKfile 100-1012

BUfile 100-471070
TOKfile 100-1029
SFfile 100-73766

Enclosed for the information of the Bureau and San Francisco are 6 copies of a report by US Naval Investigations Service dated 5/23/73.

- 1 cc each 932D*
ENCLOSURE
- 7- Bureau (Encls. 6)
 - (2- San Francisco)
 - (1- Foreign Liaison Unit)
 - 4- Tokyo
 - (1- 100-731) (1-100-1005) (1- 100-1012) (1- 100-1012)

RNB:RAR
(11)

ENCLOSURE

Copy to

by *6/7/73*

by *6/7/73*

NOT RECORDED

25 JUN 14 1973

55 JUN 19 1973

ET JUN 6 1973

FILE

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXXFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

- ☐ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552Section 552a☐ (b)(1)☐ (b)(7)(A)☐ (d)(5)☐ (b)(2)☐ (b)(7)(B)☐ (j)(2)☐ (b)(3)☐ (b)(7)(C)☐ (k)(1)☐ (b)(7)(D)☐ (k)(2)☐ (b)(7)(E)☐ (k)(3)☐ (b)(7)(F)☐ (k)(4)☐ (b)(4)☐ (b)(8)☐ (k)(5)☐ (b)(5)☐ (b)(9)☐ (k)(6)☐ (b)(6)☐ (k)(7)

- ☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to the subject of your request or the subject of your request is listed in the title only.

4 pgs
☒ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

X
Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld inasmuch as a final release determination has not been made. You will be advised as to the disposition at a later date.


Pages were not considered for release as they are duplicative of _____

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): _____

- ☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

100-448092 - not recorded serial dated 5-23/73

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X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X for this page X
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XXXXXX



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Acting Director, FBI (100-448092) DATE: 5/29/73

FROM : SAC, MOBILE (100-2408) (P)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
IS - RA
(OO: CHICAGO)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCY
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) BY

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-7H/gab/med/ala
DECLASS. AUTHORITY 25X, 2.2

COMP 455704 5/29/93

Chicago airtel to Bureau with LHM dated 1/22/73 and New York airtel to Bureau with LHM dated 2/12/73 set forth information concerning VVAW program "Operation County Fair," a program to provide medical aid for the people of Boca Chita, Alabama, and to establish a permanent clinic within the community as a non-profit volunteer organization. (S) U

Chicago FD-306 dated 4/26/73 contained report of [redacted] which set forth on page 12 a listing of VVAW project offices, including "Operation County Fair, c/o [redacted] 314 16th Street, East, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 34501 (205) 345-6773." (S) U

Albuquerque airtel to Bureau with LHM dated 5/18/73 set forth a list of persons attending the National Steering Committee Conference at Placitas, New Mexico, 4/19-22/73, including one [redacted] Bogue Chitto, Alabama. For the information of the Bureau and auxiliary offices, information is being set forth concerning [redacted] and his [redacted] project in [redacted] details concerning him have been and are currently reported to the Bureau in file entitled [redacted] aka [redacted] MoFile [redacted], Bureau File [redacted] (S) U

It is noted that the information being set forth below reflects there is no clinic under construction at [redacted] site in Boca Chitto, Dallas County, Alabama, at this time. [redacted] Negro male, born [redacted] 35, in [redacted], came to Dallas County, Alabama, in [redacted] of 19[redacted] with his white [redacted] and publicly stated they were in the process of [redacted] U

- 2 - Bureau
- 1 - Each Office
- 2 - Mobile (1 - 100-2408) (1 - 157-2757)

JTB:mb
(62)



5010-108-02

4 JUN 15 1973 12 1873

17 JUN 4 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 9788 RSL/mbk
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/29/73
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-28-95 BY 1586/SP/ML

3920

constructing a "Love City" on land which had been owned by a local Negro female who donated ten acres to [redacted] for this project. [redacted] also referred to "Love City" as "Resurrection City," and the ten acres on which he lives is located in Bogue Chitto Community in Dallas County, near Selma, Alabama. u

b7C Since 1968, sources have reported that [redacted] has not been successful in building any type community in Bogue Chitto. He has corresponded with various New Left and black extremist groups in efforts to solicit contributions but has been unable to gain any appreciable support. He has also advertised in various Left Wing publications. [redacted] farm is located on very unproductive land and he has been unable to grow enough food on the land to support his family. u

On 2/21/73, [redacted] (Urban) advised that [redacted] had fostered a plan whereby members of VVAW were to come to Bogue Chitto and build a People's Clinic. Source reported that one white male, a member of VVAW, had been to Bogue Chitto and [redacted] had claimed that the whole group would come to the community around Easter, 1973, to build a clinic. u

b2, b7D [redacted] (Prob) advised on 2/22/73 that [redacted] was getting no support locally for his efforts to build a clinic for the poor people in that area and it was believed this program, like other programs [redacted] has fostered in the past, will fail due to no substantial local support and his misrepresentations as to his farm and facilities. u

On 4/5/73, a Special Agent of the FBI observed [redacted] residence at Love City and noted the only persons there were [redacted] his wife, [redacted]; and three children, and an unidentified white male. Agent noted no activity at this location and no construction was going on. u

On this same date, Sheriff J. WILSON BAKER, Dallas County, Alabama, advised he had determined there was no activity being undertaken at Bogue Chitto with reference to the project of VVAW to build a clinic. u

Contact with sources will be maintained in the future relating to the activities of [redacted] u

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)
(70-58411)-

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-15819) (RUC)
(70-5832) (P)

DATE: May 21, 1973

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION, (WSO)
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
OO:CHICAGO

WOUNDED KNEE
OO:MINNEAPOLIS

Re Chicago teletype to Bureau dated 4/26/73,
captioned "VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)/WINTER
SOLDIER ORGANIZATION. IS-RA."

On 5/17/73, [REDACTED] advised he knows
of no one by the name [REDACTED] who is an American Indian associa
with the VVAW/WSO. Source is confident that if such an
individual were associated with VVAW in Minnesota, he would
be aware of her identity.

For information of Pine Ridge, it is noted that in
retel it is reported that at the VVAW/WSO National Steering
Committee Meeting 4/19-23/73 at Placitas, New Mexico, an
individual named AMI (LNU), American Indian, claimed she
departed Wounded Knee 4/20/73, reported 200 adult Indians,
11 white (five VVAW members), and two blacks were in Wounded
Knee and in need of supplies. She stated most of American
Indian Movement (AIM) non-Indian support has come through
VVAW and Black Panther Party (BPP).

REC-76

100-448092-2921

MAY 25 1973

- 3 - Bureau (70-58411) (RM)
(1-100-448092)
- 2 - Chicago (100-59772) (RM)
- 4 - Minneapolis (70-6832)
- 3 - Pine Ridge CP
(1-100-15819)

PBC:11
(9)

EXP-PROC

Unrecorded Copy Filed in

HP 70-6832

LEAD

MINNEAPOLIS

AT PINE RIDGE, SOUTH DAKOTA

Will attempt to identify AEM (LNU). (Retel has been furnished Pine Ridge Cp).

b7C

UNIT 3

PERSONAL ATTENTION

**VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/27/95 BY SP6BJA/KA

20

Referenced communications have been reviewed by Headquarters and all facts known to date thoroughly discussed with Departmental Attorney handling forthcoming trial involving Scott Camil and other VVAW leaders at Gainesville, Florida. Departmental Attorney has instructed that enclosed film must be turned over to local authorities with whom burglary report was made, as detailed in referenced communications. Further, Departmental Attorney instructed that ~~_____~~ be urged to voluntarily accompany Bureau Agent when this film is turned over to local authorities and he should explain circumstances and his motivation for procuring the film.

W
~~up~~

717737

CAF
62

b1D

MAILED 21
JUN - 5 1973
FBI - DE

EX-112

16/00 - 448092 - 2932

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S.
years _____
Munson _____
ers _____
ons _____

JUN 5 1958
 RUS 79 RCP

6TD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 011 CODE

MAY 30 1973

5:40 PM 5/30/73 NITEL JAW

TELETYPE

TO ACTING DIRECTOR (ATTN: INTD)
SPRINGFIELD

FROM [REDACTED] P

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR TRIP TO CAIRO, ILLINOIS,
6/16-17/73. OO SPRINGFIELD.

A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN
THE PAST ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] CHAPTER PRESIDENT OF THE
[REDACTED] VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW), INDICATED
THAT A CAIRO SOLIDARITY MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE WEEKEND
6/16 AND 6/17/73. [REDACTED] PERSONS FROM THROUGHOUT

THE COUNTRY WOULD BE PRESENT INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE (SCLC). [REDACTED] ANNOUNCED THAT THE [REDACTED] VVAW
CHAPTER AS WELL AS OTHER MIDWEST REGION CHAPTERS, WOULD ALSO
SEND REPRESENTATIVES. THE [REDACTED] CHAPTER PLANS TO
SEND [REDACTED] THOSE PLANNING
TO ATTEND FROM [REDACTED] ARE [REDACTED]

END PAGE 1

67 JUN 12 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/24/95 BY SP6 BJA/VA

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Baker	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Gebhardt	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, E.S.	_____
Mr. Severs	_____
Mr. Thompson	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Baise	_____
Mr. Barnes	_____
Mr. Lowery	_____
Mr. Herington	_____
Mr. Cooney	_____
Mr. Mintz	_____
Mr. Eardley	_____
Mrs. Hogan	_____

KC 100-15762

PAGE 2

SOURCE INDICATED THAT HE IS NOT AWARE OF ANY WEAPONS BEING TRANSPORTED NOR OF ANY INTENT TO FOMENT VIOLENCE IN CAIRO BY ANY PERSONS PRESENT.

VVAW WAS FOUNDED IN THE SPRING 1967 BY YOUNG VIETNAM VETERANS IN NEW YORK CITY. VVAW MEMBERS HAVE LED PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

BPP IS A BLACK EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION THAT HAS ADVOCATED THE USE OF GUNS AND GUERRILLA TACTICS TO OVERTHROW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

b2. b7D b1

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS [REDACTED]

FOR INFORMATION BUREAU, SOURCE HAS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WITH VVAW [REDACTED] SOURCE WILL USE HIS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO MAKE THE TRIP. AS SUCH, BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO AUTHORIZE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EXPENSES ARE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: TRANSPORTATION

END PAGE 2

MC 100-15762

PAGE 3

[REDACTED]
AND LODGING [REDACTED]

END.

DSS FBI WA DC FOR TWO CLR

FOOD

b7D

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

TO SAC [REDACTED]

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR FBI (100-448092)

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVW) - [REDACTED]

REBUTELCALL 6/6/73 RPT 6/6/73.

CONCERNING QUESTIONS AS TO OBTAINING SIGNED STATEMENT FROM [REDACTED]

FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ARE FURNISHED.

[REDACTED] DOES NOT APPLY [REDACTED] HOWEVER,

BECAUSE OF HIS PAST CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH FBI, HE SHOULD BE GIVEN FIRST [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OBTAINING SIGNED STATEMENT NOT ESSENTIAL IF AGENTS OTHER THAN SA [REDACTED] CONDUCTED INITIAL INQUIRY WHICH FORMS BASIS FOR FD-302 RPT FD-302 AND INFORMANT HAS ASSURED THAT ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM WAS FURNISHED. IF THESE CONDITIONS NOT MET, [REDACTED] IS TO BE REINTERVIEWED BY AGENTS OTHER THAN SA [REDACTED] AND, IF PRACTICAL, SIGNED STATEMENT OBTAINED.

RLP:mjg
(6)

REC-10 100-448092 29241
PAGE TWO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 7 1973

JUN 6 1973

TELETYPE

EX-117
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/95 BY SP6/SP7/SP8

JUN 12 1973 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

TELETYPE TO JACKSONVILLE
RE: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW)
100-448092

b7C

CONCERNING AFFIDAVIT FROM SA [REDACTED] NORMAL AFFIDAVIT FORMAT IS ACCEPTABLE; HOWEVER, HE SHOULD BE AWARE OF POSSIBLE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES AND GENERAL STATEMENT ALONG THAT LINE MAY BE UTILIZED AT BEGINNING OF AFFIDAVIT.

YOU SHOULD REVIEW BURDEAU VS. MC DOWELL, CIT. 256 RPT 256 US 465 RPT 465, 1921 RPT 1921, AS BEING RELEVANT TO THIS MATTER.

NOTE:

b7C

b2b7D [REDACTED] memorandum dated 6/5/73 set forth in detail developments concerning the reported im-

b7C [REDACTED] When facts were made available to Headquarters, we immediately made facts available to the Department. As result of contact with the Department, instructions were issued to take affidavits from Bureau Agents involved, obtain signed statement from informant and one other individual involved and [REDACTED] by Bureau Agent to Sheriff's Office and attempt to convince informant to accompany the Agent voluntarily and explain circumstances. SAC, Jacksonville, has raised certain questions concerning mechanics and ramifications of taking signed statements and affidavits from personnel involved in this matter. As result of inquiries, Office of Legal Counsel was contacted and furnished above observations. Coordinated with Inspector [REDACTED] Office of Legal Counsel. SAC [REDACTED] Jacksonville, contacted Section Chief [REDACTED], Intelligence Division.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 30 1973
TELETYPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Barker	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Gebhardt	_____
Mr. Jenkins	_____
Mr. Marshall	_____
Mr. Miller, E.S.	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Mr. Thompson	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Neffington	_____
Mr. Conmy	_____
Mr. Mintz	_____
Mr. Eardley	_____
Mrs. Hogan	_____

NR 012  CODE

5:35 PM NITEL 05-30-73 WRS

APPROPRIATE FIELD
OFFICE ROUTING SLIP



TO: ACTING DIRECTOR (ATTN: INTD)
CHICAGO

ON 6/25/73

FROM:  P 2P

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR PROPOSED ACTION AGAINST

~~WATERGATE BUGGING~~ IS VVAW. OO: KC. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE
INFORMATION IN THE PAST AND WHO IS ACQUAINTED WITH VIETNAM
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW) ACTIVITIES, ADVISED THAT
 CHAPTER PRESIDENT OF THE  VVAW, ANNOUNCED
AT A RECENT MEETING THAT TWO INDIVIDUALS REPRESENTING THE
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE VVAW, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, WERE
DISPATCHED TO WASHINGTON, D. C. TO LOBBY FOR EQUAL TIME FOR
THE VVAW BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING WATERGATE.
THE LOBBYISTS ALSO PLAN TO CONTACT CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND
REPRESENTATIVES IN ORDER TO REPUDIATE STATEMENTS BY MC CORD
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT THE BUGGING OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC

END PAGE ONE

cc-AAG Criminal Division

Attn: ☒ ISS

☒ GCS

☐ GCS

Litigation Unit

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP4 Jem/oms

REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2

DATE OF REVIEW 5/30/93

84 JUN 12 1973

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 Jem/oms

JUN 27 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NC 100-15805

PAGE TWO

HEADQUARTERS WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION
REGARDING THE VVAW, WHICH ACCORDING TO MC CORD, WAS A RADICAL
ORGANIZATION BENT UPON DESTROYING THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
CONVENTION. & u b7C

b1 [REDACTED] c
[REDACTED] c
[REDACTED] c

VVAW WAS FOUNDED IN THE SPRING 1967 BY YOUNG VIETNAM
VETERANS IN NEW YORK CITY. VVAW MEMBERS HAVE LED PUBLIC
DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

ADMINISTRATIVE. REMYTEL TO BUREAU 5/28/73.

SOURCE IS [REDACTED] & u b2, b7D

END

PLS HOLD ONE MORE

X

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 004 [REDACTED] LAIN

5:20 PM 5-23-73 NITEL LEB

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: INTD

FRDM

P 3P

TELETYPE

ASSIGNMENT AND FIELD
OFFICE ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP
ON [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. [REDACTED] _____
Mr. [REDACTED] _____
Mr. [REDACTED] _____
Mr. [REDACTED] _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Boise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Fowers _____
Mr. Ferington _____
Mr. Gandy _____
Mr. [REDACTED] _____
Mr. [REDACTED] _____
Mrs. Hagan _____

WAW PROPOSED ACTION AGAINST WATERGATE BUGGING; IS - VVAW;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN THE PAST AND WHO IS ACQUAINTED WITH VVAW ACTIVITIES FURNISHED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION DURING A REGULAR MEETING OF THE
[REDACTED] CHAPTER OF THE VVAW. [REDACTED] PRESIDENT OF THE
[REDACTED] CHAPTER, RECEIVED A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALL
FROM AN INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE VVAW NATIONAL HEAD-
QUARTERS IN NEW YORK CITY. [REDACTED] DID NOT IDENTIFY THIS
INDIVIDUAL BUT UPON COMPLETION OF THE CALL INFORMED THE MEMBER-
SHIP OF THE CONVERSATION. [REDACTED] SEEMED VERY EXCITED AT THE
TIME HE SPOKE TO THE MEMBERSHIP. [REDACTED] STATED THAT THE NATIONAL
HEADQUARTERS WAS CONTACTING VVAW NATIONWIDE CHAPTERS FOR RECEPTION OF PLANS TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE
BUGGING OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS BY THE NIXON

DECLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]
ON: 12/19/93

END PAGE ONE

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP4 JKL/MS
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5/21/93 DT 1

REC-19 100-448072-292

JUN 5 1973

b7C

84 JUN 12 1973

b7C

JUN 2 1973

5-4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KC 100- NEW

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7C
ADMINISTRATION. [REDACTED] STATED THAT THIS ACTION WAS PRECIPITATED
UPON REMARKS MADE BY JAMES MCCORD TO THE WATERGATE COMMITTEE
IN WHICH MCCORD CLAIMED THAT THE BUGGING WAS NECESSARY
BECAUSE THE REPUBLICAN PARTY RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE
VVAW WAS A RADICAL ORGANIZATION BENT UPON DESTROYING THE
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT THE
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS HAD NOT SPECIFIED THE EXACT ACTION TO
BE TAKEN BUT DID INDICATE THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN
BEFORE THE GAINESVILLE TRIAL, SO THAT THIS ACTION WOULD HAVE
AN IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC AND CREATE A STRATEGIC MANEUVER ON
BEHALF OF THE GAINESVILLE DEFENDENTS. THE NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
DID STIPULATE THAT THE NATIONWIDE ACTION WOULD BE IN THE FORM
OF REBUTTAL ACTION CONSISTING OF POSSIBLY DEMANDING EQUAL
TIME BEFORE THE WATERGATE SUBCOMMITTEE AND PICKETING AND
OTHER TYPES OF DEMONSTRATIONS TO PRESENT THE CONTENTIONS OF
THE VVAW THAT THE VVAW IS NON-VIOLENT AND IS NOT INVOLVED IN
THE SCHEME TO DESTROY THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION.
THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE PROPOSED ACTION WOULD BE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
END PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KC 100- NEW

PAGE THREE

VIOLENT IN NATURE. *4*

VVAW WAS FOUNDED IN THE SPRING, 1967, BY YOUNG VIETNAM
VETERANS IN NEW YORK CITY. VVAW MEMBERS HAVE LED PUBLIC
DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

ADMINISTRATIVE: *b2.b7D*

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS [REDACTED] *4*

[REDACTED] DIVISION WILL FOLLOW AND REPORT ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

END.

ACK FOR TWO

WAE FBIHQ CLR

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC, JACKSONVILLE (100-1745)

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (VVAW), IS - RA.

REURTEL 6/4/73 RPT 6/4/73.

REFERENCED TELETYPES SETTING FORTH DETAILS REGARDING IMPROPER

ACQUISITION OF VVAW FILM "WINTER SOLDIER INVESTIGATION" BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN APRIL, 1973 RPT 1973, HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED AT
 FBIHQ AND DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEY HANDLING
 FORTHCOMING TRIAL OF SCOTT CAMIL AND OTHER VVAW LEADERS SCHEDULED FOR
 7/17/73 RPT 7/17/73 IN GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA. PROPER COURSE FOR
 GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE AT THIS TIME ACCORDING TO DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEY
 IS TO TAKE AFFIDAVITS FROM AGENT PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER AND
 THAT SIGNED STATEMENT SHOULD BE OBTAINED FROM INFORMANT. REASONABLE
 EFFORT SHOULD BE EXPENDED TO LOCATE, INTERVIEW AND OBTAIN SIGNED
 STATEMENT FROM [REDACTED] FURTHER, APPROPRIATE LOCAL
 AUTHORITIES HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF THIS MATTER SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED.
 IF DEEMED ADVISABLE, OBTAIN SIGNED STATEMENTS FROM THEM; OTHERWISE,
 RECORD INTERVIEWS ON FD-302S RPT 302S.

1 - [REDACTED] PSI

FBS:djr

(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/19/95 BY SP6 BJA/WB SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 03 1973

TELETYPE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐TELETYPE UNIT ☒

Mr. Felt _____
 Mr. Baker _____
 Mr. Callahan _____
 Mr. Cleveland _____
 Mr. Conrad _____
 Mr. Gebhardt _____
 Mr. Jenkins _____
 Mr. Marshall _____
 Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
 Mr. Soyars _____
 Mr. Thompson _____
 Mr. Walters _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Baise _____
 Mr. Barnes _____
 Mr. Bowe _____
 Mr. Callahan _____
 Mr. Conmy _____
 Mr. Mintz _____
 Mr. Eardley _____
 Mrs. Hogan _____

JUN 6 1973

POLICE
 EMEH

RUS

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

TELETYPE TO SAC, JACKSONVILLE
RE: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAW)
100-448092

[REDACTED] YOU HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY SEPARATE
COMMUNICATION TRANSMITTING IT THAT IT SHOULD BE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE FURTHER

INSTRUCTED THAT INFORMANT SHOULD BE URGED TO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

HANDLE THIS MATTER IMMEDIATELY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] YOU SHOULD ALSO STAY ON TOP OF THIS MATTER
AND KEEP FBIHQ APPRISED OF PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS ON TIMELY BASIS.

NOTE:

Memorandum [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] dated 6/5/73
set forth details regarding [REDACTED] and another individual reportedly
taking the [REDACTED]. This was reported to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in Jacksonville and a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] When the circumstances of the
informant's coming into [REDACTED] were brought to the
attention of Headquarters [REDACTED] immediately contacted Departmental
Attorney [REDACTED] who advised he feels the above is the proper
course of action available to the Government. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

DATE: 6-6-73

FROM: *H/esb* SAC, MILWAUKEE (100-15674) (P)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSO)
IS - RA

OO: CHICAGO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/24/95 BY *SP6 BJS/ML*

Re Milwaukee letter to the Bureau, 5-21-73.

Enclosed for the Bureau and each receiving office is an excerpt from the May issue of the Milwaukee Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) newsletter which contains information regarding the Gainesville trial. This newsletter was furnished by [REDACTED] on 6-1-73.

For information, on 5-22-73 [REDACTED] advised the VVAW will protest in front of the courthouse where the Gainesville trial will be held. The protests will consist of skits and mock trials relating to the injustices of the "judicial system." Songs and poems are currently being composed by a local VVAW member to be used at these protests.

Milwaukee will continue to follow through source and report additional information.

REC-54

- 1 - Bureau (100-448092) (Enclosure) (RM)
1 - Chicago (Enc-1) (RM)
1 - Jacksonville (Enc-1) (RM)
1 - Milwaukee (100-15674)

AJE:gmp
(5)

17 JUN 8 1973



57 JUN 21 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

A NATIONAL ACTION!

Help us expose another aspect of the Nixon administration's conspiracy to silence all it's political opposition. One of the Nixon administration's tools to intimidate and silence it's opposition is the grand jury and charges of conspiracy, when, in fact, it is Nixon and his hacks conspiring to usurp power in this country and dispose of his opposition by any means possible.

We must Go to Gainesville this July 17, to focus national and international attention on the conspiracy trial of our VVAW brothers. We are forming another convoy like we did for the GOP convention last summer. We need your energies, skills (medics and mechanics especially) cars, radioa, time, bodies and hearts.

July 14 is the day set to leave. We will marshall and leave from Reservoir Park in Milwaukee. Look for details in the next newaletter. Once there, there is a large piece of private property on which to camp. Parade permits have already been obtained, medical and legal facilities have been set up, sensitivity sessions are being held with the Gainesville police; all demos will be completely legal. Demonstrations are achaduled to last about 5 days. Some suggested activities are:

- a grand jury play
- organized singing
- candlelight marches
- guerrilla theater
- people's assemblies/education around the grand jury
- Vietnamese meals
- movies and slide shows
- leafleting and speaking in the community
- communal, non-denominational services

(We also need your
help to put some
meat on these bones)

The Gainesville Defense Committee has set up some guidelines for security: Each region is responsible for having it's own contingent together; i.e. the people who go with us must have identification (we will provide IDs). You must work with us or at least be in good contact with us if you want to participate constructively in this national action to support our brothers.

Please remember that while hitler usurped and consolidated power in a democratic Germany, there were millions of oblivious people going around doing their every-day do-little things. It's not quite so easy for people who understand that a comparable situation is happening here; for with that knowledge goes the responsibility to DO something. This July, GO TO GAINESVILLE!!!!

2/24/98 - 5063g/11A

100-471012-2926

ENCLOSURE

FBI

Date: 4/24/73

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Priority)

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (65-5431) (P)

SUBJECT: STEVEN LEE HAWKINS
ESP - X
(REVACT SECTION)

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAW)
IS - RA

CLASS. & EXT. BY 7333 BAJ/gak
REASON-FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 4-24-78
added category 1-10320PWP 7-5-90

Re Columbia airtel to the Bureau, 4/18/73, captioned
"ESPIONAGE - X (VVAW.)" (u)

Enclosed for Columbia are (2) copies of an
LHM dated 4/3/73 and captioned "_____". This
LHM previously submitted to Bureau. (u)

Enclosed LHM being furnished Columbia for purpose
of background information. LHM was furnished Bureau for
referral to Legats Copenhagen and Tokyo for appropriate
investigation. (u)

The Chicago Division learned this date, 4/24/73,
from _____ confidential source that _____
no longer VVAW _____

_____ The source advised that _____

- ② - Bureau (RM)
- 2 - Columbia (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 2 - Chicago

RLN/bak
(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RECORDED
78 JUN 20 1973 11 APR 28 1973

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

CG 65-5431

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7C
Columbia note that Chicago is conducting espionage investigation concerning the activities of [REDACTED]. Information set out in enclosed LHM is for full understanding of background and basis for Chicago espionage investigation. Interview conducted with [REDACTED] should attempt to substantiate this information without disclosing Bureau awareness of same. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448092)

DATE: 6/5/73

FROM : *JTM/KAW*
SAC, SPRINGFIELD (100-13979) (C)

SUBJECT: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION (VVAW/SWO)
NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE (NSC)
MEETING PLACITAS, NEW MEXICO,
4/19-22/73
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

Re Albuquerque airtel to Bureau dated 5/18/73.

On 5/24/73 [REDACTED] Supervisor, Auto Registration Section, Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois, furnished the following information:

b7C [REDACTED] 1973 Illinois automobile license 33134 is registered to a [REDACTED] Chicago, Illinois, for a 1972 Ford van, VIN E14TH225976. Records indicate [REDACTED] acquired this vehicle on 8/28/72 from a [REDACTED] Riverside, California.

[REDACTED] advised that no record exists for a 1973 Illinois automobile license 22-555PV.

[REDACTED] further advised that 1973 Illinois automobile license 22555RV is registered to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Number 4 Juniper, Champaign, Illinois, for a 1972 Ford camper, VIN E24GHN43878. Automobile license was purchased on 6/28/73 and expires 6/30/73. b7

On 5/24/73, [REDACTED] Supervisor, Drivers License Section, Secretary of State's Office, Springfield, Illinois, furnished the following information:

b7C [REDACTED] currently in possession of Illinois Drivers License number 300-5254-8256. Records further reveal that [REDACTED] is a white male, [REDACTED] lbs., [REDACTED] eyes, [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] PO [REDACTED] Illinois. Drivers license issued 4/29/71 and expires [REDACTED]

- 1 - Bureau (100-448092) (RM) REC 17
2 - Chicago (Encl. 1) (RM)
2 - Albuquerque (100-3808) (RM)
2 - Springfield (100-13979) EX-109

LK/gll



5010-108-01

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SI 100-13979

Records reveal that [REDACTED] as of 5/10/73 is residing at Number 4, Juniper Drive, Champaign, Illinois.

[REDACTED] advised that his department has no drivers license information for a [REDACTED] Chicago, Illinois.

On 5/25/73 [REDACTED], Clerk, Department of Public Safety, Firearm Owners Identification Division, Springfield, Illinois, advised that her records indicate that [REDACTED] Chicago, Illinois, white male, [REDACTED] hair, [REDACTED] eyes, SSN [REDACTED] filed an application on 10/26/72. [REDACTED] records further indicate [REDACTED] also goes by the name of [REDACTED]

b7C
WEAVER advised that her department has no firearm owner's identification application for a [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

For information of Albuquerque, Springfield indices negative on [REDACTED] Chicago, Illinois, and on [REDACTED] Number 4, Juniper, Champaign, Illinois.

[REDACTED] identical to registered owner of 1973 Illinois automobile license 22555RV, is subject of Springfield file 100-13470. Investigation was predicated upon receipt of information on 11/15/71 from Captain JOHN WILKINSON, Champaign, Illinois Police Department, that [REDACTED] was a member of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois.

A review of [REDACTED] military record revealed that he served in the U. S. Marine Corps from 5/22/67 to 1/29/70 when he was discharged under honorable conditions and placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List. [REDACTED] served in Vietnam as a [REDACTED] in combat against the Viet Cong. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and various Vietnam [REDACTED] There were numerous [REDACTED] note in his military record.

SI 100-13979

The December, 1972, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois area Bell Telephone Directory lists [redacted] address as 4 Juniper, Champaign, Illinois, telephone [redacted]

[redacted] attended [redacted] Illinois from September, [redacted] to June, [redacted] receiving his GED in June, [redacted]

On 1/18/73 SA [redacted] utilizing a credit inquiry pretext telephoned 359-2169 (Champaign-Urbana, Illinois area). An individual identifying himself as [redacted]

Champaign, Illinois, [redacted]

Champaign, Illinois.

On 8/16/72 SA [redacted] utilizing a pretext of an interested veteran, contacted [redacted] Coordinator for the Illinois State Veterans Association, University of Illinois, Champaign. [redacted] advised that there is no organizational VVAW Chapter at the University of Illinois. [redacted] showed SA [redacted] a list of individuals who had shown interest in VVAW activities and [redacted] name was among those noted.

On 8/22/72 an Associated Press article entitled "Vets to Guardsmen. All in the same bag", appeared on page 6 of the "News Gazette" newspaper, in general circulation in the Champaign area. The article listed the names of several Vietnam War Veterans who came to Miami Beach, Florida, during the GOP convention to protest the war. Among those listed in the article was the name [redacted] of Champaign, who was characterized as a limping ex-Marine whose right leg was shattered at Khe Sanh, held together by a steel brace.

Numerous sources in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, area have been contacted, and advised that subject is not known to be presently involved in VVAW activities in the Champaign-Urbana, Illinois area.

SI 100-13979

b7C Enclosed for Chicago is copy of application number 1177533 for firearms owners identification card for [REDACTED], Chicago, Illinois, which was obtained at State of Illinois, Department of Public Safety, Firearms Owners Identification Division, Springfield, Illinois.

LEAD: CHICAGO DIVISION

AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS:

Will conduct appropriate investigation re a [REDACTED] Chicago, Illinois; registered owner of 1973 Illinois automobile registration number 3319A, for a 1972 Ford van, VIN E14TH225976.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

67D

NR006 CDDE

6:34PM NITEL 1/21/74 LSK

TO DIRECTOR (100-448092)

ATT: INTD 67D

FROM [REDACTED] (P) 2 PAGES

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/WINTER SOLDIER
ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSD); IS.

FIRST SOURCE, WHO HAS SUPPLIED RELIABLE INFO IN
PAST, ADVISED ON 1/18/ LAST, CAPTIONED ORGANIZATION HAS
SCHEDULED AN ANTI-NIXON PARADE FOR 1/26 NEXT. THE PARADE
WILL BE CONFINED TO THE MILWAUKEE EAST SIDE. THE UPCOMING
PARADE WAS DISCUSSED AT THE VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE
WAR/WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION (VVAW/WSD) NATIONAL
STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, WHICH WAS HELD IN YELLOW
SPRINGS, OHIO, FROM 12/27-31/73. IT WAS DECIDED AT
THIS MEETING NATIONAL ACTION SHOULD BE HELD ON 1/26 NEXT.
NO VIOLENCE DISCUSSED OR ANTICIPATED.

SECOND SOURCE, WHO IS IN POSITION TO OBTAIN SUCH
INFO, ADVISED INSTANT, CAPTIONED ORGANIZATION APPLIED
END PAGE ONE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Director's Sec'y	

TELETYPE

b7C

b7C

REC-84

100-114022

JAN 23 1974

g-cc to DOJ (155, 605) cleared up
by 0-6296093 7056/dgm 1/22/74
4/12/95 SP6 B. J. M. D.

JAN 23 1974

5-100

PAGE TWO

MI (100-15674)

FOR A PARADE PERMIT WHICH INDICATES PARADE WILL COMMENCE
AT 12:45 P.M., 1/26 NEXT, AND PARADE ROUTE WILL BE
CONFINED TO MILWAUKEE EAST SIDE.

THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE LISTED AS BEING SUPPORTED
BY THE PARADE:

1. IMPLEMENT THE TREATY/STOP ALL AID TO LON NOL AND
THIEU;
2. UNIVERSAL AND UNCONDITIONAL AMNESTY;
3. KICK NIXON OUT.

MIPD AND SECRET SERVICE, MILWAUKEE, ADVISED.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

62,67D

FIRST SOURCE IS [REDACTED]

SECOND SOURCE IS DETECTIVE [REDACTED] SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENT SQUAD, MIPD.

MILWAUKEE WILL FOLLOW.

END

JXS FBI HQ CLR

[REDACTED]

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

Acting Director, FBI

67C

June 7, 1973

1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)
INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

67C

This will confirm a conversation on June 4, 1973, between [redacted] of your Division and Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau at which time the following was discussed.


On June 1, 1973, an individual identifying himself as [redacted] reporter for the "Miami Herald," daily newspaper published at Miami, Florida, telephonically contacted the Jacksonville Office of this Bureau and inquired concerning [redacted]. [redacted] stated he had learned from the Office of the [redacted], Jacksonville, Florida, and was [redacted] Jacksonville VVAW coordinator, that [redacted] Jacksonville [redacted] Office of the FBI, was also contacted by [redacted] who stated that [redacted] and VVAW leader Scott Gail had told [redacted] and indicated that he was working as a Government agent.

On [redacted] attended a VVAW meeting at [redacted] furnished details concerning the meeting and told his handling agent that the [redacted] University of North Florida [redacted] Although no instructions were given to the informant, he subsequently [redacted]

RLP:mon (8)

REC-4

100-448097-293C



EX-103

SEE NOTE, PAGE THREE

EM

Cur
RLP
out

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Balise
Mr. Barnes
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Mr. Conny
Mr. Mintz

5 JUN 14 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/9/95 BY SP8/MLA

67C
mac
b7D

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

b7C
his handling agent on [redacted] and advised that he had [redacted]
[redacted] Scott Camil contacted the sheriff's office [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted]

b7D
Further, on April 10, 1978, [redacted] handling FBI Agent contacted the sheriff's office and determined that a [redacted]

On April 11, 1978, a sheriff's deputy telephoned [redacted] handler for a confirmation regarding [redacted]

According to our Jacksonville Office, [redacted] was never instructed to take any action in violation of any Federal, state or local law. [redacted]

[redacted] has also advised that an [redacted]
of his named [redacted]

In a separate but apparently related development, defense attorneys representing defendants in the Federal Antiriot laws case involving Scott Camil and other VVAW leaders charged with conspiracy to riot during the Republican National Convention, August, 1972, [redacted]

[redacted] stated that the proper course for the Government to pursue at this time would require [redacted]
from Bureau Agents [redacted]

In addition, [redacted]
and, if deemed advisable, [redacted]

Further, [redacted]
if advisable, [redacted]

[redacted] by a Bureau Agent to the Sheriff's office and every effort made to convince [redacted] to accompany the Agent voluntarily and to [redacted]
[redacted] we have issued instructions to comply with [redacted] requests.

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

NOTE:

Memorandum [redacted] to [redacted] dated
6/5/73 set forth details regarding [redacted]

[redacted] was reported to local authorities in Jacksonville and [redacted]

[redacted] were brought to the attention of Headquarters we
immediately contacted Departmental Attorney Guy L. Goodwin who
advised he feels the above is the proper course of action
available to the Government. This confirms the conversation with
Mr. Goodwin.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conny _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

TO :

Mr. [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]

DATE: 6/5/73

FROM :

[REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]

SUBJECT:

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAW)
INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

PURPOSE:

[REDACTED] recent indications that
[REDACTED] plan to introduce another [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Scott Camil and other VVAW leaders, and to outline
actions being taken to resolve this situation.

BACKGROUND:

On 6/1/73 SAC, Jacksonville, received a call from
individual identifying himself as [REDACTED] reporter "Miami
Herald," daily newspaper published at Miami, Florida.

[REDACTED] He stated he had learned from
Office of Sheriff, Jacksonville, and one [REDACTED] Jacksonville
VVAW coordinator, that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was referred to the Office of the Sheriff
for any details regarding any such [REDACTED] and no further
comment was made to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was also contacted by [REDACTED] who claimed that
a VVAW leader Scott Camil had told [REDACTED] that a VVAW
[REDACTED] and indicated that [REDACTED] was working as a [REDACTED]

100-448092

REC-93

10 JUN 11 1973

RLP:djr
(7)

CONTINUED-OVER

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b7C

Memorandum to [REDACTED]
RE: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAW)
100-448092

[REDACTED] and has since furnished valuable
information on a continuing basis concerning VVAW. On
[REDACTED] attended VVAW meeting at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] furnished
details concerning the meeting at [REDACTED] home and noted
to his handling Agent, SA [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] students at University of North Florida [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Although no instructions
were given informant [REDACTED]
to handling Agent on [REDACTED] and advised that he had
[REDACTED] contacted sheriff [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 4/10/73 SA [REDACTED]
contacted sheriff's office and determined that a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 4/11/73
a sheriff's deputy called SA [REDACTED] for confirmation
regarding status of [REDACTED] A [REDACTED] advises
informant was never instructed to take any action in
violation of any Federal, state or local law [REDACTED]

Memorandum to [REDACTED]
RE: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR (VVAW)
100-448092

Jacksonville has reviewed police report involving [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further indicates this was confirmed by the law enforcement agency and that the investigating officer suggested that the case be "exceptionally cleared."

[REDACTED] Informant further stated that an [REDACTED] of his name [REDACTED]

In a separate but apparently related move, defense attorneys representing defendants in the Antiriot Laws case involving Scott Camil and other VVAW leaders made available on 5/31/73 in Gainesville, Florida, [REDACTED]

On 6/4/73 facts and developments in this matter were discussed with Departmental Attorney Guy L. Goodwin, handling the [REDACTED] case in Gainesville, Florida. [REDACTED] stated the proper course for the Government to pursue at this point would involve taking affidavits from Bureau Agents involved in this matter and signed statement from the informant. In addition, reasonable efforts should be expended to locate and, if deemed advisable, obtain signed statement from [REDACTED]

Further, [REDACTED]

if advisable. < [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bureau Agent to sheriff's office and every effort made to convince informant to accompany the Agent voluntarily and to [REDACTED]

Instructions have been issued to Jacksonville to take action as requested by [REDACTED] Discussion with [REDACTED] being confirmed in writing by separate communication.

Memorandum to [REDACTED]
RE: VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE
WAR (VVAW)
100-448092

ACTION:

For your information. Developments in this matter being most closely followed and you will be kept fully advised. Internal administrative aspects of this matter are not being overlooked. Appropriate SAC recommendations will be obtained after requested material reviewed here.

RLP
BG
Curt

EM

OK

~~7~~ [Signature]